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Introduction
The conﬂict in Syria has displaced millions of people, and has forced 5.5 million
Syrians to ﬂee the country altogether by 2016 (International Organization for Mi-
gration, 2017). This is just the latest instance in a long series of instabilities around
the world that have pushed people out of their homes, and into new host countries.
According to the United Nations, as many as 25.9 million individuals around the
world were estimated to be refugees in 2017 (International Organization for Migra-
tion, 2017).1 With a perpetuity in frozen conﬂicts, asymmetric warfare, and failed
states (Newland, 2015), return for many of these refugees is increasingly unlikely.
Therefore, ﬁnding durable solutions for the new arrivals in the destination countries
has become critical.
Even though lessons from history (Barslund et al., 2016; Angrist and Kugler, 2003;
Harrell-Bond, 1995; Long, 2013), and much of the academic community (Aleinikoﬀ,
2015; Zimmermann, 2014; Betts and Collier, 2015; Long, 2015; Papademetriou, 2015;
Fratzscher and Junker, 2015; Legrain, 2016) insists that labour market integration is
the most appropriate response a host country can take in light of increased refugee
movements, exclusion of refugees from the labour market is still more commonplace
1In contrast to voluntary migration which usually comes about in search of better economic op-
portunities, I employ the term of forced migration to describe migration that takes place due
to push rather than pull factors. The `push' can be triggered by a number of manmade or nat-
ural causes. According to the Refugee Convention (United Nations, 1951), people ﬂeeing their
homelands in fear of persecution are entitled to international humanitarian protection. Whilst
being in the process of formalizing this humanitarian migrant status, the term `asylum seeker'
should be used. One oﬃcially becomes a `refugee' when the host country has granted asylum and
therewith granted refugee status. In regard to this study, `refugees' will be used as an overarching
generic term as recognized by the UNHCR, signifying a person in need of international protection
irrespective of whether the status has been given legally. This means that the settlement process
may still be in the early application stages and the status is unequal to native residents.
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than inclusion.2 Such labour market marginalization has led to refugees persistently
showing poorer economic outcomes than other immigrants, and remaining depen-
dent on aid for an extended period of time (Bakker et al., 2017; Bevelander, 2016;
Bauböck and Tripkovic, 2017). As emphasized in the literature reviewed in Chapter
1, the longer refugees stay out of the labour market, the more severe the negative
consequences for the host's economy, as well as for the refugees themselves.
Exclusion from the labour market can be caused by a myriad of reasons, which
can be broadly classiﬁed into micro and macro determinants. Based on refugees'
own perceptions on their economic lives and future prospects studied in Chapter 2,
the constraints and enablers to successful labour market integration relate to both,
structure (macro determinants) and agency (micro determinants).3 As a key struc-
tural constraint, the prevailing humanitarian approach to refugee protection framed
by the Refugee Convention (United Nations, 1951) and carried on by UNHCR's
proposed Global Compact on Refugees (2017), focuses by and large on repatriation,
instead of fostering settlement.4 Such an approach might provide some initial secu-
rity, but as it continues to treat refugees as a temporary presence, it fails to consider
their long-term livelihood needs.
This structural environment reinforces the image of refugees as a homogeneous
group of vulnerable people unable to act self-determinedly. Findings from the study
conducted in Kiel, Germany presented in Chapters 2 and 3, however, suggest a
substantial degree of heterogeneity amongst the refugees arriving in the latest wave.
These multiple backgrounds in regard to their human and social capital, inﬂuence
how much agency refugees exhibit, and how they react to structural constraints.5
Some adopt `limited agency' as a survival strategy due to past experience and future
2Economic and labour market integration is deﬁned as participating in the local workforce by
gaining employment or becoming self-employed. The somewhat neutral term of `incorporation'
is used parallel to `integration' and `inclusion' following Glick Schiller, who considers integration
and inclusion to have a political agenda (Glick Schiller and Ça§lar, 2009).
3Structure is deﬁned as the existing environment of opportunities and constraints in any given
society. Agency is deﬁned as the ability to act on the basis of individual capital (i.e. social and
human capital).
4Ideally, the humanitarian approach is guided by a state's morality and altruism to help people
`who need admission' (refugees) in contrast to those `who want admission' (migrants). However,
this humanitarian `cause to protect' has, according to many scholars (such as Harrell-Bond, 1995;
Long, 2013; Fassin, 2012; Agier, 2011; Richmond, 1988), given way to restrictionist migration
agendas by distinguishing refugees and other migrants, and regulations that apply to them.
5Human capital is deﬁned as its measurable formalized (education, work experience and training)
and its non-formalized (punctuality, honesty, motivation etc) aspects brought together (Becker,
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uncertainty, whilst others frame a diﬀerent narrative by drawing attention to their
motivation, resilience and potential for success, thus refusing the narrative of the
refugee as a victim of circumstance.
Nevertheless, being assigned the category of a `humanitarian migrant' (Zetter,
2007) brings about additional barriers to labour market entry, such as limited eﬀort
by authorities in identifying a refugee's human capital upon entry, and an even more
complicated process of recognition of qualiﬁcations due to undocumented and non-
standardized skills, qualiﬁcations, and capabilities. Chapter 3 elaborates on how this
gap in data aﬀects refugees' labour market integration, and host countries' attempts
to better match labour market supply and demand.
Finally, as mentioned above, much of the economic impact of forced migration,
nonetheless, depends on how well the newcomers are allowed to integrate to the
labour market (as shown in the overview in Chapter 1). Regulations in place in
the host country to `protect' the labour market from foreign workers, contribute
to the creation of a `refugee entry eﬀect' that keeps refugees from becoming tax-
payers and ﬁlling labour shortages where needed (Bakker et al., 2017; Reitz, 2007).
As these restrictions are still more commonplace than leniency, and as refugees
themselves have identiﬁed these structural forces to contribute to their labour market
marginalization signiﬁcantly, it warrants a deeper look into the macro determinants
of refugee labour market integration. From a comparative study on how a country's
welfare regime determines its approach towards refugee labour market integration
presented in Chapter 4, it can be further derived that the humanitarian welfare state
approach predicts much of the restrictive reactions towards refugees' labour market
integration, whilst a more utilitarian welfare state approach allows for more leniency
in policies regulating refugees' access to employment.
This dissertation contributes to the ﬁeld of refugee studies by examining the fac-
tors that facilitate and hinder labour market integration of refugees through micro
and macro perspective. Furthermore, all chapters aspire to give evidence-based
suggestions for labour market policy reforms, thus aiming to make a practical con-
tribution to the ﬁeld. Since policymakers in Europe and beyond are on a learning
curve due to recent refugee movements, it presents a prime opportunity for the aca-
1964; Fitz-enz, 2009; Collett and Zuleeg, 2008). Human capital includes skills, qualiﬁcations,
knowledge and capabilities.
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demic community to pitch in by providing evidence-based policy advice, in order to
limit further loss of human(itarian) capital.
The four chapters of this dissertation are based on four individual papers. In
the following, I brieﬂy summarize their main results, and their contributions to the
literature.
Chapter 1 Economic consequences of voluntary and forced migration - a literature
review
Around the world, people are increasingly pushed and pulled to cross borders. Fre-
quently, these new arrivals necessitate reactions from policymakers in the destination
states in the form of either more restrictions or greater leniency in migration and
integration regulations. The states' policy choices are based on a myriad of rea-
sons, but most often they boil down to calculations on the economic consequences
of immigration. This paper reviews the vast literature on the costs and returns of
immigration-induced labour supply changes for the receiving states. The literature
summarized in this paper focuses particularly on two broad categories of economic
impacts from immigration: ﬁrst, what is the the eﬀect of immigration on the labour
market (on wages and job availability); and second, what are the broader ﬁscal ef-
fects of immigration (in regard to economic output, and durability of the welfare
beneﬁts' system). Furthermore, in light of growing interest in refugee studies, this
chapter emphasizes the distinction between the impacts of voluntary and forced mi-
gration, and contributes to the literature on immigration's economic consequences
by providing a thorough up-to-date account on research done on the latter.
The literature review concludes that there are many conﬂicting studies focusing
on the labour market and ﬁscal eﬀects of immigration in which methodology, case
selection, or other factors have led researchers to ﬁnd negative, positive, or no eﬀect
of immigration. In regard to impacts on wages, voluntary and forced migrants have
been found to cause some wage loss to those local workers who most resemble them
(own eﬀect), whilst possibly increasing the income of those workers who complement
them (cross eﬀect) (Borjas, 2017b). The lack of signiﬁcant wage eﬀects is consistent
with the recent literature emphasizing mechanisms that allow for quicker absorption
of immigrants, such as dualization of the labour market (Card and Altonji, 1991) and
task specialization of native workers (Peri and Sparber, 2009; Peri, 2014). Similarly
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to the impact on wages, the expansion of job opportunities due to occupational
upgrading induced by skill diversity of immigrants and natives (complementarity),
mitigates the negative eﬀect that more labour supply on the market could have (Peri
and Sparber, 2009; Ruiz and Vargas-Silva, 2016). In regard to broader ﬁscal eﬀects
of immigration, heterogeneity of immigrants, and the rights associated with diﬀerent
categories, plays a central part (Rowthorn, 2008). Refugees are often excluded from
the workforce and placed on aid, making it harder for them to contribute more than
they take out (Aiyar et al., 2016). Nevertheless, when given the right and support
to participate in the labour market, forced and voluntary migrants alike have been
found to (1) rejuvenate the workforce (Rowthorn, 2008), thus contributing to the
welfare beneﬁts' system (Aiyar et al., 2016), and (2) raise the level of innovation
and entrepreneurship in the host country (Nathan, 2014; Betts et al., 2015), thus
contributing to economic growth (Fratzscher and Junker, 2015; Legrain, 2016).
Chapter 2 Losing human(itarian) capital: An analysis of barriers to and prospects
of refugees' labour market integration in Germany
Forced migration is rarely associated with human capital gains for the host nation
since refugees frequently remain dependent on aid and isolated from the labour mar-
ket for an extended period of time. In Germany, however, there are currently high
hopes regarding the demographic potential and human capital of incoming refugees,
particularly Syrians (Bittner, 2015; Dettmer, 2015; Diekmann, 2016; Gauck, 2014).
Nonetheless, the question remains how to foster their successful incorporation into
the labour market, and how to avoid falling into the common pattern of aid-
dependency and deskilling. This study aims to contribute to the discussion around
refugees' labour market integration by providing a unique insight into the economic
lives of refugees through their own perceptions on the structural and agency-related
constraints and enablers they face in attempting to integrate to the German labour
market. In doing so, this paper takes a transformative approach (Mertens, 2007):
ﬁrst, research participants were provided a voice, and second, an action agenda for
reform was brought forward.
By combining the ﬁelds of forced migration studies with human capital the-
ory, structure and agency were found to inﬂuence refugees' labour market integra-
tion. Findings gathered through a multilingual survey and in-depth interviews with
refugees and non-refugee respondents in Kiel, Northern Germany, suggest a substan-
XV
Introduction
tial degree of heterogeneity in the human capital of refugees arriving to Germany.
This capital, however, often goes unrecognised, which inﬂuences the determination
refugees show in their actions, and whether they challenge the structural status quo.
Furthermore, the assumed temporality of refugees' situation discourages host states
from investing in the restoration of refugees' social and human capital, and thereby
refugees' agency, leading to further skills' depreciation and aid-dependency (Mincer
and Ofek, 1982). On the basis of these ﬁndings, it can be recommended to forgo the
one-dimensional asylum policy, and opt for tailored legislation instead. Legislation
that would account for refugees' various capabilities could improve integration by
letting those, who can access the labour market immediately do so, whilst oﬀering
additional help to those, who need it. Currently high levels, as well as low levels
of human capital act more as a constraint than an enabler. Although Germany is
slowly moving towards a more utilitarian stance in regard to refugees' settlement
(Rietig, 2016), a lot can still be done about the multiple complexities in regard to
the assessment and recognition of human capital that force many refugees to start
over, and thereby delimit their self-worth. Finally, since language skills are often
too low for ﬁnding regular employment, but the skills and motivation to work ex-
ist, allowing self-employment would be another way how to avoid losing the human
capital that the refugees bring.
Chapter 3 Uncovering hidden human capital: A case for transformative mixed
methods in refugee studies
As previously mentioned, refugees are often disregarded as part of the workforce in
their new host countries. Entering as a `refugee' erects a form of protective barrier
that hides away the skills, capabilities, and qualiﬁcations potentially valuable for
the local labour market (Zetter, 1991, 2007). Since a full picture of refugees' human
capital is, therefore, not identiﬁed, their attempts to gain employment squanders.
Instead, they fall through the cracks of the formal foreign qualiﬁcations' recognition
system (Bosswick, 2013) until the only valid option is to work below their skill level
or retrain completely. It is not uncommon to ﬁnd diﬃculties transferring foreign
human capital to a domestic market, but in the case of forced migrants, the transfer
process is even more complicated (Collett and Zuleeg, 2008; Worbs and Bund, 2016;
Bosswick, 2013; Bauböck and Tripkovic, 2017; Mincer and Ofek, 1982). Hence,
more elaborate ways to identify and assess refugees' human capital are required.
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This study attempts, ﬁrst of all, to make the case for using transformative mixed
methods to uncover the hidden skills of the hard-to-reach refugee population for
future research (Creswell, 2003; Mertens, 2007; Castro et al., 2010; Bloch, 1999).
Secondly, it provides an example of such a study carried out in the case of refugees
arriving to Germany between 2014 and 2016 to further underline the potential.
The ﬁndings suggest that by focusing on participants' own voices in identiﬁcation
and assessment of refugees' human capital, signiﬁcant gaps in the current procedure
are located, and more clarity brought to the question, why refugees experience such
diﬃculties entering the labour market. Bringing in a qualitative approach addressed
the three problem areas (sticking to stagnant categories, ignoring poor correlation
between job types and educational backgrounds, and disregarding soft skills) by
being more ﬂexible and insightful than a traditional, solely quantitative study into
educational and occupational backgrounds. In the special case of refugee labour
market integration, allowing for more ﬂexibility would help with the lacking docu-
ments, non-standardized occupational backgrounds, and overcoming the internalized
inferiority feeling, all hindering the successful transfer of refugees' human capital.
If one could overcome those obstacles, the real picture of the human capital and its
utilization potential might emerge, making a better matching of labour demand and
supply within the asylum system, a possibility.
Chapter 4 Restrictive generosity or open selﬁshness - welfare regimes and refugee
labour market integration in comparative perspective
As more and more refugees are unable to return home due to continuing instabilities
around the world, the question surrounding their sustainable integration in the re-
ceiving countries tops the policy agenda. Labour market participation is an integral
part of integration, yet acceptance of refugees into the labour market still varies
across the host states. This article aims to understand the underlying reasons for
diﬀerent policy approaches towards refugees' labour market integration by focusing
in particular on the existing welfare state as an explanatory variable (Römer, 2017;
Boräng, 2015). The study tests whether the extent of overall welfare generosity ex-
plains choices and changes in refugee-speciﬁc labour policy across 28 countries over
the period of 1980-2014. Moreover, considering the possible reactionary style of
policy-making in refugee issues, a second research question on how countries shape
their refugee-speciﬁc labour policy when faced with large refugee inﬂows was in-
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cluded. By attempting to bring clarity to the underlying grounds of decision-making
in regard to refugees' labour market integration, this paper aims to contribute to
both, refugee studies and comparative welfare state research. Furthermore, in the
ﬁeld often dominated by case-studies, a large cross-sectional comparative study may
bring new insights.
The results suggest that both ends of the generosity scale (Scruggs, 2014) seem to
welcome refugee labour market integration. In limited welfare states, minimal state
intervention in the workings of the free market (Esping-Andersen, 1990), equality of
opportunity with the expectation of individual eﬀort to assure own well-being (Arts
and Gelissen, 2002; Sainsbury, 2006), and the actual (or perceived) lack of compe-
tition from refugees, all guide policy-makers to less restrictions on refugee-speciﬁc
labour policies. Furthermore, when faced with an increase of refugee inﬂows, the
least generous welfare states were found to exhibit the most welcoming attitudes by
being less likely to restrict their policies. In comprehensive welfare states, higher
degree of social solidarity and decommodiﬁcation (Esping-Andersen, 1990) shape
refugee policies similarly towards more openness. Lastly, the middle ground, made
up of mainly conservative welfare states (Esping-Andersen, 1990; Scruggs, 2014), ap-
pears to have the most restrictive attitudes towards refugees, echoing the protective
humanitarian agenda inherent to traditional asylum systems.
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CHAPTER 1
Economic consequences of voluntary and forced mi-
gration - a literature review
1.1 Introduction
Increased migration has been explained by a number of diﬀerent scholars as based
on: (1) persisting income inequalities between countries and the cost-beneﬁt cal-
culations of individual migrants (e.g. by Michael P. Todaro, Larry A. Sjaastad,
George J. Borjas, Oded Stark, J. Edward Taylor), (2) on existing social networks
(most prominently by Douglas S. Massey), and (3) on the structural demand for mi-
grant workers in developed economies (amongst others by Michael J. Piore). More-
over, globalisation thesis (e.g. by Immanuel Wallerstein, Alejandro Portes, Manuel
Castells, Saskia Sassen, Ewa Morawska) tells us how the advances in transport and
communication technology have reduced the cost of movement, making migration a
natural consequence of the globalization process1. These developments have to date
pulled around 258 million people across borders according to the United Nations
(UN) data (Figure 1.1), amounting to a rise in the global migrant population. At
the same time, there are continuing conﬂicts around the world (Figure 1.22), that
push more and more people to leave their homes. According to UN statistics, as
1Globalization is deﬁned as the widening, deepening, and speeding up of worldwide interconnect-
edness in all aspects of contemporary social life" (Held et al., 1999 cited in Czaika and de Haas,
2015).
2The ﬁgure shows only violent conﬂicts, and does not include instabilities caused by natural causes
(displacement caused by natural disasters or other environmental reasons, e.g. climate change),
which also contribute to forced migration.
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many as 25.9 million individuals around the world were estimated to be refugees in
2017 (Figure 1.1).
Figure 1.1: Migration statistics, Migration Data Portal based on data from the
UN Population Division (International Organization for Migration, 2017, retrieved
21.12.2017). 1.1 - International migration stock in total numbers; 1.2 - Interna-
tional migration stock in percentage of world population; 1.3 - Estimated number
of refugees around the world
These movements have disrupted the fabric of nation states that are receiving
these migrants, and have led to popular unease about immigration's long-term im-
plications (Rowthorn, 2008). Again and again, the question in the destination coun-
tries is - what are the consequences arising from immigration? And thereafter,
how should local policymakers manage the inﬂow of immigrants to secure positive
impacts instead of the drawbacks associated with migration?
States' approaches to immigration are based on a myriad of reasons, but most
often, as shown in this overview, it boils down to calculations on the economic
consequences of immigration. In other words, states' preferences, motivations, and
interests in choosing migration and integration policies follow the logic of costs and
returns. A vast range of academic disciplines (such as labour economics, human
geography, and political sociology to name a few) have oﬀered a helping hand in
providing expert analysis for policy designers to make informed decisions. The liter-
ature summarized in this paper is concerned with two broad categories of economic
impacts from immigration: ﬁrst, the eﬀect on the labour market (wages and em-
ployment); and second, broader ﬁscal eﬀects (such as economic output and reliance
on welfare beneﬁts). There are many conﬂicting studies in these areas in which
methodology, case selection or other factors have led researchers to ﬁnd negative,
positive or no eﬀect of immigration.
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Figure 1.2: Number of conﬂicts around the world, Uppsala Conﬂict Data Program
(Department of Peace and Conﬂict Research, Uppsala University, 2017, retrieved
21.12.2017)
This article is structured as follows: ﬁrst, it will discuss literature dealing with
the labour market eﬀects, i.e. whether immigrants depress natives' wages and take
away their jobs. Second, it will review literature addressing the question of whether
immigrants contribute to the economy to the same extent that they contribute
from welfare entitlements. These two parts focus mostly on the impacts caused by
voluntary migration, whereas the third part gives a more speciﬁc overview of the
literature, and especially empirical evidence, about forced migration's impact on the
host country's economy. The conclusion proposes future research directions, but also
takes the position of the policymaker, and summarizes what is of importance from
the theoretical literature for the practical decision-making on policies regulating
migrant entry and settlement.
1.2 Labour market eﬀects of immigration
Immigration-induced economic costs and returns are diﬃcult to assess empirically.
Nevertheless, many authors have attempted to do so (discussed in this review are
amongst others George J. Borjas, David Card, Giovanni Peri, Gordon H. Hanson,
and their collaborators3). Due to varying methodological approaches, they have
reached conﬂicting results with some studies ﬁnding negative, some positive, and
some have found no eﬀect of immigration on natives' wages and employment rates.
The following will attempt to summarize the various studies, describe the diﬀerences
in approaches, and reconcile the conﬂicting results with regard to wages and jobs.
3This list is by no means exhaustive.
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1.2.1 Human capital of native and foreign workers
Before moving to the speciﬁc impacts of immigrants on wages and jobs, however,
it is important to address crucial issues in the literature with regard to the human
capital of native and foreign workers. First of all, although immigrants might have
similar education and experience to natives, their human capital might not be com-
parable (Hanson, 2008). Transferring foreign human capital to new host country is
a problematic task, mainly due to limited understandings and diﬀering standards in
origin and host countries (Friedberg, 2001; Hendricks and Schoellman, 2017; Boss-
wick, 2013). This might lead to an undervaluation of capabilities, which in turn
results in a lower position on the labour market. Furthermore, reaching a com-
mensurable career level as in the origin country proves to be complicated for many
foreign workers since human capital acquired domestically often outweighs human
capital from abroad (due to lack of country-speciﬁc skills and information) (Fried-
berg, 2001; Angrist and Kugler, 2003; Bauböck and Tripkovic, 2017; Hendricks and
Schoellman, 2017; Chiswick, 1978).4
Secondly, Hanson (2008) argues that immigrants are positively self-selected (con-
cept attributed to Borjas, 1987), as well as positively sorted. To elaborate, migrants
tend to not be drawn randomly from the population, and their destinations reﬂect an
individual cost-beneﬁt analysis. Hanson's research (Grogger and Hanson, 2008 cited
in Hanson, 2008) shows that most emigrants are likely the more educated individ-
uals within the origin country, meaning that they appear to be `positively selected
in terms of schooling' (Borjas, 1987; Hanson, 2008). Though emigrants incline to
be more educated than those that stay behind, they often are much less educated5
than native populations in their chosen destination countries (Hanson, 2008).
Whether high- or low-skilled, immigrants are rarely direct substitutes for native
workers based on the above mentioned factors (Constant, 2014).6 They are, accord-
4Reitz (2007) and Bakker et al. (2017) have called this an `immigration entry eﬀect': due to the
lack of host country work experience and language proﬁciency, and the problematic recognition
of their home country credentials, migrants are most likely to start at lower levels than natives."
5Exceptions to this exist in cases where a points-based admission system allows in immigrants
predominantly with very high educational levels (such as in Canada).
6From Constant (2014) two deﬁnitions are important to include here: 1) Substitute or replacement
labour meaning `workers who can serve in place of other workers because they have similar skills,
and thus compete with each other for positions'; and 2) Complementary or supplemental labour
meaning `workers who need to work together in certain proportions to accomplish a task, and
thus who do not compete with each other for positions'.
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ing to multiple authors, imperfect substitutes, and in some cases complements to the
local workforce (Borjas, 2003; Ottaviano and Peri, 2006; Goldin and Katz, 2007; Peri
and Sparber, 2009). How the various categories aﬀect immigration's consequences
for the hosts' labour market will be discussed with the help of empirical evidence in
the next two sections.
1.2.2 Impact on native employment rate and job availability
As more and more immigrants enter, the common expectation is that it will make
it harder for local people to ﬁnd jobs due to the additional competition created by
newcomers. In order to ﬁnd out whether this assumption holds, researchers have
employed various methods to various cases, which have yielded contrasting results.
Constant (2014) has divided the approaches that researchers have taken into area-
and production function approach. Most studies employing the area approach, that
is, comparing the economic outcomes for native workers in areas with large and small
immigrant inﬂows, have found no adverse eﬀects of immigrant inﬂows (Constant,
2014). Studies using a more simplistic version of the production function, that
is, diﬀerentiating workers by skills on the basis of nation-wide data, have found
a moderate eﬀect of immigration on native workers, whilst more methodologically
complex studies employing the same production function, that are focusing on the
degree of substitutability among workers, ﬁnd no negative eﬀects. Therefore, the
conventional assumption7 in the academic circles is that immigration has a very
small or short-lived impact on native employment (Rowthorn, 2008).
Many of the studies emphasize, however, that immigration does bring some com-
petition to those workers who are directly substitutable by migrants (Freeman and
Kessler, 2008). Considering the previously mentioned diﬃculties with foreign human
capital transfer, it might occur that even the immigrants with higher education and
experience levels will end up competing for the same jobs as the low-skilled native
workforce. Therefore, competition might be heightened for the low-skilled natives
(Freeman and Kessler, 2008). These developments could lead to a so called `crowding
7Rowthorn (2008) mentions two studies that go against this assumption: (1) Angrist and Kugler
(2003) statistically signiﬁcant model for Europe estimates that for each 100 male immigrants, a
loss of between 35 and 83 male native jobs occurs. Similarly, (2) Dustmann and Wadsworth (2003)
ﬁnd that 23 to 60 native jobs are lost for every 100 immigrants (based on the UK census data,
and a statistically signiﬁcant result derived from employing a diﬀerence-in-diﬀerence approach.)
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out' of the native population, but what many researchers8 ﬁnd instead is a dual-
ization or segmentation of the labour market accompanied by task specialization of
native workers (Peri and Sparber, 2009; Hanson, 2008; Pischke and Velling, 1997;
Card, 2001, 2005).
First, the dual (or segmented) labour market theory tells us that migration is
caused by a permanent demand for immigrant labour inherent to the economies
of developed countries (Piore, 1979 cited in Massey et al., 1993). This demand
comes from the structural change in the labour market with the rise of the social
deﬁnition of speciﬁc jobs as `immigrant jobs,' and the need thereafter to ﬁnd workers
willing to do those jobs natives refuse.9 Quite often such occupations are manual
labour intensive10, and as a result, natives move to ﬁelds in which communication
and language skills, as well as culture-speciﬁc knowledge, play a bigger role, and
give them a comparative advantage (Peri and Sparber, 2009). Similar `occupational
upgrading' happens if the share of highly-educated immigrant workers rises. When
immigrants occupy analytically intensive positions in science and technology, the
highly educated native workers move on to managing them (Peri, 2014). Secondly,
an inﬂux of immigrants therefore might encourage native workers to specialize in
diﬀerent production tasks (Figure 1.3).
The skill diversity among native and foreign workers might spur more profound,
and general positive consequences, according to Peri and Sparber (2009) and Peri
(2014). For the host country's economy, it might mean more eﬃciency, innovation,
and productivity growth.11 Local ﬁrms and industries may also expand in response
8Again, some exceptions exist such as described by Borjas and Doran (2012) cited in Nathan (2014).
They examined how the arrival of mathematicians from the former Soviet Union inﬂuenced the
publications and career trajectories of their U.S. counterparts, reaching the conclusion that there
is strong evidence of native crowding out, both in terms of subject shifts and exits from the ﬁeld.
9The so called `immigrant jobs' are usually executed under unpleasant conditions, at low wages,
with great instability, and facing little chance for advancement (sometimes also referred to as
DDD-jobs, dirty, dangerous, and demeaning jobs). Historically, women and teenagers were em-
ployed in such positions as they were usually looking for `supplemental income', thus treating the
job as just a means to an end (Massey et al., 1993). As female labour force participation rose and
transformed, so did the demand for foreign labour supply to do those types of jobs.
10Occupations falling under this category in the service sector are for example housekeeping, gar-
dening, child care, dry cleaning, etc. Cortes (2008) ﬁnds that in the 1980s and 1990s U.S. cities
with larger inﬂows of low-skilled immigrants experienced larger reductions in prices for these
labour-intensive services. He associates a 10% increase in the local immigrant population with a
1,3% decrease in prices for labour-intensive services (cited in Hanson, 2008).
11Discussed in further detail in the `Fiscal impact' chapter.
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Figure 1.3: Communication/Manual Intensity of Natives, Recent Immigrants, and
Long-Term Immigrants U.S. (19702000). Workers with a high school degree or less
education (Ruggles et al 2005 IPUMS Dataset cited in Peri and Sparber, 2009).
to an increase in immigrant workers, and in this way absorb much of the immigrant
labour available on the market (Hanson, 2008; Peri, 2014). This might bring about
the creation of additional jobs, which in turn might be taken up by complementary
native workers (Constant, 2014; Peri, 2014). Oppositely to these theoretical posi-
tive impacts, Ottaviano and Peri (2006) have found that an increase in immigrant
labour causes a negative impact for the already existing immigrant population in
the host country. Newcomers might present a direct competition for many former
immigrants, especially those who have not accumulated a lot of host country-speciﬁc
human capital (Peri and Sparber, 2009).
1.2.3 Impact on wages
The assumption has often been that excessive labour supply provided by immigra-
tion will reduce wages of the native population (Figure 1.4). Empirical evidence
from decades of academic research, however, shows a more complicated picture. In
fact, there are many competing ﬁndings in the literature about whether immigration
aﬀects natives' income, ranging from immigrants raising the native wage (comple-
mentarity), lowering it (competition), or most commonly, not having any eﬀect at
all (Figure 1.5).
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Figure 1.4: Opinion poll: Do immigrants depress the wages of natives? (Peri, 2014)
Figure 1.5: Share of empirical evidence showing negative and positive eﬀects of
immigrant share on native wages, based on averages of 270 baseline estimates from
270 empirical studies (Peri, 2014)
Most notably over the past decades, George Borjas12 has studied the impact of the
inﬂow of Mexican workers on native workers' wages in the United States. Through-
out many studies and articles, Borjas has argued that Mexican immigration to the
U.S. has put downward pressure on the wages of low-skilled American workers. This
is due to imperfect substitutability that the human capital of an average Mexican
immigrant brings to the U.S. workforce. Borjas' research strategy has been to use
nation-wide data to study the impacts of immigration. Beyond the previously men-
tioned U.S.-focus, he has applied a similar approach to Canada and Mexico to ﬁnd
12His work includes (a) Borjas (1987) Self-selection and the earnings of immigrants, American
Economic Review 77 (4), 531-555; (b) Borjas (1991) Immigrant participation in the welfare sys-
tem, ILR Review 44 (2), 195-211; (c) Borjas (1994) The economics of immigration, Journal of
Economic Literature 32 (4), 1667-1717; (d) Borjas (2003) The labor demand curve is downward
sloping: Reexamining the impact of immigration on the labor market, Quarterly Journal of Eco-
nomics 118 (4), 1335-1374; (e) Borjas (2017b) The wage impact of the Marielitos: A reappraisal,
ILR Review 70 (5), 1077-1110.
8
Chapter 1 Economic consequences of voluntary and forced migration
comparable evidence on wage eﬀects of immigration. In all three countries, Aydemir
and Borjas (2007) ﬁnd that a 10% change in labour supply leads to a 4% to 6% loss
in wages.
David Card13 has been the most prominent opponent of Borjas, arguing that there
is no eﬀect on the natives' wages attributable to immigration. Card claims that by
looking at the same education-experience cluster model that Borjas has, but on a
sub-national level (U.S. cities), that the correlation between the relative wage and
the relative supply of natives and immigrants in the low-skilled cluster (which is most
commonly the focus of these studies due to comparability) is close to zero (Card,
2005). Similarly to Card, other sub-national and regional studies done outside the
U.S.14 have found little or no impact of immigration on regional wages. This leads
to the conclusion that labour market scope choices (national vs local) matter for the
ﬁndings on estimated wage eﬀects of immigration (Hanson, 2008).
Nevertheless, the lack of signiﬁcant wage eﬀects is consistent with the recent
literature emphasizing mechanisms that allow absorption of immigrants, such as
complementarity, technology adjustment, increases in demand, and eﬃciency (Peri
and Yasenov, 2017). Similarly to the impact on jobs, the expansion of job oppor-
tunities due to occupational upgrading induced by skill diversity of immigrants and
natives, mitigates the negative eﬀect that more labour supply on the market could
have (Peri, 2014). Unfortunately, resemblance in impacts can also be found for ear-
lier immigrants. Namely, because newcomers are often direct competitors for many
earlier immigrants, they can have a substantial eﬀect on the incomes of the latter.
1.3 Fiscal impact of immigration
Immigration enthusiasts insist that most of the time immigrants move to areas where
labour demand is high (Hanson, 2008), meaning that they will quickly become part
13His work includes (a) Card (1990) The impact of the Mariel boatlift on the Miami labor market,
ILR Review 43 (2), 245-257; (b) Card and Altonji (1991) The eﬀects of immigration on the labor
market outcomes of less-skilled natives, Immigration, trade and the labor market, 201-234; (c)
Card (2001) Immigrant inﬂows, native outﬂows, and the local labour market impact of higher
immigration, Journal of Labor Economics 19 (1), 22-64; (d) Card (2005) Is the new immigration
really so bad? The Economic Journal 115 (507).
14Hanson (2008) lists Addison and Worswick (2002) for Australia; Pischke and Velling, 1997 for
Germany; Zorlu and Hartog, 2005 for the Netherlands and Norway; Carrasco et al., 2008 for
Spain; and Dustmann et al., 2005 for the UK
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of the workforce, and start contributing to the economy. They also tend to be
young(er) (Freeman and Kessler, 2008), which presupposes that they will contribute
for a long time, and most likely pay in as much or more than they take out from
the welfare system. Those, however, who worry about immigration draw attention
to the heterogeneous nature of the `immigrant group'. Namely, that immigration's
ﬁscal impact depends on the immigrant category (such as labour migrant, family
migrant or refugee/asylum seeker15), and rights and obligations associated with these
categories (Rowthorn, 2008; Bakker et al., 2017; Cobb-Clark, 2000; Zetter, 2007;
Ruhs and Martin, 2008). Furthermore, multiple other factors such as education,
professional experience, and ability to gain suitable employment without displacing
native workers matter for the calculations about immigrants' ﬁscal contributions.
According to Dustmann et al. (2010), the literature on this matter is rather scant
in comparison to the vast research estimating labour market eﬀects of immigra-
tion, mainly due to the diﬃculty of empirically assessing immigration's ﬁscal eﬀects.
Nonetheless, the following chapter will review some studies done in the ﬁeld of immi-
gration's ﬁscal impacts focusing on, (1) immigrants' contributions to the economy,
and the speciﬁc inﬂuence on innovation in the host country; and (2) immigrants'
participation rates in welfare programs, and their impact on public ﬁnances in gen-
eral.
1.3.1 Impact on economic output
What is the net contribution of migrants to economic growth? Like with all other
questions highlighted in this review, there are contrasting results on whether immi-
grants are a positive or negative inﬂuence for the economic output16 in the receiving
state. There are pessimistic views associated with the aforementioned problem-
atic substitutability issue of immigrant to native workers, and therefore an assumed
decreased level of labour market integration of immigrants (Quispe-Agnoli and Za-
vodny, 2002 cited in Nathan, 2014). At the same time, there are optimists who be-
15Rowthorn (2008) mentions a `spectrum' on which on the one end are highly educated, skilled,
and talented individuals who having found suitable employment will make large contributions
to the local economy. On the other end of the spectrum, are immigrants who are dependent
on public support (such as refugees and asylum seekers), and who are likely to take out more
welfare beneﬁts than they pay in taxes. Quite often though, these groups are kept dependent on
aid due to many de jure and de facto barriers to employment (Long, 2015).
16Economic output is the total value of goods and services produced in the economy.
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lieve that immigrants will cause productivity shifts, meaning they bring with them,
directly or indirectly, more innovation and eﬃciency (Peri and Sparber, 2009).
Rowthorn (2008) summarizes a variety of American and European studies analysing
the ﬁscal impact of immigration on advanced economies, and ﬁnds that in most cases
the impact is rather small, ranging between +/- 1 per cent of GDP. He explains this
ﬁnding with the heterogeneity of immigrant population, meaning that the positive
contribution of some highly educated, skilled, and talented immigrants with a suit-
able job, is largely or entirely oﬀset by the limited or negative contribution of others.
Hanson (2008) further asserts that the more skilled the migrant inﬂow, the more
likely the positive ﬁscal consequences for the host country. In cases though, where
immigrants are less skilled, and take up positions that pay less (such as the `immi-
grant jobs' mentioned earlier), the net tax burden on natives might increase resulting
in a necessity to raise taxes, reduce government beneﬁts, or increase borrowing from
future generations. This ﬁnding explains rather well why more and more destination
countries have in recent years opted for more selective migration policies (de Haas
et al., 2016).
A further strand of research has looked into whether the natives and the local
economy could beneﬁt from an immigrant inﬂux instead of presuming negative out-
comes. Borjas (1994) calculations on whether there might be an immigration surplus
for the host countries found that a surplus exists when the skills of natives diﬀer
from the skills of immigrants i.e. natives and the country beneﬁt if immigrants
are complementary to natives. This contradicts the trend amongst Western coun-
tries that try to attract only high-skilled immigrants (de Haas et al., 2016) since
they are drawing immigration that does not complement their already high-skilled
workforces. Nonetheless, Borjas (1994) adds that even if the native workforce is pre-
dominantly skilled, there are still beneﬁts to be gained from an exclusively skilled
immigrant inﬂow due to complementation in production between skilled workers and
capital that unskilled workers do not oﬀer (Figure 1.6).
High-skilled immigrants are often associated with higher productivity, thus pro-
viding the host market more gains from letting them enter and contribute. Studies
also suggest that irrespective of formal educational and professional levels, immi-
grants of all skill levels might be positively self-selected in regard to entrepreneurial
and innovative abilities, and motivation (Bonacich, 1973; Borjas, 1987; Zucker and
11
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Figure 1.6: Immigration surplus and immigrant skills, in a model with capital,
assuming 50% of natives are skilled (Borjas, 1994)
Darby, 2007; Honig et al., 2010 cited in Nathan, 2014). Meaning, it is assumed that
besides their personal circumstances17, their characteristics make them more likely
to set up businesses (Hunt, 2011, 2013), generate new innovative ideas, and create
knowledge (Page, 2007; Berliant and Fujita, 2009 cited in Nathan, 2014).
Nathan (2014) review paper on wider eﬀects of immigration shows that much of
the literature on immigrants' economic contributions presents small robust positive
impacts attributed to immigrants, especially high-skilled ones. In studies done both
in the U.S., and in Europe18 on area and ﬁrm level, scholars have found that:
• Immigrants are more likely to start companies than similar natives (Hunt,
2013, 2011);
• There is a causal relationship between company/industry/country workforce
diversity (bringing in reduced risk due to diasporic connections and co-ethnic
groups), and an increase in trade ﬂows (LeBlang, 2011; Javorcik et al., 2011;
Peri and Requena, 2010 cited in Nathan, 2014);
17The so called `survivalist entrepreneurship' which means that by becoming self-employed they are
able to circumvent the many barriers i.e. react to being excluded from the mainstream economic
life (Kloosterman and Rath, 2001 cited in Nathan, 2014).
18According to Nathan (2014), the research on this matter in the U.S. is very well developed
and vast, whereas in Europe it is a lot sparser, and due to various factors (such as greater
heterogeneity in migrant levels and ﬂows; sending countries and communities; and receiving
country history and institutions) presenting a lot more mixed results. All the same, also these
studies ﬁnd typically a small net positive impact of high-skilled migration.
12
Chapter 1 Economic consequences of voluntary and forced migration
• Heterogeneous teams are more eﬀective in problem-solving by virtue of a wider
pool of perspectives and skills (Page, 2007).
Another argument to connect innovation to migration is presented through the
model of Liang et al. (2014). According to them, innovation is more present in
younger societies as the entrepreneurship level is higher there (Figure 1.7). Hence,
the many young people who migrate could not only relieve the pressure on the
pensions system which will be discussed in more detail shortly, but also raise the
entrepreneurship level of the host countries.
Figure 1.7: Entrepreneurial rate and demographics (Liang et al., 2014)
1.3.2 Impact on welfare system
The understanding amongst the public and scholars alike is that immigrants tend
to rely more on welfare programs19 than native citizens, as immigrant households
are often larger and poorer than native households (Rowthorn, 2008; Borjas and
Hilton, 1996; Brücker et al., 2002; Barrett and McCarthy, 2007; Dustmann et al.,
2010; Boeri et al., 2002; De Giorgi and Pellizzari, 2009). In the U.S., studies ﬁnd
that immigrant-headed households are more likely to receive public beneﬁts than
native ones due to lower educational levels, poverty and lack of health insurance
(Fix and Passel, 2002 cited in Freeman and Kessler, 2008). Yet, Dustmann et al.
19Welfare programs are provisions by the state for the basic economic and social well-being of
their citizens (and in some cases also non-citizens) (Sciortino and Finotelli, 2017). Goods and
services allocated under welfare programs include various social security measures e.g. sickness
provisions, poverty relief, health care etc. (Giulietti, 2014).
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(2010) paint a completely opposite picture for the UK by showing that migrants
from A8 countries20 for example, are actually less likely to live in social housing
or to receive state beneﬁts and tax credits than their native counterparts. This
variation between the two cases illustrates that the size and characteristics of the
migrant population, as well as the generosity and inclusivity of the state's welfare
programme, all matter for the calculation on the ﬁscal consequences of migration
for the host country (Freeman and Kessler, 2008).
Some of the most important characteristics to predict the public ﬁnance impact
of migrants are unsurprisingly education and professional experience (Wellisch and
Walz, 1998 cited in Hanson, 2008). To elaborate, migrants in low-skilled positions
with lower than average incomes, tend to pay less in taxes, but at the same time,
depending on the welfare system in place, are likely to be more eligible for various
government services (Ruhs and Martin, 2008). The opposite can be said for high-
skilled migrants, who tend to contribute more than they take out (Dustmann et al.,
2010).
Beyond human capital, the literature shows how age, visa (entry) category, and
welfare eligibility play a role in predicting the balance between taxes paid and ser-
vices received. Rowthorn (2008) argues that due to the age structure of immigrants,
their value rests in the rejuvenation of the local population, as well as in adding
to the workforce who potentially pay taxes that ﬁnance pensions and welfare ser-
vices for the ageing societies. In their assessment of welfare magnetism in certain
EU countries, De Giorgi and Pellizzari (2009) further state that letting in migrants
who are from countries with younger and growing populations, will alleviate the
ﬁnancial strain on public pension systems in many of the migrant receiving member
states. It is also less likely that immigrants themselves will claim the pensions from
the system they contributed to, as they often go back to their countries of origin
(Figure 1.8) before that time arrives (Freeman and Kessler, 2008). Furthermore,
whether one enters the country as a voluntary labour migrant, family migrant or as
a forced migrant is to be expected to correctly estimate welfare participation rates.
Quite often, governments attempt to limit the numbers of migrants in the last two
categories in order to minimize the ﬁscal costs immigration might bring (de Haas
et al., 2016; Czaika and de Haas, 2015) or limit their access to welfare beneﬁts (Ruhs
20Central and Eastern European countries that joined the European Union (EU) in May 2004.
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and Martin, 2008; Römer, 2017). Although, when already arrived, it is more likely
that asylum seekers, refugees, and family migrants depend on government aid to a
larger extent and contribute to the tax-base to a lesser extent than labour migrants
(Sciortino and Finotelli, 2017).
Figure 1.8: Immigrant return probabilities are high after ﬁve years, selected OECD
countries (immigrant cohorts arriving 20042005) (Bijwaard, 2015)
Regardless, empirical analysis has found little evidence of welfare overuse by immi-
grants (Barrett, Kahanec, Zimmermann and Maitre, 2013; Barrett, Kahanec, Zim-
mermann, Giulietti and Guzi, 2013 cited in Sciortino and Finotelli, 2017). The
relationship between contributions and expenditures vary considerably according to
which part of the budget are considered welfare expenditures, the time span consid-
ered (annual net or life-cycle and generational), the period, and of course the type
of immigrants (Sciortino and Finotelli, 2017).
1.4 Economic consequences of forced migration
Literature on the labour market and ﬁscal impacts of forced migration is limited
compared to the corresponding literature on voluntary migration (Ruiz and Vargas-
Silva, 2016). Nevertheless, more and more scholars have found labour supply shocks
created by increased involuntary immigration to be excellent subject matter for
quasi-experimental studies, especially because these shocks occur irrespective of the
economic situation of the destination country, making it possible to better identify
causal relationships between immigration, and its impacts on the host country (Ruiz
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and Vargas-Silva, 2016; Peri and Yasenov, 2017).21 Moreover, focusing on forced
migration's impacts has broadened the regional scope of the literature (as can be
seen from the list of historic episodes discussed in this review presented below).
The following chapter will ﬁrst shortly explain how forced migrants diﬀer from
voluntary migrants in regard to the economic impacts their arrival might bring.
Secondly, the main studies analysing forced migration's economic consequences will
be discussed in detail. The historical episodes covered include:
• Syrian refugee movements due to the ongoing civil war (Ceritoglu et al., 2015);
• Forced migration of people from Burundi and Rwanda due to ethnic conﬂicts
in the early 1990s (Ruiz and Vargas-Silva, 2016);
• Cuban migrants involved in the Mariel boatlift in 1980 (Card, 1990; Borjas,
2017b; Borjas and Monras, 2016; Borjas, 2017a; Clemens and Hunt, 2017; Peri
and Yasenov, 2017).
1.4.1 Economic integration of forced and voluntary migrants
In regard to economic integration22, it has been argued that the reason for migrating,
and the assigned entry category, are of little importance as immigrants' economic
outcomes depend largely on host country-speciﬁc knowledge, educational level, work
experience, language proﬁciency, and social capital (De Vroome and Van Tubergen,
2010; Waxman, 2001; Connor, 2010). Thus, forced and voluntary migrants do not
signiﬁcantly diﬀer from each other in their likelihood of participating in the work-
force, and thereafter impacting wages, employment rates, job availability, and public
ﬁnance (Cobb-Clark, 2000; Connor, 2010).
Many scholars23, however, do not share this view, and have collected strong em-
pirical evidence to show that forced migrants experience a much tougher and slower
economic integration process than voluntary migrants. This is due to many barriers
21According to Peri and Yasenov (2017), `sudden and unexpected refugee waves may provide a
cleaner source of exogenous supply shocks, relative to the inﬂow of economic migrants which are
more gradual, predictable and driven by local economic conditions'.
22Economic integration in this paper refers to participation in the economy in the form of working
or being self-employed, and contributing as tax-payers.
23See for example Richmond, 1988; Harrell-Bond, 1995; Angrist and Kugler, 2003; Long, 2015,
2013; Bauböck and Tripkovic, 2017; Bevelander, 2016; Lamba, 2008; Bakker et al., 2017
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such as (1) a precarious and temporary legal status (2) lacking employment rights,
(3) complicated human capital transfer, (4) dependence on aid and welfare, (5) lack-
ing social capital, (6) lack of location choice and limitations on onward mobility, (7)
lacking documentation, and (8) general labour market discrimination.24
Figure 1.9: Employment (more than 8 h p.w.) per migration motive cohort 95-99
in % by years of stay in the Netherlands (Bakker et al., 2017)
These barriers contribute to the poorer economic outcomes of refugees as found in
the Netherlands by Bakker et al. (2017) (Figure 1.9), in Sweden by Bevelander (2016)
(Figure 1.10), and more generally in the EU countries by Bauböck and Tripkovic
(2017) (Figure 1.11), on the basis of employment rates. All of these studies show that
shortly after entry, forced migrants come across something that Bakker et al. (2017)
call `refugee entry eﬀect'. Building on the aforementioned `immigrant entry eﬀect',
the `refugee entry eﬀect' proposes that when arriving to the host country, refugees
tend to be less prepared than labour and family migrants. Also, due to being subject
to a long asylum procedure, their participation on the labour market is further
delayed. According to Bakker et al. (2017), these factors lead to a disadvantaged
position compared to other migrants at the start of residency.
Beyond experiencing initial hardship, the studies ﬁnd evidence to support the ex-
istence of a more permanent `refugee gap', meaning that labour market participation
rates of refugees remain lower than those of other migrants (i.e. labour migrants, but
24The various barriers are discussed in more detail in Kaabel (2017); Long (2015); Betts et al.
(2015); Rietig (2016).
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Figure 1.10: Employment integration of migrants and refugees in Sweden (Beve-
lander, 2016)
also to a certain point family migrants) even after having stayed in the host coun-
try for an extended period of time. This ﬁnding is most visible in the Netherlands
study (Figure 1.9), where the employment rates of refugees are lagging even after 15
years of residence. In the Swedish case, Bevelander (2016) emphasizes the gender
aspect in economic outcomes of various migrant groups (Figure 1.10). He ﬁnds that
the employment rates of female refugees are comparable with the rates of female
family migrants. The same applies to their male counterparts, who seem to have
had similar experiences on the labour market. Nonetheless, both of these groups are
trailing behind the rates of labour migrants even after 20 years of residence. Lastly,
Bauböck and Tripkovic (2017) show that a similar trend can be witnessed when
studying the whole of the EU, and not only a single country case study. In contrast
to the other two, they see a potential merging point and a disappearance of the gap
between labour and forced migrants at 20+ years of residence (Figure 1.11).
Consequently, because refugees are unlikely to be part of the workforce, especially
immediately after arrival, it seems rather futile to assess any direct25 impacts they
might have on wages, jobs, and public ﬁnances. Nevertheless, in mass inﬂux circum-
stances, governments often attempt to limit the barriers to employment26 making it
25Indirectly, refugees can be responsible for creating some jobs, especially those that deal with
their own arrival (Ceritoglu et al., 2015; Ruiz and Vargas-Silva, 2016).
26An example of such state behaviour can be witnessed in Germany, where in response to the latest
heightened inﬂux of Syrian refugees, authorities shortened and in some places fully waived the
requirement of job market tests (Vorrangprüfung), which required employers to give priority in
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Figure 1.11: Employment rates by type of initial residency permit and years of
residence in the EU. Ages 15-64 in 2014 (Bauböck and Tripkovic, 2017)
more likely that refugees end up participating in the workforce (Angrist and Kugler,
2003). As a result, scholars have been focusing their research on such drastic histor-
ical episodes as mentioned beforehand, rather than on the continuous ﬂow of forced
migrants from other unstable regions. The following overview recaps a selection of
such empirical studies.
1.4.2 Fiscal impact of forced migration
The humanitarian principles that condition countries to accept substantial amounts
of forced migrants have important distributional consequences. The protection of-
fered by many host states to individuals under the `refugee' and `asylum seeker'
categories often comes with exclusion from the workforce (and thereof from be-
ing tax-payers), and placement on aid and on welfare (see for example Engbersen
et al. (2015); Bevelander (2016); Bakker et al. (2017); Bauböck and Tripkovic (2017);
Thränhardt (2015)). This naturally creates a rather unpopular status for those indi-
viduals in the society as they are more often seen as `welfare burden' and `freeloaders'
than their labour migrant counterparts (Sciortino and Finotelli, 2017).
Although it has been found that refugees' ﬁscal contribution tends to be less than
that of labour migrants over the life-cycle (Aiyar et al., 2016), it is important to re-
vert back to the above mentioned refugee-speciﬁc barriers as an explanation. These
barriers hinder refugees integration into the labour market, which then in turn has a
direct impact in both the short and long term on their economic contribution poten-
hiring to Germans, EU-citizens, and to migrants with a `better' status before oﬀering the job to
a refugee (Bundesregierung, 2016).
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tial, as well as dependence on the welfare system.27 Rapid integration would instead
reduce the net ﬁscal cost associated with forced migrants' inﬂow, which is especially
necessary in mass movements' situations (Aiyar et al., 2016). Fratzscher and Junker
(2015) and Legrain (2016) both emphasize the importance of initial investment into
welcoming and integrating refugees in order to receive `economic dividends' (con-
cept used by Legrain, 2016) in the long run (Figure 1.12). Furthermore, Aiyar et al.
(2016) draw attention to the ageing populations of many of the major host countries
in the West, which could beneﬁt from the newcomers successful labour market in-
tegration in countering ageing's adverse ﬁscal eﬀects (pressures on pension systems,
healthcare provisions, and beneﬁt schemes).28
Figure 1.12: Beneﬁts from successful integration net of costs, in percent of GDP
(Fratzscher and Junker, 2015)
Due to limited labour market access and problematic human capital transfer,
many scholars (see for example Aleinikoﬀ, 2015; Betts et al., 2015; Long, 2015) call
for governments to give refugees the opportunity to engage in entrepreneurship in or-
der to become self-reliant, and to overcome the slow bureaucratic procedures. Even
though self-selection plays a smaller role in the case of `pushed' migrants, some char-
27The actual usage of welfare beneﬁts depends on the social rights the host countries have aﬀorded
to refugees. Quite often, refugees and asylum seekers have been given some speciﬁcally designated
aid, but at the same time they are excluded from the general welfare system (Römer, 2017).
28This holds especially true in case of refugee ﬂows in which the average age is lower and fertility
rates are higher than that of natives. At the same time, however, Rowthorn (2008) brings out
that refugees more often use family reuniﬁcation schemes, which results in more incoming people
(also from age groups out of the workforce) with lacking country-speciﬁc human capital, who are
more likely to end up on welfare than on the labour market.
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acteristics mentioned beforehand are also present in forced migrants (Zimmermann,
2014; Gauck, 2014).
Anecdotal evidence on innovative capabilities and entrepreneurship of refugees has
been collected by Betts et al. (2015). Their report presents case studies of bottom-
up innovations by refugees in Uganda, Jordan, Kenya, South Africa, and the United
States. Innovative activities and entrepreneurship are often undertaken in these
communities by refugees as a reaction to being excluded from the labour market,
but it also comes about when the individuals identify market gaps. Often-times,
ideas come from personal experience or from recognizing demand for something
within the refugee population. Due to the proximity to natives in the studied urban
camps, the services and products may also ﬁnd their way to the native market.
1.4.3 Labour market impact of forced migration
The degree to which refugees may aﬀect labour market outcomes of host country
natives depends on the degree of substitutability between refugees and natives just
as with voluntary migrants. Evidence from previous studies (Braun and Mahmoud,
2014 about Germans from Eastern Europe to Germany after World War II), suggests
that there are situations in which refugees could be considered close substitutes for
natives due to having similar (and easily transferable) educational and professional
backgrounds, as well as linguistic skills (same or similar mother tongue or close
linguistic ties). In these circumstances, unsurprisingly, refugees have had a signif-
icant negative impact on native employment (Ruiz and Vargas-Silva, 2016). More
often, the fact that transferring human capital is very diﬃcult for refugees means
that they end up not being perfect substitutes and instead, irrespective of their skill
level, competing with unskilled and low-skilled migrant29 and native populations.
This would indicate that the impact from refugee inﬂuxes is more along the lines of
job availability on the low-skilled labour market, and an increased competition for
the so called `immigrant jobs'.
29Jacobsen (1996) has found that self-settled (meaning not restricted to camps) refugees might
limit job availability, especially with regard to the poor and old immigrant populations in the
host country.
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Ruiz and Vargas-Silva (2016) have found support for both of the above mentioned
points in the case of Burundi and Rwandan refugees in Tanzania.30 First, there is
a signiﬁcant degree of substitutability in the Great Lakes region due to linguistic
overlap, and comparable educational and professional experiences.31 Second, due
to the desperate situation that many refugees in Tanzania found themselves in, the
Burundi and Rwandan refugees often willingly accepted lower paid and lower skilled
jobs (Maystadt and Verwimp, 2014; Lawrence and King, 1998 cited in Ruiz and
Vargas-Silva, 2016).
Substitutability and desperation both aﬀected the native employment in Tanza-
nia, according to Ruiz and Vargas-Silva (2016). They note that the labour supply
shock made it necessary for the natives to change their economic activities to adjust
to the arrival of so many refugees. This meant moving away from basic agricul-
tural activities that they had come accustomed to, and instead undertaking ven-
tures which required more idiosyncratic and culture-speciﬁc knowledge. This was
especially true for those Tanzanians who worked formerly as casual labourers32 as
refugees represented direct competition. As a consequence, the shock meant dis-
placement for many of the causal labourers. At the same time, the circumstances
propelled some displaced people into self-employment. Speciﬁcally, the locals in-
creasingly attempted to ﬁll the demand on the regional market for speciﬁc goods
and services brought about by such an international refugee crisis (Alix-Garcia and
Saah, 2009 cited in Ruiz and Vargas-Silva, 2016).
Similarly to Ruiz and Vargas-Silva (2016) study done in Tanzania, Ceritoglu et al.
(2015) have found a negative eﬀect arising from Syrian refugee labour supply for
the local Turkish population. Oﬃcially, Syrian refugees are not allowed to work in
Turkey (Baban et al., 2017), which means that in order to make a living they attempt
to enter the informal market irrespective of their skill level. Amongst this workforce,
30Considering that UN statistics (International Organization for Migration, 2017) show that most
refugees still end up in the neighbouring countries (the top three in 2017 of destination countries
was Turkey, Jordan, and Lebanon), which are usually low-income ones, there is merit in discussing
studies from developing countries in more detail.
31Ruiz and Vargas-Silva (2016) write: `Individuals in Burundi, Rwanda and Tanzania rely heavily
on agricultural work for subsistence. The three countries also have below average educational
levels. The net enrolment rate for primary school for Burundi in 1993 was 48%, whereas it was
50% for Tanzania'.
32Ruiz and Vargas-Silva (2016) have used the following deﬁnition for casual work: Casual workers
are typically hired on a daily basis to do basic jobs with low degrees of responsibility for which
they receive a relatively low payment".
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Syrians make for perfect substitutes for native workers, and Ceritoglu et al. (2015)
have found empirical evidence to support this claim. They record an increase in
unemployment of natives, while labour force participation, informal employment,
and job ﬁnding rates for the natives have all declined. In other words, as a result of
being replaced on the informal market by Syrians, many locals end up registering
as unemployed or leaving the labour market altogether. The authors, however, also
found a small increase in formal employment among the native male33 population,
which they assume is due to them taking up newly available jobs addressing the
refugee crisis (e.g. childcare, security, education services). All in all, the study paints
a rather gloomy picture of labour market eﬀects of refugee ﬂows, especially for the
younger Turkish population, who are in direct competition with the predominantly
young refugee group.
The two reviewed studies both show what happens to native employment in low-
income countries if forced migrants are close to perfect substitutes. The studies
inspecting the impact of Cuban refugees arriving to Miami in 1980, however, deal
with imperfect substitutability between natives of a high-income country and forced
migrants. The labour supply shock caused by the so called Mariel Boatlift34 is an
excellent example of a quasi-experimental study due to the exogenous nature of the
shock, as well as due to the short and precise time line of the inﬂux. In spite of
the clarity this case oﬀers for a potential assessment of causality, the ﬁndings on
the impacts of the Cuban migrant workforce on Miami's native workforce are highly
contested. Mainly two immigration economists, Card (1990) and Borjas (2017b,a),
with the support from their followers (Peri and Yasenov, 2017; Clemens and Hunt,
2017) keep disagreeing on the matter.
Card (1990) ﬁrst studied the case of Mariel Boatlift refugees, and concluded that
when comparing Miami with four other unaﬀected control cities in the U.S, the
forced migrant inﬂux did not have any signiﬁcant adverse eﬀect on the wages and
employment of (low-skilled)35 natives. Surprisingly, Card (1990) also found no strong
33Ceritoglu et al. (2015) also bring out gender diﬀerences, showing that when native men register
as unemployed or go to the formal market if being replaced by refugee workers, native women
usually drop out of the workforce completely.
34The majority of Cuban refugees settled in Miami, increasing its labour force by about 7%, and
its Cuban workforce by about 20% (Card, 1990).
35Similarly to studies done about voluntary migration's eﬀects, scholars in refugee studies see the
low-skilled native workforce as the best comparison to incoming refugees, therefore assuming
largest impacts in this group.
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eﬀect from the `new' Cubans on the `old' Cubans' wages and jobs. He explains both
of the ﬁndings through growth of speciﬁc industries36 that utilize relatively unskilled
labour, which absorbed the supply shock created by the Mariel immigrants.
Borjas (2017b) re-examined the case in 2015 and found instead a large and de-
layed eﬀect of the incoming people on the natives' labour market opportunities.
This comes about due to employing his own approach (Borjas, 2003) of correlat-
ing wages and immigration across skill groups deﬁned by education and age in the
national labour market, to ﬁnd a relevant eﬀect. In other words, due to the incom-
ing Cubans being predominantly low-skilled, it makes sense to focus one's study at
what happened to the wage and employment of the group of natives most likely
impacted before and after the event. In this case, Borjas (2017b) uses the sample
of Miami's non-Hispanic male workers with less than high school educational levels
in the age group of 25-59. The results show that those local workers who most
resemble the refugees suﬀer the greatest wage loss (own eﬀect), whilst those workers
who complement the skills brought in by the Mariels may experience a wage gain
(cross eﬀect). He conducts a similar exercise to examine other cases of refugee sup-
ply shocks (Algerian nationals repatriating to France, Soviet refugees emigrating to
Israel, and Balkan refugees moving to several European countries) and concludes
that depending on the episode and data, such exogenous supply shocks reduce on
some occasions competing natives' wages, on others their employment rates, and
sometimes both (Borjas and Monras, 2016).
These opposing ﬁndings on the basis of the same data have further given raise to
many studies challenging Borjas and supporting Card's initial `no eﬀect' conclusion.
In the original study, Card (1990) employed a diﬀerence-in-diﬀerence method by
comparing Miami to four unaﬀected control cities, which as a result of the challenge
posed by Borjas decades later, has been retested by Peri and Yasenov (2017). They
compare native wages and employment in Miami, and in a synthetic Miami as
control, and ﬁnd that Card (1990) results hold (Figure 1.13). They challenge Borjas'
study on the premise of his choice of time-frame and small sub-samples, which ended
up with misleading results (Peri and Yasenov, 2017). Namely, Borjas (2017b) focused
only on the small sub-group of non-Hispanic males aged 25-59 as representative of
36In Miami, textile and apparel industries were especially noteworthy with 5,5% of total employ-
ment ﬁgures. Those working were mostly Cubans (75% of the workforce), meaning that the
Mariels quite likely found jobs in those industries (Card, 1990).
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all native high school drop-outs in Miami and just in relation to the low-skilled wage
trend as of 1977. Peri and Yasenov (2017) instead looked at 27 possible alternative
samples and included a longer pre-trend on wages (1972-1991). According to Peri
and Yasenov (2017) and Clemens and Hunt (2017), small samples such as chosen
by Borjas (2017b) display large ﬂuctuations in all periods (not just after the event)
and have the markings of measurement error rather than the consequence of any
speciﬁc event. According to Clemens and Hunt (2017), if one does enough slicing,
one will undoubtedly ﬁnd sub-samples for which the impacts were as hypothesized,
but which do not permit one to make any generalizations. In addition, it is also
invalid to aggregate eﬀects in sub-samples to evaluate overall net beneﬁts or costs.
Moreover, both papers accuse Borjas (2017b) of misrepresenting the low-skilled
wage trend in Miami and its eﬀect on his observed signiﬁcant results. Peri and
Yasenov (2017) show that once a longer pre-trend is introduced, there is no evidence
of a post-1979 drop in wages in comparison to the pre-existing trend. Clemens and
Hunt (2017) show that due to the compositional changes in the workforce brought
about by a sharp increase in black population with lower wages in Miami around the
time of the Mariel Boatlift, and political pressure to include more low-skilled black
workers in the census, a spurious fall in average wages for workers with less than
high school diplomas can be identiﬁed. Testing the size of this spurious wage eﬀect
further shows that the doubling of the black fraction in the Miami population pre-
and post-Boatlift accounts for roughly a 40% decline in the average wage (Clemens
and Hunt, 2017). All in all, the critics of Borjas agree that he does not provide
suﬃcient evidence to show that Card's results were false, and that the arrival of
the Cuban immigrants reduced any low-skilled workers' opportunities on the Miami
labour market.
Regardless of how the conﬂict over Mariels' impact on the labour market cul-
minates, the overarching consensus from empirical evidence still maintains that
refugees have small or null eﬀects on average native workers.37 On that account, it
is interesting now to conclude with the real world implications of such ﬁndings, and
list some recommendations for how policymakers can address the conﬂict between
the public's perceptions and academic conclusions.
37Clemens and Hunt (2017) refer to Hunt (1992) study on repatriating Algerians to France, Fried-
berg (2001) study on Soviet refugees entering Israel, and Angrist and Kugler (2003) study about
Balkan asylum seekers ﬁnding their place in the EU.
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Figure 1.13: Comparison between Borjas (2017b) and Peri and Yasenov (2017)
Synthetic Controls (Peri and Yasenov, 2017)
1.5 Conclusion
The rise in the global migrant population places pressure on policymakers in the
host countries to come up with responses that limit the drawbacks and increase
the advantages associated with migration. As scholars from various disciplines have
long been exploring the very same questions surrounding migration, it is reasonable
to assume that this large body of research could have substantial implications on
real-world public policy. Hence, it is of importance to review the literature, and
sketch out some policy recommendations.
The concern over the potential adverse eﬀect of immigration, especially for the
labour market and public ﬁnances, plays a central role in the immigration debate.
In this debate, those who are worried about immigration emphasize its negative
consequences, such as welfare dependency and increased labour market competition,
whilst in contrast, those who are optimistic about immigration stress the potential
of immigrants to ﬁll labour market and public ﬁnance shortages caused by ageing
populations and undiversiﬁed skill-pools. Empirical evidence shows that both of
these camps are to some degree correct, and to some extent mistaken.
Much of the economic impact of immigration depends on how well immigrants
integrate to the labour market. Regulations in place in the host country to `protect'
the labour market from foreign workers, contribute to the creation of an `immigrant
entry eﬀect' that keeps them from becoming tax-payers and ﬁlling labour short-
ages where needed. Considering that the majority of scholarly work has found that
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market mechanisms manage to adequately absorb immigrants, there is no real basis
for government restrictions. Policymakers should rather focus on attracting immi-
grants with complementary skill-sets to boost productivity and job creation through
occupational upgrading and task specialization of the native workforce.
The literature also mentions that in any case, allowing more high-skilled workers
to enter is beneﬁcial for the host country. Being positively self-selected on the basis
of characteristics associated with entrepreneurship and innovativeness amongst other
things, helps to create an `immigration surplus' for the host's economy. Nevertheless,
globalization has caused segmentation or dualization of the labour market, meaning
demand for immigrants to carry out `immigrant jobs' is ever persistent, resulting in
a need for low-skilled workforce as well.
Finding the right balance between diﬀerently skilled immigrants is hard, especially
due to the humanitarian obligation to accept forced migrants irrespective of them
ﬁtting into the host's labour market. As seen from multiple examples, refugees
tend to have the hardest time entering the labour market and becoming self-reliant.
Human capital transfer from origin to host country is already cumbersome for high-
skilled voluntary migrants, but for people pushed out of their homes it becomes an
insurmountable task without help from the host state. Finding ways to simplify
the qualiﬁcations' recognition procedure, facilitate accumulation of country-speciﬁc
human capital, and remove refugee-speciﬁc barriers to employment and mobility,
would yield positive returns for both the host country and the individual refugees.
To summarize, in order to reap the economic beneﬁts of immigration, large initial
investments might be needed by the host country. In both cases, voluntary and
forced migration, the key is to incorporate the incoming people to the workforce
as rapidly as possible. This process might require some initial expenditures in the
form of language classes or expediated recognition procedures, but as many scholars
have found - this investment has a very high rate of return (Borjas, 1994; Fratzscher
and Junker, 2015; Legrain, 2016). The challenge for the host countries, therefore,
is to communicate the positive and non-eﬀects of immigration found in most of the
literature to the public to encourage their participation in the integration process.
This is certainly a complicated task as individual negative cases such as someone
losing a job to a foreigner, or meeting an unemployed immigrant who collects social
beneﬁts from the state, receive a lot of attention from the media. The general
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unpopularity of leniency on immigration thus explains why much of the public policy
initiated by politicians seeking re-election still follows the logic that restrictions on
immigrants mean prosperity for the natives.
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CHAPTER 2
Losing human(itarian) capital: An analysis of barri-
ers to and prospects of refugees' labour market inte-
gration in Germany1
2.1 Introduction
Germany presents a pioneering case study in labour market integration of refugees.
Behind the Chancellor's `Wir schaﬀen das' (translated roughly into `We can do it')
(Merkel, 2015) is a changed discourse surrounding the newest inﬂux of refugees,
mainly from Syria. The asylum debate quickly moved on from mere labelling,
to how German society and economy could prepare itself, and beneﬁt from the
refugees' demographic potential (Bittner, 2015; Dettmer, 2015; Ochsner, Thomas,
2015; Diekmann, 2016). Nonetheless, how exactly to foster refugees' successful in-
corporation into the host's labour market continues to be a matter of contention.
Multiple studies suggest that refugees persistently show poorer economic outcomes
than other immigrants2 by often having diﬃculties entering the labour market in
the ﬁrst place, and becoming dependent on government support in the long run (see
1This chapter was published under the title `Losing human(itarian) capital: An analysis of barriers
to and prospects of refugees' labour market integration in Germany' in 2017 in Refugee Review:
Special Focus Labour III, pp. 46-64.
Thanks to the reviewers and editors at Refugee Review for helpful comments; to the participants
and conveners of the BGSS Summer School for all their advice; and to everyone giving feedback
at the many conferences I presented this paper at.
2`Other immigrants' refers here to family migrants and labour migrants. Similar distinction was
made in the Dutch case described by Engbersen et al. (2015), and Bakker et al. (2017)
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for example Engbersen et al., 2015; Bevelander, 2016; Bakker et al., 2017; Kelly and
Hedman, 2016; Bauböck and Tripkovic, 2017; Institut für Arbeitsmarkt- und Berufs-
forschung, 2015). Therefore, the questions arise: what factors determine refugees'
incorporation. And how can such incorporation be facilitated through meaningful
policy measures?
The literature suggests that both social structure3, i.e. the existing environment
of opportunities and constraints in any given society, and agency, i.e. the ability to
act (Hunt, 2008; Healey, 2006) on the basis of individual capital, play a big role in
refugees' labour market incorporation.4 Refugees tend to experience limited ability
to act autonomously, in particular while waiting for a decision on their asylum
claim.5 At the same time, the prevailing humanitarian approach towards refugee
settlement, which has repatriation in its core, has gained currency among policy
makers.6
This study aims to contribute to the discussion around refugees' labour mar-
ket integration by analysing how newly arrived refugees attempt to integrate into
the German labour market. By combining the ﬁelds of forced migration studies
with human capital theory, the following questions are addressed: how do refugees
themselves perceive their agency? What strategies do they employ in transferring
individual capital from a situation of war to the new host country? And how are
these activities enabled and/or constrained by structural factors in the host country?
In doing so, this paper takes a transformative approach: ﬁrst, research participants
are provided a voice, and second, an action agenda for reform is brought forward
(Mertens, 2007; Creswell, 2003). This requires a further assumption, namely that
3Social structure is understood in this paper according to Bakewell (2010) as states or cultural
norms. In the context of this article, structure is seen in terms of labour markets, governments'
policies, and host culture.
4Multiple previous studies have discussed the importance of including both structure and agency
in refugee research. See for example Kelly and Hedman, 2016; Bakewell, 2010
5Several studies take a look at refugees' limited ability to act. Richmond (1988), whilst speaking
about proactive and reactive decision-making of refugees, states that most often they have limited
`degrees of freedom' in their decisions. Even in the case of refugees with higher capabilities studied
by Kelly and Hedman (2016), they ﬁnd that the agency to determine their own future is limited.
6Humanitarian approach aims to protect the `asylum space' by introducing regulations to dis-
tinguish between refugees, and other migrants. Even if such an approach might protect the
immediate right of entry (or settlement in a third country), it fails to consider economic needs
of refugees, which exasperates their inequality, and dependency. For further reading on how the
humanitarian approach has led to the `refugee issue' to become morally questionable, see Fassin,
2012; Agier, 2011; Walters, 2011; Baban et al., 2017.
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the interplay between individuals, and their environments leads to societal, and
economic transformations in the host country [as per the works of Archer (1995)
and Giddens and Sutton (2013)].7 Therefore, evidence-based suggestions for labour
market policy reform are the second, practical contribution that the study aims to
make.
The outline of the article is as follows: ﬁrst, the literature regarding labour market
integration as part of asylum policies is introduced. The second section focuses on
the case of the Northern German city of Kiel. Third, the data collection method
is brieﬂy presented, which is followed by an overview of the ﬁndings about factors
that enable and constrain labour market integration of refugees. Lastly, policy
suggestions are given on how to facilitate refugees' incorporation into the German
labour market.
2.2 Refugees' economic lives beyond aid
Barbara Harrell-Bond (1995) has stated that `the history of responses to refugees in
the 20th century has been one long series of attempts to circumvent the problem,'
when discussing the increasing focus on refugee returns and repatriation in Western
asylum policies since World War II.8 In her historical account, Long (2013) has
traced the movement away from the pre-Convention9 approach towards refugees as
migrants to the contemporary protection regime, which increasingly frames refugee
protection as humanitarian. In its ideal form, the humanitarian approach is guided
by a state's morality and altruism to help people `who need admission' (refugees)
in contrast to those `who want admission' (migrants) (Long, 2013; Ticktin, 2014;
Fassin, 2012). However, this humanitarian `cause to protect' has, according to many
scholars, given way to restrictionist migration agendas (Fassin, 2012; Harrell-Bond,
1995). Protection of refugees became a `sedentary pursuit' in which refugees were
7See Bakewell (2010) for a thorough overview of these two scholars, and how they discuss the
process of social change considering structure and agency.
8She also refers to Richmond's writings about a `global apartheid' in which developed countries
are practicing institutional racism by introducing restrictive immigration and refugee policies.
9That is the Refugee Convention of 1951.
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expected to just wait to return (Long, 2013).10 Any meaningful long-term integration
solution has thereby been forestalled.
With no solution in sight for Syrian war raging since 2011, many Syrians are now
among the refugees coming to Europe. As such, the long prevailing refugee protec-
tion policy model that assumes temporality of the situation for the refugee, as well
as for the host state has become outdated and increasingly inept to provide suﬃ-
cient solutions.11 With a proliferation in protracted conﬂicts, asymmetric warfare,
and failed states, displacement is now increasingly protracted, and often lasts for
decades or even generations (Newland, 2015). This requires sustainable solutions in
the form of improved integration measures.
Harrell-Bond and Long show that historically the answer to increased refugee
movements was in labour market integration (Harrell-Bond, 1995; Long, 2013). Ex-
amples given by Betts et al. (2014, 2015) and Zetter (1991) further prove the eco-
nomic, and societal value of including refugees in the host country's workforce.
This has also led multiple scholars to call for a more utilitarian approach from
host countries, mainly because integrating refugees into the labour markets serves
their self-interest (Aleinikoﬀ, 2015; Legrain et al., 2015; Long, 2015; Papademetriou,
2015; Zimmermann, 2014; Wirth et al., 2014). Pre-war Syria had relatively high
literacy rates, and provided suﬃcient employment opportunities, and many of the
incoming Syrian refugees now present diﬀerent characteristics to previous migra-
tion movements from other countries (OECD, 2015; United Nations Development
Programme, 2016).12 `Higher educated' and `experienced workers' are characteriza-
tions that are commonly featured in the public discourse (Bittner, 2015; Ochsner,
Thomas, 2015; Rahmsdorf, 2015; Dettmer, 2015; Diekmann, 2016). These attributes
are further reﬂected by Syrians' choices of mobility strategies which are often similar
10Harrell-Bond (1995) maintains that the key measure in temporary asylum system has been the
refugee camp. She illustrates her point with the case of Germany `which in the 80s and 90s
opted for the view that refugees are an issue to be dealt with outside Germany's territory, and
if people do end up entering then their repatriation to a `safe host county' (note: also, often to
a refugee camp) will follow on easy terms.' Germany has had these agreements with a number
of neighbouring countries
11This is challenged by Crisp (2016). He argues that European asylum policy still keeps to the same
principles, with for example the EU-Turkey of restricting and managing the arrival of asylum
seekers oﬀshore, and in `safe zones.'
12Interviews with refugees and non-refugee respondents conducted by the author in Kiel, Germany
in 2016 concur with that.
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to those of voluntary economic migrants.13 Higher educated refugees in particular
seem to have more leeway in making conscious choices about their host country with
regards to the economic opportunities it provides. Kunz (1973) refers to this dis-
placement strategy as `anticipatory' movement, which in contrast to reactive `acute'
movements are undertaken by refugees with higher capabilities to somewhat plan
their ﬂight.
Considering, however, that refugees diﬀer from other migrants in their ability to
act, and the power they possess over their legal status (Harrell-Bond, 1995; Giddens
and Sutton, 2013; Kelly and Hedman, 2016), a policy-makers' stance (humanitar-
ian/altruistic or utilitarian/self-interest) plays a signiﬁcant role in determining the
success or failure of labour market incorporation (Healey, 2006). One such an ex-
ample is keeping in place refugee-speciﬁc barriers to labour market entry instead of
allowing capable refugees to ﬁnd better economic opportunities on their own.14 This
paper will focus on how the German government has decided to handle the labour
integration of the newest refugee group from Syria, in particular highlighting the
prevailing integration mechanisms, and how Syrian refugees perceive their power,
and capabilities within these.
2.3 Destination: Germany
Germany received more than a million refugees in the period from 2014 to 2016,
mostly working-age men from Syria (Bundesamt für Migration und Flüchtlinge,
2016). The last time such a steep rise in asylum applications occurred was in the
early 1990s as a consequence of the war in former Yugoslavia. This resulted in Ger-
man policy-makers opting for a more restrictive asylum regulation (Asylkompromiss
1993). The view guiding asylum policies in Germany revolved around the notion
that after providing humanitarian assistance for people ﬂeeing persecution, they
will be repatriated to their home countries (Thränhardt, 2015; Harrell-Bond, 1995).
Such a practice led to the view that refugees are only ever staying in Germany tem-
porarily. This, however, has led to the protracted aid-dependency of refugees who
13Germany was a preferred destination for Syrian refugees due to better access to employment and
education, in particular in comparison to the situation in Turkey.
14Long (2015) as an example of such `migration activities: Moving somewhere else within or outside
the host country to ﬁnd better opportunities, and not being constrained by quotas and other
measures, which limit refugees' freedom of movement.
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have stayed longer, and have not been able to return home, but have received little
integration assistance (Thränhardt, 2015).
Recently, Germany has developed a more utilitarian stance in its immigration
regulation. It started with the relaxation of the rules for third-country nationals
entering the German labour market, and acceptance of Germany's position as an
`Immigration country' (Einwanderungsland) to tackle shortages caused by aging
demographics, and limited skill-pools (OECD, 2013). Considering that the unem-
ployment rate has been low (Statistisches Bundesamt, 2016), and that levels of in-
novation and entrepreneurship are lagging (Global Entrepreneurship Monitor, 2014;
Copley, 2016), the potential that the immigrant population brings is appreciated for
economic growth.
Still, the steps taken to integrate refugees were minor and often politically undesir-
able (Thränhardt, 2015) until the reality of the newest `wave of refugees' (Flüchtlings-
welle) took place in 2015. Since November 2014, advancements have been under-
taken with the aim to support refugees to become self-suﬃcient, which means inte-
grating them into the labour market, and contributing to the host country's economy
at a faster pace. Since the interviews for this paper were conducted (in the ﬁrst half
of 2016), the federal government has adopted a new comprehensive Integration Law
(31.07.2016), that introduces various refugee-speciﬁc measures such as reducing the
period of restrictions on working, and providing `one-euro-job' opportunity during
an ongoing asylum procedure which enables refugees to take up employment faster
(Bundestag, 2016). Shortening, and in some places fully waiving the requirement
of job market tests (Vorrangprüfung), serves the same objective by simplifying the
process of hiring a refugee for employers (Bundesregierung, 2016). Furthermore, in
order for refugees who are under full or subsidiary protection to gain a settlement
permit, they need to show their ability to make a secure living (Bundesamt für Mi-
gration und Flüchtlinge, 2017). These are the ﬁrst attempts by German lawmakers
to change the notion of `refugee as a burden' to `refugee as a potential beneﬁt,' and
hence bring about a signiﬁcant policy shift.
2.4 Data
Research for this article was conducted using a concurrent nested mixed methods
design in which the data was collected in one stage (Creswell et al., 2003). Data
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from 139 multilingual surveys, and 25 in-depth interviews were collected in the
ﬁrst half of 2016 in Kiel, Germany from working-age newly arrived (2014-2015)
refugees who are likely to stay in Germany (with so called gute Bleibeperspektive),
and non-refugee respondents.15 As refugees are commonly understood as a `hard to
locate'16 and `hard to reach'17 population, the inclusion of non-refugee respondents
aided in identifying refugee respondents, as well as detecting issues otherwise not
discussed. However, self-selection problems could not be fully mitigated. Being
identiﬁed through local bodies may indicate that the interviewed refugees stand
out a little more or have shown initiative to be noticed. They themselves decide
to come forth, which does not necessarily mean that they are representatives of
the community. Nevertheless, the multiple entry approach provided a way into the
group of self-settled refugees outside oﬃcial housing and centres, who are diﬃcult
to reach (Jacobsen and Landau, 2003).
2.5 Determinants of labour market incorporation
The following factors that determine refugees' incorporation into the labour market
were identiﬁed from the research data: (1) structural status quo, and structure
selectivity; (2) heterogeneity of human capital, and limited agency; (3) hindered
human capital transfer; and (4) adjusted social capital, and structural capacity.
They are discussed in more detail below.
2.5.1 Structural status quo and structure selectivity
In regard to refugees, principal social structures both at country of origin and coun-
try of asylum play a signiﬁcant role in determining the success or failure of labour
market incorporation (Healey, 2006). Whether the host state has taken a human-
itarian (altruistic) or utilitarian (self-interest) stance in its policy-making towards
15Non-refugee respondents included reception centres workers and volunteers working with refugees
in Kiel on a day to day basis. The basis for selection was experience with working with refugees,
and the potential of providing rich data due to direct and continuous contact with the subject
group.
16Bloch (1999) refers to the non-existence of a complete and accurate sampling frame.
17Linguistic, cultural and emotional (trusting issues) barriers have been mentioned by Bloch (1999)
and Jacobsen and Landau (2003). Often times, the inclusion of women's views is particularly
diﬃcult in this group.
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refugees inﬂuences the ease of ﬁnding employment. As described above, German
asylum policy has until recently focused on the temporality of the refugee situation,
as well as return and repatriation (Harrell-Bond, 1995; Constant and Zimmermann,
2016). For the refugees interviewed for this study in the ﬁrst half of 2016, this meant
that they felt constantly excluded from the workforce. The government's rigid view
of the right to work and freedom of movement was articulated by non-refugee re-
spondents as well. Respondents who worked at refugee reception centres illustrated
this by highlighting the lack of coordinated eﬀort to assess skills of refugees, and
thereafter matching labour supply and demand in their placement. Likewise, not
having a mechanism ready for refugees' integration in general (e.g. language classes
from the start18), and keeping them waiting in limbo during the lengthy asylum
procedure, kept strong structural barriers to labour market integration ﬁrmly in
place.19
One of the main issues brought up in the interviews as an obstacle to integra-
tion was command of the language. According to Healey, language can be both a
structural and agency factor, depending on whether one learns it to increase one's
capabilities, or because it is mandated by the authorities (Healey, 2006). `Lan-
guage is most important for integration, and gaining employment' was mentioned
in some form or another in every interview. Refugees insisted they want to learn
the language, whilst also stating that without knowing German they will neither
be employed nor accepted. Non-refugee participants agreed that proﬁciency in the
local language is the cornerstone of improving one's opportunities in Germany.
The existing societal structure enables or hinders everyone in diﬀerent ways (Healey,
2006; Hunt, 2008; Bourdieu, 2011; Giddens and Sutton, 2013). One clear example
of this brought up by many non-refugee respondents is the limited availability of in-
tegration measures for refugees without a `good prospect of staying' (so called gute
Bleibeperspektive). While Syrian, Iranian, Iraqi, and Eritrean refugees (i.e. asylum
seekers with a good prospect of staying) were invited to join state funded language
classes, Afghanis and those from the Balkans (i.e. asylum seekers without a good
18As of the end of 2015, language classes were organised for asylum seekers from Syria, Eritrea,
Iran, and Iraq (Einstiegskurse).
19In November 2016, BAMF introduced the Integrated Refugee Management system which should
both speed up the process and inquire about skills in earlier stages, and in a more coordinated
manner.
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prospect of staying) had to ﬁnd volunteers to teach them, pay for private classes or
not learn at all. Language as a tool to enhance agency was, therefore, taken away.
Not only do certain regulations cement a status quo in refugees' employability,
but based on the personal experience of some interviewees, employers also have
shown negative attitudes towards hiring refugees by dismissing their job applications.
Nevertheless, many respondents doubted that the cause is pure unwillingness, but
instead the high numbers of refugees arriving in Germany. The interplay between
willingness and ability in structural capacity will be discussed below in more detail.
2.5.2 Heterogeneity of human capital and limited agency
The picture of a large, collective human mass in perpetual trouble is what charac-
terises much of the media coverage of the so called `wave of refugees/refugee crisis'.
This reproduces the view of a homogenous group of vulnerable people that are not
able to act self-determinedly, and only possess limited agency. Within the aforemen-
tioned structural environment, refugees exercise agency based on what they have
experienced in the past, what they perceive as possibilities for the future, and how
they evaluate their situation in the present (Emirbayer and Mische, 1998). In itself,
agency can be constrained or enabled by human and social capital. The existence
of skills required in the host market, and personal characteristics such as resilience
and motivation help gain employment, while on the other hand a lack of skills and
personal issues extend the time spent outside the labour market (Betts et al., 2015;
Kelly and Hedman, 2016; Colic-Peisker and Walker, 2003).
There are a whole range of people coming in, because when a war breaks out it is just
not one segment that will ﬂee - from lawyers, and doctors, and university professors
to people with no education at all. (MZ, non-refugee respondent, male)
Multiple backgrounds and multiple future trajectories were emphasized by non-
refugee interviewees, as well as by refugees themselves. `Not all are good people
who come' and `not all want to contribute' were utterances that occurred almost as
often as praise for the `highly-educated and experienced.' Heterogeneity of formal-
ized human capital (work experience and education) also shows in the results of the
multilingual survey carried out amongst working-age newly arrived refugees in Kiel,
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Germany in the ﬁrst half of 2016.20
Human capital (formal) %of respondents
High occupational proﬁle 48%
Medium occupational proﬁle 39%
Low occupational proﬁle 13%
Total N 139
Table 2.1: Refugees' skills survey, respondent sample
The occupational proﬁle was categorized with the help of the International Stan-
dard Classiﬁcation of Occupations (ISCO) (International Labour Organization, 2007)
based on university attendance, speciﬁed profession, and self-perceived skill level.
Generally, most respondents indicated having some work experience, and more than
half stated that they had attended university.21 The highest level makes up 48% of
the participants' occupations due to large number of teachers, engineers, computer
programmers, and lawyers. Secondly, ISCO-08 Group 7 (craft and related trades
workers, such as electricians, food processors, and tailors) and Group 5 (services
and sales workers) boosted the number of medium level occupations, accounting for
39% of the whole sample of the survey. Low level occupations, mostly comprised of
Afghan housewives, came in third with 13%.22
20The survey is not representative of the whole refugee population, mainly due to the small sample
size, and the inclusion of only those refugees who, in the beginning of 2016, had a somewhat
high likelihood of being granted some form of protection (e.g. meaning asylum seekers from the
Balkans were not included). Nevertheless, the survey ﬁndings have been largely conﬁrmed by
a representative study carried out by IAB-BAMF-SOEP about qualiﬁcations of refugees who
arrived in Germany between 2013 and 2016 (Institut für Arbeitsmarkt- und Berufsforschung
et al., 2016). Where possible in this paper, I have emphasized the connections.
21In comparison to the IAB-BAMF-SOEP study, the number of university attendees is compara-
tively very high. Their study says that 31% attended tertiary, university or vocational education,
which might be due to groups of refugees I left out of my survey. The work experience ﬁgure is
similar to my ﬁndings (73%).
22Besides Syrians, other groups were also included in the survey. From the survey answer sheets
29.8% were from women and 70.1% from men. With regards to nationality, 69% were from
Syrians, 10.5% from Iran, 9.6% from Iraq, 6% from Afghanistan, and 4.9% from other countries.
The gender distribution matches the one found by the IAB-BAMF-SOEP study, but my sample
does have an overrepresentation of Syrians in comparison. There are regional diﬀerences in
Germany, and it is the case that more Syrians end up in Kiel than do from other nationalities
according to local authorities. A report from the Interior Ministry of Schleswig-Holstein also
shows that the gender distribution varies a little from the general estimates of Germany  namely
around 76% of the incoming refugees in Schleswig-Holstein are men. Findings of the IAB-BAMF-
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If agency is said to be enabled or constrained by individual capital, there is merit
in speaking about various levels of agency among refugees based solely on the for-
malized human capital diﬀerences. Refugees with higher occupational proﬁles might
exert more self-determination in their actions than uneducated and lesser-skilled per-
sons (Bauböck and Tripkovic, 2017). This point was also highlighted by many of the
interviewees who noted that it is tougher for refugees who are older, less educated,
female or not from Syria to take charge of their own future in the host country.
However, higher formal capabilities do not necessarily mean an enhanced ability to
act. There could be two reasons for this. First, structural barriers in human capital
transfer inﬂuence highly skilled refugees in the form of problematic recognition of
qualiﬁcations (Bauböck and Tripkovic, 2017) as will be discussed in the next section.
Secondly, it clearly emerged from the interviews that many refugees accept their
limited agency and structural status quo as a survival strategy due to past experience
and future uncertainty. This strategy is often described in forced migration research,
when people in precarious situations want to promote a particular vision of their
suﬀering as part of their survival strategy (Jacobsen and Landau, 2003).
In some cases, however, the opposite occurs and refugees try to remove the
metaphorical equals sign between being a refugee and therefore passive, and un-
employable by default. By drawing attention to their motivation, resilience, and
potential for success, refugees are challenging the notion of limited agency and fram-
ing a diﬀerent narrative.23 This will be discussed further in the following section in
regard to unformalised human capital.
2.5.3 Hindered human capital transfer
The disruption of the life-cycle due to ﬂight often leads to the depreciation of skills,
knowledge, and networks (Bakker et al., 2017).24 Skills and knowledge in general are
not directly transferable across frontiers, but with a war raging at home the process
becomes even more complicated. Mincer and Ofek (1982) have noted that the loss
SOEP study also show that of the incoming female refugees, 38.5% are under 16 years old, and
hence outside the working-age considered in this study (NDR, 2015; Ministerium für Inneres und
Bundesangelegenheiten, 2015; Bundesamt für Migration und Flüchtlinge, 2015).
23Example was given by BM (refugee, Syria, male): `I say it actually all the time. Ich bin Flüchtling
(note: `I am a refugee' in German). Because this is the reality. I am not ashamed of that. I am
a refugee and I will be a successful refugee.'
24The authors have referred to this as the refugee entry eﬀect
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of human capital is more severe when the interruption of a work career has been
unanticipated (e.g. due to a war breaking out), and when the economic and cultural
`distance' between countries of origin and destination is greater. As human capital
acquired domestically often outweighs human capital from abroad (due to lack of
country-speciﬁc skills and information), even highly educated refugees experience
problems in sustaining a career status like the one they had at home (Friedberg,
2000; Bauböck and Tripkovic, 2017).25
This constraint is most visible in the recognition of formal qualiﬁcations. First,
Germany has a strict system for recognizing foreign certiﬁcates (Federal Ministry of
Education and Research, 2017b).26 Secondly, many refugees have problems supply-
ing any documentation for examination in the ﬁrst place. These points are illustrated
by HM (refugee, Eritrea, male) who studied medicine in Eritrea:
We did not have our certiﬁcates with us, because we are political refugees, and our
government did not give us the documents. Our families and friends cannot go and
ask for the documents, because they could also be arrested. I took my course list
with me, but no grade transcripts. Those I could not get. /. . . / I studied in English
in Eritrea. Here you cannot do that. The possibility to study medicine here is very
complicated. It is also alright for me to start from the beginning again.
Medicine is not the only ﬁeld where the respondents have identiﬁed a qualiﬁcations
mismatch. Lawyers, teachers, hairdressers, and engineers who were part of the
sample have all experienced problems getting their certiﬁcates recognized. Often the
only valid option is to retrain in Germany from the very beginning. The question
posed by MM (refugee, Iran, male), who trained and worked as a hairdresser back
home in Iran, exempliﬁes the situation well. He said: `What do they mean I have
to start from the beginning again?'
25For more on studies done on higher educated refugees' integration to the labour market see
Bakker et al., 2017 and Jamil et al., 2012
26On this portal one can research the requirements for the qualiﬁcations' recognition of various
professions. The standard depends on whether the profession falls under regulated professions
or under non-regulated professions. In regulated professions (including many trades) the full
recognition of foreign qualiﬁcations is essential for being able to practice the profession (either
as an employee or self-employed).
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One strong indicator that came out of the surveys27 and interviews28 was the
number of formerly self-employed people and entrepreneurs29 among the refugee re-
spondents, who often do not have certiﬁcates to prove their expertise (Bundesmin-
isterium für Arbeit und Soziales, 2017).30 For a country such as Germany, which
is said to lag in entrepreneurship (Global Entrepreneurship Monitor, 2014; Copley,
2016), it could be especially beneﬁcial to allow these individuals to contribute to
the economy. As shared by many interviewees, these groups of refugees unfortu-
nately have a particularly hard time adjusting to the German setting due to these
structural constraints. An example was given by MK (refugee, Syria, male):
My cousins did not study too long in Syria, until the sixth grade, no high school
diploma. They just went to a company, and worked there for 10 years. Now they
have their own company. In Germany, they have problems. They are not allowed to
work here. They do not have any certiﬁcates.
Often the self-employed people are self-taught, which does not match with the rigid
vocational training and education standards in Germany. As reported by PU (non-
refugee respondent, male), refugees often bring with them very limited formalized
vocational training and education. This means that even construction workers,
electricians, mechanics, hairdressers, etc. cannot oﬀer their services legally without
completing the training in Germany ﬁrst.31
27Instances of chosen profession `expert in crafts and related trades' with no educational back-
ground.
28`Syrians do a lot of business. I lived in Turkey for four months, and saw how many companies
were founded by Syrians. Wherever the Syrians are, they are active and good for the economy.'
(RL, refugee, Syria)
29The representative study done by IAB-BAMF-SOEP (2016, 6) also found that 27% of the refugees
who arrived in Germany during 2015 were self-employed in their origin country.
30In accordance to regulation explained on this portal - if a refugee would want to become self-
employed or start a business multiple barriers are faced. First, depending on their legal status,
one is allowed or restricted from self-employment and entrepreneurship. Secondly, according to
the ﬁeld of activity, requirements of `professional suitability' exist. This is determined by formal
qualiﬁcations. In a majority of cases the recognized qualiﬁcations must be equal to German ones
to take on self-employment or start a business. Also, additional requirements such as licenses,
permits or memberships from the professional associations might be required.
31 For example, per the `Recognition in Germany' portal the following requirements exist to become
a self-employed hairdresser or mechanic: `Register of Crafts and Trades (the so-called Handw-
erksrolle) is mandatory if you wish to become self-employed in this occupation. For this, your
foreign qualiﬁcation usually must be recognised as being equal to the corresponding German
master craftsman qualiﬁcation.' According to the `Wir Gründen in Deutschland' portal, being
allowed to start a company in these two ﬁelds in Germany also requires a full recognition of
formal qualiﬁcations of the person wishing to do so.
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Paperwork is also often not available at all with the non-formalized part of hu-
man capital, often referred to as soft skills (Collett and Zuleeg, 2008; Fitz-enz, 2009).
According to Collett and Zuleeg (2008), `while technical skills and professional qual-
iﬁcations are important, translating proﬁciency into economic output requires soft
skills.' When speaking about their journeys to Germany, many interviewees de-
scribed resilience, dynamism, and ingenuity in their actions, and experiences. Many
Syrian refugees for example had worked in Turkey before to support an onwards
journey or to send money back home, which shows ability to adapt, and ﬁnd solu-
tions. As it is complicated to work legally in Turkey due to a precarious status of
Syrian refugees (Baban et al., 2017), in many instances both the soft skills, and hard
skills gathered are left undocumented, and are hence not formally transferrable. Be-
sides the most recent work experience abroad in Turkey, many refugee respondents
included in this study mentioned previous internships and jobs they had completed
abroad. This is further proof of the international ties which characterise part of the
incoming refugees from Syria.
The refugees are very motivated to work. They arrive here (note: reception centre)
and after one-two days already ask about employment possibilities. They want to
know how they can work, if they can help out. Also as volunteer. Just to have
something to do. (RN, non-refugee stakeholder)
From my study in Kiel, and from the work of Bakker et al. (2017) in the Netherlands,
it becomes apparent that most refugees are very motivated and determined to `make
a success of their life' in the new host country. Not only because return is not an
option (Bakker et al., 2017), but as the refugee respondents in Kiel summarized it `to
not just sit around and wait.' Motivation as a soft skill is invaluable for integration
into the labour market and can reassure the host state that refugees have potential.
2.5.4 Adjusted social capital and structural capacity
Besides human capital, social capital32 also inﬂuences refugees' ability to act. Find-
ings suggest that even if the traditional ties of family, friends, and ethnic groups
become limited when displaced, new forms of social capital emerge through rela-
tionships with volunteers and workers at reception centres. In almost all instances
32Social capital refers to available networks and ties within any given society, and beneﬁts individ-
uals accrue through membership within a group (Bourdieu, 2011).
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of successful attainment of work (such as volunteering for a language course or doing
mini-jobs around the reception centres and temporary housing), refugee respondents
named these connections as critical. The individual eﬀort by a few local contacts to
overcome structural constraints such as language insuﬃciency, and information gaps
whilst looking for work also became evident from the interviews with non-refugee
respondents.
Returning to structural constraints and enablers, the absorption capacity of the
receiving society must be mentioned. According to Jacobsen (1996), `a receiving
community's absorption capacity is deﬁned as the extent to which the community
is willing and able to absorb an inﬂux of refugees.' Ability signiﬁes the factual
capability of incorporating refugees into the society and economy, whilst willingness
refers to the perception of one's capabilities. Willingness, therefore, can be limited
by the presence of fear, racism, and antagonism in the society even if the economic
capacity to handle the inﬂux of additional refugees has been assured. In general,
the narrative about `a welcoming North-Germany' emerged from the interviews.
The aforementioned helpful connections were available for most of the interviewed
refugees. But not all newcomers beneﬁt from it. Large parts of the German society
are still closed oﬀ, literally and ﬁguratively, leading many refugees to remain in
ethnic enclaves (Lamba, 2008). Being stuck in the pre-existing networks was said
to contribute to the pull factor of the informal market. Even though many refugee
respondents recalled success stories of earlier refugees in regular employment, the
dominant view was that it would be very easy to ﬁnd work on the informal market.
2.6 Discussion
The magnitude of the changes the current refugee inﬂux brings to the German labour
market is yet to be seen. In regard to incorporation into the German labour market,
many Syrian refugees with higher capabilities follow the path of voluntary migrants,
and thus challenge the prevailing structures. They are reinventing themselves as
workforce by challenging the `limited assumption' and expect the policy-makers to
follow.
But I think the government here wants us to educate us, not only to work in factories
or something. They want to make educated people, because I think eventually most
of them will be Germans. They will build a new Germany. Like for me - I am thinking
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about it like that - I am living in Germany, I will learn this or that and eventually
this will go to Germany. This is the positive role for the government. (BM, refugee,
Syria, male)
It is common that the early investments made into individual capital in the new
setting are done by refugees themselves.33 Temporality of refugees' situation dis-
courages host states from investing in the restoration of human capital, and thereby
refugees' agency (Bakker et al., 2017). As stated by Mincer and Ofek (1982) , this
is a mistake because `repairing' previously eroded human capital is less costly than
the accumulation of new human capital. The ﬁrst step to rebuild and employ exist-
ing capital would be to recognize the educational and professional qualiﬁcations of
refugees. Delimiting refugees' self-worth by forcing them to start over is the biggest
reason for staying outside of the labour market for so long.
This does not, however, mean that all refugees will be able to start working the
moment their credentials are oﬃcially checked and approved. In contrast to what is
often portrayed, the incoming group of refugees is very heterogeneous. Considering
the members of the group as identical has led to a one-dimensional refugee pro-
tection policy which acts as a structural constraint. Tailored legislation that takes
diﬀerences in formal and informal educational and professional background into ac-
count could improve integration by letting those who can access the labour market
immediately do so, whilst oﬀering additional help to those who need it. Currently
high levels, as well as low levels, of human capital act more as a constraint than an
enabler.
Lack of certain professional and educational backgrounds is evident from the data,
and could be attributed to the social contexts back home. For example, university
studies in social sciences and professions in those ﬁelds were rarely mentioned by
refugee respondents. According to the Syrian respondents, it was more prestigious
and forward-looking to embark on a natural sciences path instead of social sciences.
In order to build a more diverse community that can one day assist in building up
the origin country, there should be a conscious choice to encourage refugees to take
up social sciences. Also, more attention should be focused on getting women into
education or training, and thereafter to having professional careers.
33Within my sample, the majority had taken steps to learn German beyond mandatory courses, and
had managed to gather local employment practise in the form of voluntary work or a mini-job.
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Since language skills are often too low for ﬁnding regular employment, but the
skills and motivation to work exist, self-employment would be the way to avoid
deskilling and aid-dependency. Survey respondents and interviewees indicated that
there are many former business-owners and entrepreneurs within the group of refugees
in Kiel who could start new ventures in the host country if given adequate support.
This can be in the form of changes to legislation and to the procedure of recogni-
tion of qualiﬁcations, but also by providing possibilities for entrepreneurial refugees
to present and cultivate their ideas at workshops or innovative spaces. In general,
local work experience of any sort is likely to enhance agency (Becker, 1964). Fur-
thermore, many refugee respondents mentioned that they also worked in sales and
services in various other countries along the way to Germany. This wide range of
work experience, and the informal skills that it suggests, should also be considered.
The experience of interviewees also shows that what matters to integration into
local labour market are local connections. Mostly people who have chosen to inter-
act with refugees are the ones who support the creation of such networks, but for
wider eﬀects the rest of society should also be engaged. One way to address this
would be giving potential employers, and future colleagues the option to partake in
intercultural trainings.
Germany is slowly moving towards a more utilitarian stance in regard to refugees'
settlement. Self-interest is shown in the amount of measures introduced with the
new Integration Law of 2016 to foster refugees' incorporation into the labour mar-
ket. This could be taken a step further if the non-negotiable German proﬁciency
requirement would be more lenient, especially in positions where English, Arabic,
Farsi etc. are suﬃcient. However, as both refugees and non-refugee respondents
considered language to be the most important factor of integration and gaining
employment, it is unlikely that this will change.
This study set out to produce research with a transformative goal. With the
help of perceptions gathered from refugee and non-refugee respondents, a picture of
the factors that inﬂuence labour market incorporation of refugees in Germany has
emerged. This, in turn, can inform reform of integration and labour policies.
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2.7 Conclusion
Even though the right to work is included in both the Refugee Convention (United
Nations, 1951) and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights [Article 23] (United
Nations, 1948), multiple barriers exist for refugees to exercise this right (Wirth et al.,
2014). In light of the latest movement of refugees to Europe, many migration schol-
ars (see e.g. Betts et al., 2014; Betts, 2015; Betts and Collier, 2015; Papademetriou,
2015; Aleinikoﬀ, 2015; Long, 2015) call for a shift in asylum policies, and increased
incorporation of refugees into local labour markets. Nevertheless, previous experi-
ence shows that integrating refugees is a far more complicated task. Not only is this
due to limited capabilities of refugees that keep them out of the workforce on av-
erage much longer than other immigrants, but the changing of immigration policies
in general tends to be politically undesirable. Therefore, the determinants needed
to be studied in order to answer the research question posed in the beginning are in
the line of social structure, and refugee agency.
Data for the article was collected in Kiel, Germany through a multilingual survey,
and in-depth interviews with refugees, and non-refugee respondents. Findings sug-
gest that in contrast to what is often portrayed, refugees arriving to Germany exhibit
a substantial degree of heterogeneity in human capital. Multiple backgrounds, as
well as multiple future trajectories inﬂuence how much determination refugees show
in their actions, and whether they challenge the structural status quo. Some adopt
`limited agency' as a survival strategy due to past experience and future uncer-
tainty. Others frame a diﬀerent narrative by drawing attention to their motivation,
resilience, and potential for success, refusing the narrative of the refugee as a victim
of circumstance.
Nevertheless, data shows that the structural status quo, i.e. the contemporary
asylum policy's view of refugees as outside the workforce, still dominates. Further-
more, assumed temporality of refugees' situation discourages host states from invest-
ing in the restoration of refugee's social and human capital, and thereby refugees'
agency. Two of the biggest obstacles are rigid language requirements, and com-
plicated recognition of foreign qualiﬁcations. Both extend the time refugees spend
outside the labour market, and hinder the transfer of potential human capital from
origin to host country.
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Based on the sample, the following recommendations can be formulated: (1) Ger-
many should facilitate the recognition of refugee's human capital (both formalized
and non-formalized), and its transfer opportunities; (2) legislation should be tai-
lored to account for heterogeneity of the refugees with regards to their skills; and
(3) employers should be further engaged to provide employment for refugees.
Germany's former president Joachim Gauck (2014)has described the refugees that
reach Europe (and Germany in particular) as highly mobile, ﬂexible, multilingual,
motivated, and willing to take risks. Considering that one of the main questions
concerning labour market policy making in Europe is how to acquire human capital
in the current demographic setting, the answer would be to stop losing the human
capital already under one's nose.
This study oﬀers a unique insight into the economic lives of refugees through their
own perceptions on the structural, and agency-related constraints and enablers they
face in attempting to integrate to the German labour market. By asking refugees
to reﬂect on these implications, new information for policy-makers can be acquired.
This also helps overcome the assumptions about refugees being mere victims, and
incapable of carrying on economic lives in the host country.
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Uncovering hidden human capital: A case for trans-
formative mixed methods in refugee studies1
3.1 Introduction
Refugees are often disregarded as part of the workforce in their host countries.
This is mainly due to an humanitarian migrant status that brands the person as a
vulnerable victim instead of a full member of the society. Recently, however, many
scholars2 have called for a change in that thinking emphasizing the likely win-win
situation from including refugees in the workforce. First, refugees potentially help
ﬁlling shortages on the host's labour market left behind by ageing workers exiting
or by limitations of the existing pool of skills. Second, working could be a useful
tool for more rapid integration of the newcomers.
The argument for enhanced refugee labour market incorporation relies on the
assumptions of human capital of the incoming people. Many of the arrivals have
had working lives back home, and/or have educated themselves3, which leads to the
expectation that if given the opportunity, these people could and would want to work
in their new home. Problems, however, still lie in ﬁrst identifying and assessing, and
thereafter utilizing this potential human capital.
1Thanks to Julia Hempﬂing, Ilka Hübner, Elisabeth Haug, and to all the participants, who vol-
unteered their time to take part in the surveys and interviews. This paper also beneﬁted from
helpful feedback at the IMISCOE Spring Conference on Methods in Migration Studies.
2Alexander Betts, Katy Long, Demetrious G. Papademetriou to name a few.
3Studies done by IAB-SOEP-BAMF, as well as REACH show how commonplace it was that
refugees had worked in the origin country, and/or were schooled there.
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Often the human capital of refugees is and remains hidden4. Not only do clear
emotional, linguistic, and physical barriers associated with the refugee group hinder
the identiﬁcation of their human capital, but also the administrative capabilities in
the host countries further delay and derail its assessment, and utilization (Institut für
Arbeitsmarkt- und Berufsforschung, 2015; Rich, 2016; Aiyar et al., 2016; Engbersen
et al., 2015). The refugee group is clearly not as homogeneous as it is often portrayed
(Kaabel, 2017; Institut für Arbeitsmarkt- und Berufsforschung et al., 2016; REACH,
2017), therefore in order to make informed decisions, and adjust policies to the actual
occupational characteristics of the newest members of the society, knowledge of the
real human capital is essential. Therefore, recognition of the skills, qualiﬁcations,
and capabilities, even if they are well-hidden, should be improved.
This article aims to make a case for using transformative mixed methods in the as-
sessment of human capital of refugees. By embedding a qualitative approach within
a traditionally quantitative study of educational and occupational characteristics
of a population, researchers may uncover hidden human capital, and move beyond
mere assumptions of skills and capabilities of refugees. Furthermore, by employing
the transformative approach to research, prior assumptions are challenged, and voice
of the participants heard. In the case of refugees arriving to Germany, for example,
the story lines, compiled on the basis of survey and interview data, exposed (1) how
ﬂuid the working careers of current day workers are; (2) how lacking the formal pro-
cedures of qualiﬁcations' recognition are in regard to identifying skills necessary for
modern economies; and (3) how internalized labour market inferiority is in regard
to refugees. Without the qualitative input, the quantitative data would have told
half the story. As policy-makers, however, it is important to know the full one.
The following article is divided into four sections. First, an overview of the liter-
ature dealing with refugees' labour market incorporation and human capital assess-
ment is given. Thereafter, the data collection is explained and the main ﬁndings
from the illustrative study done in Kiel, Germany are presented. Last, the role
of transformative mixed methods in the skills assessment of refugees is discussed
further.
4Hidden human capital refers to both, explicit and implicit/tacit human capital of refugees that
can be left uncovered due to the refugee group being a hard-to-reach and hidden subject group.
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3.2 Refugees' human capital assessment: Making the case for
transformative mixed methods
3.2.1 Refugees' labour market incorporation
After an often long journey and tedious admission procedure, many refugees want
to forget the perils of the road, and carry on their lives as normally as possible in
the new home countries (Bakker et al., 2017). One of the most common everyday
activities to facilitate that process, is work. However, previous research shows that
refugees in general tend to have low employment levels both, immediately after entry
and in the long-term (Bakker et al., 2017; Engbersen et al., 2015; Bevelander, 2016).
Exclusion from the labour market is due to many reasons. First, refugees are
admitted as people needing international protection. This category, assigned to
them by migration policy aiming to keep this group from settling (Zetter, 2007),
sticks with them and seems to diminish their ability to work. Being labelled as
`humanitarian' migrants instead of `economic' migrants fortiﬁes the understanding
that refugees will not be part of the workforce (Collett and Zuleeg, 2008; Zetter,
2007). This also means that their admission and settlement procedures do not pay
attention to qualiﬁcations.
Zimmermann (2014) claims that many of those who come to Europe for human-
itarian reasons actually have valuable `human capital' in the form of hard and soft
skills. Papademetriou (2015) adds that the way we are treating the displaced, by
placing them under poor conditions, and not acknowledging the added value they
bring, amounts to a signiﬁcant waste of human capital. Instead of using the skills
and resources refugees have, they are `warehoused' or forced into jobs well below
their skill level (Papademetriou, 2015; Betts et al., 2014, 2015; Aleinikoﬀ, 2015).
Furthermore, this creates a backward spiral with the skills degrading over time, and
making it impossible to lift oneself out of poverty, and become independent of aid.
Instead of continuing with this pattern, scholars (amongst others Katy Long,
Alexander Betts) insist that there is a likely win-win situation for the host coun-
tries and refugees in the mix. First, participation in the labour force is a useful
tool of integration for the refugees, but also for the governments always on the
lookout for new ways on how to integrate newcomers faster. Second, by removing
refugee-speciﬁc barriers to entry of employment (Long, 2013), refugees could con-
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tribute to the host's labour market by potentially ﬁlling shortages left behind by
the exiting ageing workforce or by limitations of the existing skill pool. In other
words, employing refugees would ensure that a growing economy was not slowed
down by a declining workforce (Wirth et al., 2014). Furthermore, according to the
segmented/dual labour market theory, some shortages are very unlikely to be ﬁlled
by local unemployed people, making immigrants the prime alternative.
3.2.2 Human capital assessment
Recognition of qualiﬁcations, and assessment of skills, and capabilities are necessary
to attain employment, get higher education, and start a business. In other words, in
order to partake in the labour market, refugees, as well as other migrant groups, have
to get their human capital transferred from origin to host country. This process,
however, is not without its hurdles.
There is a rigidity associated with foreign qualiﬁcations recognition in general.
According to Collett and Zuleeg (2008) the skills of migrants are overlooked every
day because migration is regulated with what they call `a planned economy approach
reminiscent of the postwar period,' instead of using ﬂexible approaches increasingly
adopted by human resource managers in the private sector. They argue that current
immigration policies are incapable of identifying the skill needs of the 21st century
economies, because they (a) stick to their stagnant categories, (b) ignore the poor
correlation between job types and educational background, and (c) disregard soft
skills completely.
To elaborate, as the world is witnessing a trend towards more selective migration
policies5, the incoming migrants and labour market needs increasingly mismatch.
By focusing on attracting the so called high-skilled migrants, and limiting the entry
of low-skilled migrants, those selective policies do a disservice to many systems in
dire need of speciﬁc low-skilled workers6. Furthermore, Collett and Zuleeg (2008)
recognize a limited correlation between nowadays job types (many of which are not
easily categorised as speciﬁc profession or trade), and broad categories of experience
and formal qualiﬁcations [which often tend to be country-speciﬁc (Worbs and Bund,
5See for example work of Hein de Haas and his colleagues at Oxford University based on the
DEMIG-POLICY dataset.
6Collett and Zuleeg (2008) gave the example here of the medical ﬁeld, where next to doctors and
nurses, ambulance drivers, nurses' aides, and lab technicians are also needed.
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2016)] fuelled by a growing importance of on-the-job training, and existence and
development of soft skills. Hence, traditional understanding of skills is inept to
guide governments in identifying the most productive migrant workers to ﬁll existing
shortages7.
Instead of keeping to the traditions, more ﬂexibility in the rigid skills and capabili-
ties assessment is required. Even though resource-intensive, adapting some of private
sector's recruitment strategies, such as proxy measures (Collett and Zuleeg, 2008)
to evaluate soft skills (previous experience, hobbies, interests, or charity work), and
personalized assessments (interviewing, psychological tests), or including employers
earlier and to a larger extent, could be of assistance in matching labour supply and
demand better. In regard to the speciﬁc migrant group of refugees, going beyond
the assessment of formal qualiﬁcations certiﬁed by documentation might open new
depths.
3.2.3 Refugees' human capital assessment with transformative mixed
methods
Transferring foreign human capital is already problematic due to limited under-
standings of diﬀering standards in origin and host countries (Worbs and Bund,
2016; Schuster et al., 2013), but it becomes even more complicated if the interrup-
tion of the work career has been unanticipated (e.g. war breaking out as explained
by Mincer and Ofek, 1982). As human capital acquired domestically often outweighs
human capital from abroad (due to lack of country-speciﬁc skills and knowledge),
even highly educated refugees experience problems in sustaining a career status like
the one at home (Bauböck and Tripkovic, 2017).8 Moreover, due to the magnitude
of the recent inﬂux of refugees, the already overburdened administrative bodies (Ai-
yar et al., 2016; Rich, 2016; Institut für Arbeitsmarkt- und Berufsforschung, 2015)
have more important things on their plate9, leaving the quest of ﬁnding employment
to refugees themselves or to a few engaged local individuals (Kaabel, 2017). This,
7For example, in an account manager position in an up-and-coming start-up, the ability to learn
and adapt matters a whole lot more than a bachelor's degree in business. Similarly, among workers
taking care of the elderly, having a worker with interpersonal skills is critical.
8For more studies done on higher educated refugees' integration to the labour market see Bakker
et al., 2017; Jamil et al., 2012.
9For example ﬁnding accommodation, getting the asylum procedure under way, and signing up
and running the integration/language classes.
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therefore, means that no systematic nor eﬃcient eﬀort to recognise refugees' human
capital is undertaken, leaving policy-makers continuously in the dark. In order to
get a full picture of the scope of refugees' qualiﬁcations, skills, and capabilities, tools
from social science research could be employed.
Mixed methods, that is a combination of qualitative and quantitative methods,
are used to get a more complete and full portrait of our social world through the
use of multiple perspectives and lenses (Teddlie and Tashakkori, 2003; Creswell,
2003; Mertens, 2007, 2011; Castro et al., 2010). By combining statistically derived
outcomes from a quantitative study with quotes from the qualitative study, story
lines can be derived (Castro et al., 2010). In the particular case of refugees' human
capital, embedding a qualitative approach within a traditionally quantitative study
of educational and occupational characteristics of a population, may help to capture
the intricacies of the skills that the refugees might have, and uncover hidden human
capital. With surveys conducted so far by others (for example Worbs and Bund,
2016), there has often been the problem that various educational categories, and
professional capabilities do not shine through as they do not correspond to the host
country's standards. Thus, the quantitative data does not tell the whole story. With
the quotes to help, a conceptualization is achieved instead of a mere description.
The qualitative data served a further purpose. Namely, interviewing was used
in order to give voice to the participants in accordance with the transformative
approach (Creswell, 2003). Transformative research is used to understand the situ-
ation through ﬁrst-hand experience of often socially unprivileged groups (Mertens,
2013, 2011, 2007) to inform policy-makers, and suggest an action agenda for reform
(Creswell, 2003). Considering refugees, in order to combat the previously mentioned
existing assigned labels and categories with limited rights, we should try to learn
from the subject group itself to make more informed decisions.
The following sections present the data collection and analysis of human capital
of refugees through transformative mixed methods in an illustrative case study done
in Kiel, the capital of the Federal State of Schleswig-Holstein in Germany. On the
basis of this study, the discussion section will further attempt to make a case for
using transformative mixed methods in refugees' human capital assessment.
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3.3 Data
Researchers are increasingly recognizing the beneﬁts of incorporating a secondary
method within a mono-method design (Mertens, 2011, 2013, 2007; Castro et al.,
2010). When quantitative approach de-contextualizes the phenomenon by detaching
it from its real-world context (Moghaddam et al., 2003; Castro et al., 2010), then
qualitative research does the opposite by looking at a holistic object of research
fully embedded in its natural environment (Gelo et al., 2008; Castro et al., 2010).
This leads to limited generalizability due to a small number of observations that
can be examined in such depth. Even though some scholars (Denzin and Lincoln,
1994; Castro et al., 2010) argue that qualitative research does not have to comply
with the `canons of scientiﬁc research (generalizability, replication, reliability, and
validity)' then incorporating a quantitative study would pave the way for some
further applications of a qualitative study.
In this study, the research activities followed a concurrent nested mixed methods
design (QUAN + QUAL) in which the data was collected in one stage (Creswell,
2003). Data from multilingual surveys (n=139) and in-depth interviews (n=25)
were collected in the ﬁrst half of 2016 in Kiel, Germany from working-age newly
arrived (2014-2015) refugees, who are likely to stay in Germany (with so called Gute
Bleibeperspektive). Non-probability sampling procedure was employed in ﬁnding the
respondents from what could be said to be a `hard-to-reach' population due to clear
linguistic, emotional (trusting),10 and physical (protective spheres) barriers11. Fur-
thermore, following the advice of Bloch (1999) on studying populations in which the
10Being afraid due to a precarious status in the host country, not wanting to be sent back to initial
point of entry (ex. Italy, Greece, and Hungary) or not wanting to get registered in the hopes of
travelling on (ex. Sweden, Denmark, and Norway) contribute to strong privacy concerns, and
from thereon misleading statistics.
11Non-probability sampling or purposive sampling allows the researcher to select elements from
the target population with the assistance of previously selected population elements, and helps
to achieve heterogeneity, and make comparisons along factors of interest to the study (Daniel,
2012; Maxwell, 1997; Creswell et al., 2003). According to Daniel (2012) and Bloch (1999), in the
case of rare and hard-to-reach populations, it is a more eﬀective way of sampling.
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sampling frame is unclear12, snowballing technique was used together with informant
sampling13.
Even though it is often diﬃcult to meet desired standards of randomness in refugee
research due to access problems, I believe that through having various local bodies as
initial sources I have limited the risk of producing a biased sample14. Furthermore,
this approach has given me a way into the group of self-settled refugees i.e. outside
oﬃcial camps, who are according to many studies diﬃcult to reach (Jacobsen and
Landau, 2003). It also allowed for asylum seekers who have already moved on from
the initial point of entry (reception camp) to analyse the situation and their potential
in the host country.
The survey phase explored the self-perceived skill-sets of the refugees. Self-
perceived skills were looked at due to the aforementioned supposition that many
refugees are unable to produce oﬃcial qualiﬁcation certiﬁcations, had no chance to
ﬁnish a degree back home, or in the camps in neighbouring countries15. Thereafter,
survey data was sorted to proﬁle the human capital of the newcomers in descrip-
tive statistics, and interview data16 was analysed with the help of thematic analysis
for data triangulation. The following ﬁndings' section brings together the refugee
proﬁles that emerged from the surveys, and the ﬁndings of the thematic analysis
12As is often the case with refugee research, then also in Kiel the size and distribution of the
refugee population are fairly unknown. There are various estimations done by the Federal Oﬃce
of Migration and Refugees of Germany and the Interior Ministry of Schleswig-Holstein, mostly
based on the number of oﬃcially registered refugees, but no consensus exists. A lack of a
clear sampling frame is a common characteristic of studies into somewhat hidden populations
(Heckathorn, 1997)
13Even though this means that a representative sample is not achieved, and therefore statistical
inferences can not be made, I have triangulated the survey data with other representative studies
done in Germany such as IAB-SOEP-BAMF (Institut für Arbeitsmarkt- und Berufsforschung
et al., 2016) to limit bias.
14Bloch (1999) used also many starting points in her study to yield greater diversity in the sample.
15Moreover, after considering existing studies and advice from stakeholders, I decided to keep the
survey as short as possible, and not ask speciﬁc educational achievements. Instead, I just kept
the question whether the person had attended a higher education institution.
16Interviews with 17 refugee and 8 non-refugee stakeholders were conducted. From these 4 inter-
views were with women (2 refugees and 2 non-refugee stakeholders) and 21 with men (15 with
refugees and 6 with non-refugee stakeholders). The majority of the refugee participants were
from Syria (n=15). Non-refugee participants in this case refer to a number of key informants
identiﬁed in process of ﬁeld research who gave valuable insights into refugees' possible access
to the labour market. Following the principles of intensive interviewing the process was carried
out until theoretical saturation was achieved, meaning that with additional respondents no new
information was uncovered.
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of interview data. The focus is mostly on Syrian refugees, and identifying their
skill-sets to be used to inform relevant policy-makers.
3.3.1 Limitations
The limitations of the study arising from data are twofold. Firstly, the fact that
it is a small sample study17 with in-depth interviewing as the main data collection
method means that representativeness is under question (Jacobsen and Landau,
2003). The study is not claiming to be representative for the whole of Germany or
beyond, but it does give a clear impression of the nature of human capital refugees
bring with them, and the types of assessment methods proposed.
Secondly, limitations due to the subject group need to be addressed. People
in these stressful situations with temporary and precarious statuses might want
to promote a particular vision of their suﬀering as part of their survival strategy,
which means they might hide the truth or use statements that do not jeopardize their
positions or that they expect the researcher wants to hear (Bloch, 1999; Jacobsen
and Landau, 2003).18 Even though it was made clear from the beginning of the
interviews that there are no `right' answers, and that the authorities are in no way
connected with the project, the bias in self-reporting cannot be fully escaped.19
Another bias that limits the study's results is self-selection. Being identiﬁed
through local bodies already indicates that the interviewed refugees perhaps stand
out a little more or have shown some initiative to be noticed. They themselves
decide to come forth, which does not mean that they are representatives of the com-
munity, only that they are more active. Also, language and cultural barriers kept
away some informants.20 Especially diﬃcult was studying the views held by women
17Typically exploratory research (meant to better understand a population, theoretical issues or
methodological issues) does not require a rigorous sample design. A non-probability sample with
a small sample size may suﬃce. In this case, a sequential multilevel non-probability design was
undertaken in which samples are selected from diﬀerent levels of a target population at diﬀerent
points in time to create more variance and richer data. (Daniel, 2012)
18In BAMF statistics `not known' as origin has been indicated on multiple occasions giving weight
to the claim that many refugees might not want to make their origin clear in the fear of being
sent away, or that they have taken the `advice' of smugglers, and dropped their passports on the
way to Germany (Interview N.D.).
19In order to limit researcher's bias, the age was not asked so as not to be swayed to think that a
person is lying just when my understanding of age and skill level do not match.
20The fact that the survey was done in writing scared away some participants who did not know
how to read or write. In cases where help was asked, translators helped also the illiterate refugees
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in this community.21 To counter the biases stemming from the subject group, non-
refugee respondents22 were included. In this way issues otherwise not discussed also
came out and were included in the ﬁndings.
3.4 Findings: Assessment of refugees' qualiﬁcations in Ger-
many
3.4.1 Germany and refugees' skills assessment system
Germany received more than a million refugees in the period from 2014 to 2016,
mostly working-age men from Syria (Bundesamt für Migration und Flüchtlinge,
2016). After initial admission and settling, many of the incoming people have wanted
to take up employment (Kaabel, 2017). This requires, however, an assessment and
recognition of previous qualiﬁcations.
Multiple bodies on various levels are in charge of recognizing foreign qualiﬁca-
tions in Germany. Policies are set and decisions are made by the Labour Ministry
(BMAS), Education Ministry (BMBF) and the Federal Institute for Vocational and
Professional Education (BIBB) on the federal level, by the Labour and Employment
Ministries of the states and approbation oﬃces on the state level, by local employ-
ment agency branches (BAs), and job centres on the local level, and by chambers
i.e. professional associations of German employers from a speciﬁc trade or industry,
and other employer associations on the non-governmental level (Rietig, 2016). Even
though federal standards exist in this process, a lot of individualized assessment is
undertaken on the state level, as well as on the non-governmental level23.
Rietig (2016) has called the decentralization and complexity of the multilevel sys-
tem `a systemic limitation of the current German recognition system' that is unlikely
to ﬁll in the survey. Translators in general went through the questionnaire with almost all the
participants, and helped them out if they did not know the terms in English or German
21This is not necessarily a very signiﬁcant problem, because according to the statistics of the Federal
Oﬃce of Migration and Refugees in Germany, almost half of women arriving to Germany in 2015-
2016 were under 16 years old, and therefore not in the target group of this study (Bundesamt
für Migration und Flüchtlinge, 2016).
22According to the logic of purposive sampling and informant sampling, the people who have key
information and key experience were included (Daniel, 2012).
23Such as for example in qualiﬁcations' assessment of many regulated professions, where the cham-
bers play a signiﬁcant role as do state authorities (state authorities focus especially on professions
with a public interest such as teachers and lawyers, as well as medical doctors).
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to change. However, she also underscores that the system provides accountability
and a guarantee of quality in its current form. Nevertheless, the rigidity also con-
tributes to keeping refugees, who are often lacking the standardized `paperwork', out
of the labour market for an extended period of time, and pushes them into starting
over with their careers. Nowhere is this more visible than in the vocational/trades
ﬁeld in which many of the newcomers would want to work at (based on the upcoming
ﬁndings about occupational proﬁles from the survey and interviews).
Germany prides itself for the quality of its professional and vocational education,
and training system, which is also why so much importance is assigned to the formal
recognition of qualiﬁcations. This applies especially to regulated professions, but
is also sometimes the case with non-regulated professions.24 Moreover, if asylum
seekers or refugees would want to become self-employed or start a business in most
trade ﬁelds, they have to ﬁrst possess the necessary legal status, and thereafter prove
their `professional suitability' determined by formal qualiﬁcations.25
Bosswick (2013) further agrees that it is very complicated as a foreign born from
a non-EU country with qualiﬁcations acquired abroad to be awarded full profes-
sional rights in Germany. The picture is, however, not as bleak according to the
monitoring report compiled in 2017 on the ﬁve years of progress of the Recognition
Act of 2012 (Federal Ministry of Education and Research, 2017a). In contrast to
what Bosswick (2013) and Rietig (2016) have called an inept system to deal with
migrant qualiﬁcations' assessment, the report insists that the process works, and
has improved since the introduction of new measures of skills' recognition with the
new law of 2012. Looking at the statistics that the report provides, it is hard to
argue, because for example Syrian applicants (1,995) between 2012-2015 have got in
24Regulated professions in Germany include professions in the medical and legal sectors, a number
of crafts' qualiﬁcations at the Meister level, teachers, and jobs in the civil service. According to
the Federal Ministry of Education and Research, in such professions, `recognition is a precondition
for access to the profession, as well as for using the job title. Without recognition, persons with
professional and vocational qualiﬁcations gained abroad may not work in these professions in
Germany'. In contrast, one may work in a non-regulate profession without recognition. However,
the `Recognition in Germany' portal suggests that it might be `helpful to get recognition to
provide potential employers with a better understanding of your qualiﬁcation'. Recognition is
not an essential precondition for exercising non-regulated occupations.
25In most ﬁelds, the qualiﬁcations have to be given full recognition, and additional licences, permits,
and/or memberships of professional associations might be required. If one wants to become a
self-employed hairdresser or mechanic, for example, they need to have qualiﬁcations equal to
German master craftsman standards.
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majority their qualiﬁcations fully recognized (75,7%) (Federal Ministry of Education
and Research, 2017a).
Nevertheless, Rietig (2016) and Bosswick (2013) draw attention to the length,
costs, and complexity of the process (that the report fails to adequately address).
First, even though a designated maximum amount of procedural time per applica-
tion is set, it conveniently only begins when the applicant has managed to supply all
necessary documentation, which takes an average economic migrant already quite
a while. A refugee applicant needs to deal with further complications if the edu-
cational or professional institution does not exist any longer to give out certiﬁcates
(Rietig, 2016). Furthermore, and this already ties into the costs' aspect which was
not calculated in the report, all the documents have to be translated and certiﬁed.
Bosswick (2013) estimates that the whole process could cost up to a thousand eu-
ros per applicant. All in all, considering the above mentioned complex multilevel
system of responsible institutions, the `recognition machine' will take some time to
crunch the data creating backlogs and hold-ups, which further prolong taking up
employment or studies in Germany.
It could be argued that the system is built in such a way to protect the asylum
seekers and refugees from being exploited, whilst also guarding the quality of the
German qualiﬁcations. However, it is interesting how the rules become a whole
lot `bendier' if, for example, a shortage exists. Therefore, it seems that the aim of
the bureaucracy is not to gurantee quality per se, but rather to protect the local
labourers.
Why even undertake the process as a non-native with foreign human capital?
Germany has connected the status of permanent residency to being in possession of
means to make a secure living. Furthermore, as asylum seekers are assigned to a
location, and can only change that if they have a job to cover expenses in a diﬀerent
location. Bosswick (2013) also states the most obvious reason - German employers
commonly require it.
The German system for recognizing foreign human capital has improved substan-
tially in the last years (Rietig, 2016) by incorporating more and more alternative
measures to also address non-formalized human capital, and lack of standardized
documentation. Yet, the underlying structural complexities, responsibility frag-
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mentations, and insistence on formal human capital approach make it a `work-in-
progress', which hopefully is open to take suggestions from the social sciences.
3.4.2 Descriptive statistics
The skill-sets were categorised according to the International Standard Classiﬁcation
of Occupations (ISCO-08)26 into three skill levels27 shown in the following Table ??28.
26The organisation responsible for the classiﬁcation is the International Labour Organization
(2007). Professions are divided into 10 major groups (1. Managers; 2. Professionals; 3. Tech-
nicians and associate professionals; 4. Clerical support workers; 5. Service and sales workers;
6. Skilled agricultural, forestry and ﬁshery workers; 7. Craft and related trades workers; 8.
Plant and machine operators, and assemblers; 9. Elementary occupations; 0. Armed forces
occupations). All the major groups are then broken down to sub-major groups, minor groups
and unit groups (for example a `baker' is coded as  major group 7. Craft and related trades
workers; sub-major group 75. Food processing, wood working, garment, and other craft and
related trades workers; minor group 751. Food processing and related trades workers; and unit
group 7512. Bakers, pastry-cooks, and confectionery makers). With some professions, there is
a diﬀerence between being an expert (professional), and being on an entry level position (for
example for a position in `sales' the major category of `5. Service and sales workers' would apply
on most occasions, but when the person is a `sales professional' they should be categorized as a
professional in group 2). The diﬀerentiation between high-, medium-, and low-skilled was taken
into account in assigning a category for every respondent.
27According to the ISCO classiﬁcation, the 10 major groups are further divided into 4 skill levels.
Occupations at Skill Level 1 require the performance of simple and routine physical or manual
tasks, and usually only primary education may be required. Major group 1 (Elementary occupa-
tions) is classiﬁed as skill level 1. Occupations that involve operating machinery and electronic
equipment, driving vehicles, and maintenance and repair of electrical and mechanical equipment
fall under Skill Level 2. To become for example a butcher, bus driver, secretary, dressmaker, shop
sales assistant, police oﬃcer, hairdresser etc. one requires generally a completion of secondary
education, and in many cases also specialized vocational training. ISCO-08 Major groups 4-8 fall
under this category. Third level in the ISCO system involves the performance of complex tech-
nical and practical tasks which require a higher level of specialization, and completion of formal
education. All sorts of technicians are on this level i.e. ISCO-08 Major group 3. Occupations
on the highest skill level entail solving complex problems, and making decisions on the basis of
extensive theoretical and factual knowledge in a specialized ﬁeld. Such as managers, engineers,
teachers, medical practitioners, and computer systems analysts. Major groups 1 and 2 make up
Skill Level 4.
28The survey is not representative of the whole refugee population, mainly due to the small sample
size and the inclusion of only those refugees who, in the beginning of 2016, had a somewhat
high likelihood of being granted some form of protection (e.g. meaning asylum seekers from the
Balkans were not included). Nevertheless, the survey ﬁndings have been largely conﬁrmed by
a representative study carried out by IAB-BAMF-SOEP about qualiﬁcations of refugees who
arrived in Germany between 2013 and 2016. Where possible in this paper, I have emphasized
the connections (Institut für Arbeitsmarkt- und Berufsforschung et al., 2016).
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Human capital (formal) %of respondents
High occupational proﬁle 48%
Medium occupational proﬁle 39%
Low occupational proﬁle 13%
Total N 139
Table 3.1: Refugees' skills survey, respondent sample
The table combines data about education, professional experience and self-assessment
of skill level to categorise the respondents as possessing high-, medium- or low-
occupational proﬁles.29 Triangulating the education and professional data with
other studies (such as Institut für Arbeitsmarkt- und Berufsforschung et al., 2016;
REACH, 2017; UNHCR, 2015), the following ﬁndings can be highlighted.
First, the fact that many respondents have attended higher education sends a
positive signal of the composition of the incoming group.30 What came out through
the interviews which was not clear from the survey, however, was that in many cases
refugees have ﬂed before the end of their studies. This indicates the age structure
of the incoming people, who by and large are rather young.
The gender composition of university attendees, presented in Figure 3.1, shows
that men have more often than women indicated a university background. The same
goes for Syrian and Iranian refugees in comparison to Iraqi and Afghan refugees.31
This ﬁnding goes against what was found in the 2014 BAMF (Worbs and Bund,
2016) study in which the Iraqi refugees were identiﬁed as the most educated, and
the Syrian refugees as the least. In this place it could be argued that times have
changed, and so has the composition of incoming Syrian refugees. The ﬁndings of
the study in hand are, for example, supported by the UNHCR (2015) conducted in
April-September 2015 at the entry point to Europe, which state that most Syrian
refugees have a very high level of education. The REACH (2017) study on the road
29High level occupations are according to ISCO Skill Levels 4 and 3, which correspond to the ﬁrst
three major groups. Medium level occupations are on Skill Level 2 of ISCO-08 incorporating
Major groups 4-8. And low level occupations are on Skill Level 1, and count as Elementary occu-
pations in the ISCO major groups system. Armed forces, which made up 1% of the respondents,
have been left out of this categorisation.
30In comparison to the IAB-BAMF-SOEP study, the number of university attendees identiﬁed in
this survey is very high. Their study says that 31% attended tertiary, university or vocational
education, which might be due to groups of refugees I left out of my survey (such as Balkan
migrants).
31From the Syrian respondents 64%, and from the Iranian respondents 79% have indicated univer-
sity experience.
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Figure 3.1: Refugees' skills survey, data on university attendance, and gender,
respondent sample
of refugees to Europe also conﬁrms that Syrians show higher levels of education than
other groups (excluding the migrants from North Africa such as Egypt, Algeria, and
Morocco).
Most Syrians have indicated that they have studied engineering, computer sci-
ence or ﬁnance/economics/accounting. Interview data also supports the popularity
of engineering degrees within the Syrian population (only economics and business
were mentioned as often as engineering). Humanities (such as literature studies),
languages (most often English, French or Arabic language studies), education and
law follow the top three (Figure 3.2). From analysing the gender diﬀerences within
study areas, it can be noted that the picture is a lot more `colourful' in the male
group than in the female group. The top study topics in the female group tend to
be on the soft sciences' side (with languages and humanities being the most often
chosen options), and in the male group hard sciences prevail. Even though only
presented by an observation or two, some more unconventional study areas could be
brought forth  such as veterinary medicine and navigation.
Second, comparing the professional backgrounds (Figure 3.3) collected in my sur-
vey data32 with the IAB-SOEP-BAMF study (Institut für Arbeitsmarkt- und Berufs-
32In order to make the selection easier for the respondents, 11 professions together with `No profes-
sion' and `Other' were listed on the survey. These professions were decided upon through ISCO
classiﬁcation, and were meant to incorporate a high number of potential ﬁelds of activities. It
did help in some cases, but in most cases the respondents chose to tick the box for `Other' and
then write down the various professions (such as hairdresser, baker, mechanic etc.). In situations
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Figure 3.2: Refugees' skills survey, data on study topics of Syrian respondents,
respondent sample
forschung et al., 2016) shows that both ﬁnd a positively large existence of previous
work experience. Most respondents have worked in services/sales as hairdressers,
Figure 3.3: Refugees' skills survey, data on professional backgrounds, respondent
sample
bakers, tailors, and shopkeepers. Interviews further conﬁrmed this by adding that
when it was possible, the `other profession' was incorporated under the larger group (e.g. hair-
dressers under sales/services), but some professions were left separately to give a more precise
picture (e.g. athletes, accountants, drivers).
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often the experience was also gathered after the initial ﬂight from the home coun-
try (such as for example in Turkey on the way to Europe). Corresponding to the
education data, respondents had often professional experience in the ﬁeld of engi-
neering/computer programming.33 Some of the more interesting professions that
are worth the additional mentioning were ﬁreman, ship captain, football player, and
under water welder.
Most of the respondents, who had indicated `No profession,' were female. More-
over, no female respondents have indicated that they have worked in armed forces,
construction, nor as managers. In other ﬁelds there exists somewhat of a balance.
This shows in general that there might be many women, who even though not having
any professional baggage, could train in Germany to become part of the workforce.
In their case, the career was non-existent before, which could mean that adjusting
to a new career path might be less traumatic. The 2014 BAMF study (Worbs and
Bund, 2016) also showed that women tend to remain unemployed for longer than
their male counterparts. The dominance of men in the labour markets in origin
countries shines through.
Figure 3.4 shows that those who have been employed as engineers/programmers,
teachers/scientists, and doctors/lawyers are exclusively university attendees, and
those without a profession have said that they have not attended a university every
time. This graph also shows that often people in construction have not attended
higher education. This hints that in many cases people who could be of use in
the construction ﬁeld in Germany will not be able to prove their skills and work
experience due to the lack of proper education documentation.
Lastly, the self-evaluation of skills needs to be addressed to complete the occupa-
tional proﬁle picture. As can be derived from Figure 3.5, very few people have called
themselves `low-skilled'. This is due to respondents who have marked `no profession'
leaving the skill level unevaluated (n=10). This might be due to the thinking that
if one does not have a profession this automatically means that the person is low-
skilled. Therefore, in order to get the most relevant results, I have included in the
descriptive statistics also the respondents who have decided to leave the skill level
33Even though many for example have mentioned an engineering or computer science education,
then only some have classiﬁed themselves in these ﬁelds. More often they have indicated `ser-
vices/sales' profession. This may also show the refugees' age structure's inﬂuence  as most
incoming people are young then they might have only had the chance to do initial steps in their
careers, and those need not be in their corresponding study ﬁelds.
64
Chapter 3 Uncovering hidden human capital
Figure 3.4: Refugees' skills survey, data on educational and professional back-
grounds, respondent sample
question unanswered. In the case of the Afghan women who were part of the study,
none have wanted to enclose their skill evaluation which further advances my as-
sessment that a large part of the incoming Afghan women are home-makers without
professional lives. This group also inﬂuences the statistics about male and female
groups' assessment in which men clearly have a higher opinion about their skills
than women. Taking a peak into studies of conﬁdence and self-esteem, it does not
come as a surprise that women tend to undervalue their skills (Janjuha-Jivraj and
Chisholm, 2016; Bleidorn et al., 2015). Having attended university also raises the
self-perceived skill level  from the university attendees, 65% have rated their skills
to be high, whilst only 5% have ticked the low-skilled box. The latter assessment
could be due to having just started with the university studies or not having been
able to complete the studies before ﬂeeing the country. In general asking about the
self-perceived skill levels did give valuable insights into the professional expertise of
the respondents. Positioning oneself on the scale from `expert knowledge' to `begin-
ner knowledge' guided the process of classifying the respondents in high-, medium-
and low-skilled occupations which then in turn act as the occupational proﬁles of
incoming refugees presented in the beginning of this section.
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Figure 3.5: Refugees' skills survey, data on self-perceived skill levels and gender,
respondent sample
3.4.3 Story lines
As mentioned beforehand, quantitative data only tells us a part of the story. In order
to uncover the full pictures, qualitative data was also collected and analysed. The
combined mixed method analysis produced three intertwined story lines (presented
in Figure 3.6) in regard to the human capital of refugees: (1) ﬂuidity of working
careers, and multiplicity of career paths; (2) rigidity of current formal recognition
procedures; and (3) internalization of labour market inferiority. The following chap-
ter will elaborate and give examples of these story lines from the interview data.34
3.4.3.1 Story line 1: Multiplicity of career paths and ﬂuidity of working careers
The survey results already showed that work experience is very present amongst the
newest inﬂow of refugees to Germany. The interviews further conﬁrmed that, and
brought out another dimension to this. Namely, that the work experience is very
diverse. When 18,4% of the respondents to the surveys already indicated multiple
34The interviews were conducted in English and German. The German data was translated into
English, and therefore the direct quotations are given only in English. Atlas.ti does not allow
editing in the data, and it does not have a tool for checking spelling, thus, the direct excerpts
from data may include grammar and spelling errors.
66
Chapter 3 Uncovering hidden human capital
Figure 3.6: Story lines of assessment of refugees' human capital, interview data,
compiled by author in Atlas.ti (`G' refers to `groundedness' of the codes in the data
i.e. utterances; `D' refers to `density' i.e. links of the code to other codes)
professions, then in describing personal professional backgrounds in the interviews,
more than half of the refugee participants (10/17) spoke of a multiplicity of jobs
in very versatile ﬁelds (Figure 3.7). It is not only a new development amongst
the refugee population to participate in more than one career paths, but in general
nowadays it is not set in stone that one sticks to one career choice throughout one's
lifetime. From the interviews, two reasons for the multiplicity and ﬂuidity of careers
of refugees emerged: ﬁrst, many had worked whilst studying, or on their way from
origin country to Germany. For example, many had gathered sales and services
experience from Turkey on their way to Europe.
Secondly, as a positive aspect for the German economy, which is said to lag be-
hind in entrepreneurship and innovation (Copley, 2016; Global Entrepreneurship
Monitor, 2014), the entrepreneurial nature of the incoming people found support
in this study. As can be seen on Figure 3.8, this often meant that next to careers
as lawyers or teachers, many had smaller traditional businesses such as brokering
real estate or running a clothes store, or non-traditional businesses partaking in the
sharing economy. This data on experience with self-employment35 was also hidden
35The representative study done by Institut für Arbeitsmarkt- und Berufsforschung et al., 2016 also
found that 27% of the refugees who arrived in Germany in the latest inﬂux were self-employed
in their origin country.
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Figure 3.7: Story line 1 Multiplicity of career paths and ﬂuidity of working careers,
proﬁles of refugee respondents, interview data with code names for respondents
in the survey responses. In the surveys, 20% indicated they are `experts in crafts and
related trades ﬁelds,' and many positioned themselves as `managers' whilst having
no higher educational background. One could disregard it by looking at the purely
quantitative study  most likely the people were lying/boasting, but from the inter-
views the full picture emerged. Many had actually learned themselves, and became
self-employed afterwards (Fig. 3.8 Quote 5:9).
Setting up an own business in Syria was seen as a rather common practice (Fig.
3.8 Quotes 5:1, 5:5, 5:7, and 5:10), even though according to some, it was mostly
out of necessity (Fig. 3.8 Quote 5:8) and relatively complicated (Fig. 3.8 Quote
5:2). The entrepreneurial nature of the Syrian people also carried onto the Turkish
market (Fig. 3.8 Quote 5:11), and was noticed by locals in Germany (Fig. 3.8
Quote 5:12). An Iranian respondent also had a positive experience with starting his
own business in his home country (Fig. 3.8 Quotes 5:3 and 5:4), whilst an Eritrean
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respondent considered self-employment to be virtually impossible in Eritrea (Fig.
3.8 Quote 5:6).
Figure 3.8: Story line 1 Multiplicity of career paths and ﬂuidity of working careers,
Atlas.ti network output of verbatim quotations with `Fluidity_self-employment'
codes
The negative aspect of these levels of self-employment comes out due to the up-
coming `Story line 2' about rigidity of the formal procedure. Speciﬁcally, the lack
of documentation to prove expertise, which makes it particularly hard for the peo-
ple involved to adjust to the new setting.36 Despite the complication caused by
36In accordance with German regulation (Federal Ministry of Education and Research, 2017b), if a
refugee would want to become self-employed or start a business the following barriers occur: (1)
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this, it can be argued that it would be very beneﬁcial to allow these individuals to
contribute (Kaabel, 2017).
3.4.3.2 Story line 2: Rigid formal recognition procedure
Current refugee admission policies do not take a lot of time identifying qualiﬁcations
beyond the formal ones, which complies to what Collett and Zuleeg (2008) called the
problems of the traditional understanding of skills (sticking to stagnant categories,
ignoring the poor correlation between job types and educational backgrounds, and
disregarding soft skills). As mentioned earlier, however, in order to partake in the
labour market, refugees have to get their human capital transferred from origin to
host country. Transfer, in most cases, requires the oﬃcial recognition of qualiﬁ-
cations. In Germany, that means the undertaking of a lengthy process within the
previously described complex multilevel system in which refugees have often a tough
time navigating (Rietig, 2016).
Even though Germany has introduced some new measures for foreign skills' recog-
nition and eliminated many refugee-speciﬁc barriers (such as the job market test) in
recent years, the problems prevail in large part due to one crucial aspect - documen-
tation (Fig. 3.9 Quote 6:17). Fortunately, in only extreme cases, such as described
by HM (Fig. 3.9 Quote 6:21) or when the universities and/or employers do not exist
any more, do refugees not possess any documented proof of their educational and
professional background. More often their documents are merely insuﬃcient for the
German system to give them full equivalence to German qualiﬁcations.
This is especially the case with professions that require vocational training/education.
According to PU (non-refugee, male), refugees have usually worked (which was also
evident from the survey results, and from the self-employment experiences on Fig-
ures 3.7 and 3.8), but have very rarely studied and trained for the profession on
a level acceptable for German standards (Fig. 3.9 Quotes 6:14 and 6:16). MM
(refugee, male, Iran) described his own personal experience: "I wanted to work here
in the beginning as a hairdresser. They told me, that yes you can do it very well,
form of protection (whether the person has been recognised and given full protection, subsidiary
protection or if they are tolerated) allows or restricts the person taking up self-employment and
entrepreneurship; (2) `professional suitability' in the ﬁeld of activity determined by an assessment
of formal qualiﬁcations, and their matching to German ones; (3) additional requirements such
as licenses, permits or memberships from the professional associations might also be required.
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but you do not have any oﬃcial training. You need to do the training for three
years. I could not understand. I had learnt it in three months, then worked for six
months  why do I need to start from the beginning again?"
Retraining seems to be the preferred course of action for the German labour
market which values domestic human capital more highly. In the beginning, the
issue of `warehousing' refugees was mentioned, and how it contributes to deskilling.
I formulated that as a threat and a problem, but it looks like a strategic step by
the government to facilitate integration by waiting until the `warehouse' is just ﬁlled
with `empty canvasses'. Even though starting over might be an acceptable step to
many of the younger refugees, the older generation who already had professional
identities back home will have a much harder time coming to grips with this (next
chapter elaborates on this aspect).
Due to the perceived low value of some foreign human capital (Fig. 3.9 Quotes
6:7, 6:8, and 6:12), and a general lack of interest that is shown in their skills (Aiyar
et al., 2016; Rich, 2016; Institut für Arbeitsmarkt- und Berufsforschung, 2015), few
refugees attempt to take on the formal recognition procedure. Also, the daunting
nature of the oﬃcial system deters some (Fig. 3.9 Quote 6:11). Rietig (2016) says
that refugees lack awareness of the regulations, which hinders them from `gaming'
the system like some locals do (e.g. going to those German states that have more
lenient recognition procedures or shortages in particular ﬁelds). As can be seen on
Figure 9, the one aspect that counteracts the rigidity of the formal procedure is
individual help given by a few local individuals. Such activities included helping out
with ﬁnding information, teaching the language, and even more speciﬁc hands-on
actions by the individuals such as described by SD (non-refugee, female) in Quote
6:32 (Fig. 3.9). She also recalled instances when she had gone with various craftsmen
to prospective employers, and how she always calls up the hospital if someone with
medical training comes to the reception centre.
From the responses to the interviews, I could also infer a common misconception
held by both refugee and non-refugee respondents (Fig. 3.9 Quotes 6:6, 6:8, and
6:10), about educated people having an easier time transferring their human capital
(Bauböck and Tripkovic, 2017). This corresponds to the traditional approach to
skills recognition discussed beforehand (Collett and Zuleeg, 2008), which is often
the only understanding that is communicated to refugees and those helping them on
71
Chapter 3 Uncovering hidden human capital
the grass-root level. From all the interviews conducted in Kiel, only one respondent
could mention an additional measure to prove qualiﬁcations (Fig. 3.9 Quote 6:29).
Although, many innovations have been introduced to the recognition of qualiﬁca-
tions in Germany as discussed earlier, the one area which seems to be less developed
(and deﬁnitely less valued) is the recognition of non-formalized human capital. Ac-
cording to Collett and Zuleeg (2008), we should not underestimate how much soft
skills contribute to the economic output of employees. Namely, that without these
skills, the proﬁciency based on technical skills, and professional qualiﬁcations, would
not necessarily lead to successful performance.37
Refugees demonstrate a vast spectrum of soft skills, such as being easily adaptable
to ﬂuid career paths, being resourceful in dealing with dynamic new environments,
and being resilient in the face of hardships. Moreover, from both my study in Ger-
many, and from the work of Bakker et al. (2017) in the Netherlands, the common
characteristics of refugees in regard to labour market integration emerge - determi-
nation and motivation. Not only to make the misery and pain of the ﬂight worth
it, and because return is not an option (Bakker et al., 2017), but as the refugee
respondents in Kiel summarized it: Not to just sit around and wait.
None of the above mentioned skills are formally transferable, but they matter
profoundly in labour market integration. One way to record, and evaluate this non-
formalized human capital, would be through a more individualized and personalized
formal recognition procedure in which the potential workers could share the stories
about their international practise, cultural ties, and volunteering (as they could do
in the framework of this study's data collection, e.g. Fig. 3.9 Quote 6:2). The pros
and cons of such an approach will be discussed shortly.
37Collett and Zuleeg name personal services and marketing as examples of such occupations in
which it is especially the case.
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Figure 3.9: Story line 2 Rigidity of formal recognition procedure, Atlas.ti network output of exemplary verbatim
quotations with `Rigidity' codes
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3.4.3.3 Story line 3: Internalization of inferiority
Building on Pierre Bourdieu's notion of habitus, which proposes a class-based idea
of one's place in the world, Kanno and Varghese (2010) ﬁnd in their analysis on
refugee students on a campus, that they often show tendencies of self-elimination.
This means an acceptance of a inferior position amongst fellow students, and an
unchallenged status quo (in Kanno and Varghese's study for example done by not
applying for further studies due to the assumption of having `no chance'). In the
case of labour market participation, refugees often see their position as inferior on
the local labour market in comparison to the natives and other migrants, and they
accept that. In the particular German case, acceptance means conforming to the
expected behaviour - that is forgetting the old, and starting over in Germany with
their standardized training and education (Fig. 3.10 Quotes 4:1 and 4:6). From the
interviews, multiple factors came out that can explain this behaviour.
First of all, repeating the above mentioned issues, refugees often see themselves
as not suitable for the German labour market. This comes from the external in-
formation/misinformation sources, but it is also a matter of ﬁnding oneself in a
substantially diﬀerent economy than used to at origin countries (Fig. 3.10 Quote
4:3). Interviewees BM (Fig. 3.10 Quote 4:7) and RN mention for example many
hand-workers, who end up being obsolete in a machinery-ﬁlled Germany, and AA
recalls a very personal experience, where his training as a petroleum engineer is left
completely unused in a small oil producer country such as Germany.
Accepting the need to change one's career path in order to partake in the labour
force does not come easy, especially to those who had established professional iden-
tities back home. Acknowledging that one's existing foreign human capital is not as
highly regarded as it was in the home country nor as is the local human capital (Fig.
3.10 Quotes 4:8 and 4:2), can diminish self-worth even more so, and force some to
accept a lower position in the workforce hierarchy. The rigidity of the formal pro-
cedures of human capital recognition further complicate this (Fig. 3.10 Quotes 4:4
and 4:5), leading to fewer attempts to even undertake the process.
Lastly, the inﬂuence of the overall asylum policy plays a role in understanding
one's position. Being labelled by the system as a `vulnerable person' indicates to
the refugee that they are placed in a sort of protection bubble, and should not really
venture out from it to join the rest of the society. Even if the above mentioned mea-
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Figure 3.10: Story line 3 Internalized labour market inferiority, Atlas.ti network
output of verbatim quotations with `Inferiority' codes
sures to incorporate refugees into the workforce by making the recognition systems
more compliant to the special needs of this group are oﬃcially in place, then in real-
ity the understanding amongst the refugees (as well as the non-refugee respondents
in this study) continues to be that refugees are in principle not allowed to work (Fig.
3.10 Quote 4:5).
3.5 Discussion
Could transformative mixed methods, in the end, improve the way we currently
identify and assess refugees' human capital? Due to the nature of this question,
main criteria from social sciences [the so called `canons of scientiﬁc research - gener-
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alizability, replication, reliability, and validity (Denzin and Lincoln, 1994)] are not
accurate tools for evaluation. Instead, the two key aspects that should be taken into
account when answering this question are applicability and feasibility.
The paper so far has attempted to generally demonstrate the need for knowing
more about refugees' human capital, but more particularly in which ways the cur-
rent system of identiﬁcation and assessment is lacking. Evaluating the proposed
methods from the viewpoint of applicability, it can be argued that transformative
mixed methods manage to capture more of the intricacies of refugees' human capital
than traditional approaches. Instead of mere assumptions about the human capital
of refugees, and options for its use, a full picture of the knowledge, qualiﬁcation,
capabilities, and skills can be achieved. Aspects that would remain `hidden' away
due to the nature and assigned status of the refugee group, such as undocumented
capabilities, soft skills, and diﬀering formal qualiﬁcations, see the light of day when
the investigator ventures beyond the formal procedures, and mere statistics. Sum-
marizing this point with the help from Mertens (2007), `a qualitative dimension is
needed to gather community perspectives, while quantitative dimension provides the
opportunity to demonstrate outcome that have credibility for community members
and scholars.'
Why is it important to go about this subject matter with a transformative ap-
proach? Even though policy-makers might assume that they have taken necessary
steps to encourage refugee labour market access, and facilitate the integration pro-
cess leading up to that point, the lack of awareness and confusion amongst refugee
and non-refugee respondents showed me that the understandings of what is impor-
tant are diverging. Mertens (2013, 2011, 2007) refers to diﬀerent lenses that people
of privilege versus people of marginalization bring to the discussion about what
is real (what she calls `multiple realities' in her research). Refugees need protec-
tion due to power relations, and their unprivileged position, but not in the way
ascribed by the asylum policy (by placing the refugees outside the labour market
by labelling and categorizing them as vulnerable victims in need of protection). In
order to get the full picture, and actually make a diﬀerence, the research should
recognize inequalities and injustices in the society, and strive to challenge the status
quo (Mertens, 2007). For that, one needs to know the subject group, which requires
listening and trust building. Moreover, instead of making qualiﬁcations' identiﬁca-
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tion and assessment a clinical process, one could bring in a qualitative dimension to
gather perspectives.
Bringing in a qualitative, and often more personalized approach is also important
to what Collett and Zuleeg (2008) have described as the great challenge for policy-
makers attempting to match supply and demand on the 21st century labour market.
A qualitative study would address the three problem areas (sticking to stagnant cat-
egories, ignoring poor correlation between job types and educational backgrounds,
and disregarding soft skills) by being more ﬂexible and insightful than a traditional,
solely quantitative study. In the special case of refugee labour market integration, al-
lowing for more ﬂexibility would help with the lacking documents, non-standardized
occupational backgrounds and overcoming the inferiority feeling all hindering the
successful transfer of refugees' human capital. If one could overcome those obsta-
cles, the real picture of the human capital and its utilization potential might emerge,
making a better matching of labour demand and supply within the asylum system
a possibility.
However, it is not likely that the qualitative data collected about the human
capital will get much use in practice, because it exhibits a number of weaknesses that
make the applicability and feasibility of transformative mixed methods in human
capital identiﬁcation, and assessment questionable. First, how would one assess
the skills (especially non-formalized skills), and evaluate their utilization potential
without a `measurement stick'? In this case, it can be argued that it is suﬃcient
to just identify the skills and not give proﬁciency in them a score, but for many
employers it might not suﬃce as a tool to identify the best candidate (as labour
market still functions on competition).
Second, even if the aim is just to identify and not score the non-formalized skills,
it stills brings about the need to become more personalized and more speciﬁc to
individual potential, which means the whole process becomes very resource-intensive
(and potentially subjective and/or discriminative). The administrative capabilities
are already pushed to the limit due to the magnitude of the latest refugee movements.
Therefore, it is unlikely that resources exist to take on an elaborate human capital
identiﬁcation and assessment project. It is more likely that standardized tools, to
speed up the process, prevail.
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Moreover, considering that we would want to remove the `clinical' attitude, further
time investments would be required. That is, in order to get to know the subject
group, and build trust, a long-term approach has to be adopted. This, however,
might create even more severe hold-ups in the process and longer backlogs, which
would be counter-productive to facilitating labour market integration for refugees.
And in the current day and age, anything that would extend the process is viewed
in a negative light by both sides.
3.6 Conclusion
Even if in more and more states, refugees are getting de jure rights to employment,
there exist multiple de facto barriers for their full integration in the labour market.
This paper presented one crucial obstacle, which is the limited ability of host states
to identify and assess refugees' human capital, and a way how social science research
tools, namely transformative mixed methods, could be used to alleviate this issue.
On the basis of a sample case study conducted in Germany, it was found that
adopting a transformative mixed methods approach to uncovering refugees' human
capital is very applicable as it, (1) deals with the hard-to-reach nature of the refugee
group, (2) gives voice to those behind the protective barriers erected by the assigned
labels of `vulnerable victims', and (3) goes beyond the formal recognition procedure
to expose skills, capabilities, knowledge, and qualiﬁcations otherwise hidden away.
At the same time, it needs to be acknowledged that such a venture is very resource-
intensive, and with limited practical use, therefore, rather infeasible.
Nevertheless, in the case of available time-, personnel,- and ﬁnancial resources,
I would argue: (a) that embedding a qualitative approach within a traditionally
quantitative study of educational and occupational characteristics of a population
will bring out intricacies otherwise undetectable (such as the ﬂuidity of working
careers and multiplicity of professional lives); and (b), that using a transformative
approach in refugee studies will reveal problem areas in policy ﬁelds ranging from
refugee protection to qualiﬁcations' recognition, that are not visible through the lens
of the privileged policy-maker.
78
Chapter 3 Uncovering hidden human capital
3.A Appendix
Figure 3.11: Survey form
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Int.Nr. Pseudonym Category Gender Origin Language of interview
1 MN refugee male Syria German
2 BM refugee male Syria English
3 MD refugee male Syria German
4 ND refugee male Syria German
5 MK refugee male Syria German
6 PU non-refugee male Germany German
7 SH refugee male Syria German
8 OH refugee male Syria German
9 MH refugee male Syria English
10 MR refugee male Syria English
11 M refugee male Syria German
12 AA refugee male Syria English
13 AB refugee male Syria English
14 MS non-refugee female Germany English
15 HM refugee male Eritrea German
16 MM refugee male Iran German
17 RN non-refugee male Germany German
18 MQ non-refugee male Germany German
19 RL refugee female Syria German
20 VL refugee female Syria German
21 ML refugee male Syria German
22 MZ non-refugee male Germany English
23 D non-refugee male Germany English
24 SD non-refugee female Germany German
25 R non-refugee male Germany German
Table 3.2: Interview respondent data
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Restrictive generosity or open selﬁshness - welfare
regimes and refugee labour market integration in com-
parative perspective1
4.1 Introduction
The conﬂict in Syria has displaced millions of people, causing 5.5 million people to
ﬂee the country altogether (International Organization for Migration, 2017). This
is just the latest instalment in a long series of instabilities around the world pushing
people out of their homes, and into new host countries. According to UN statistics,
in 2017 as many as 25.9 million individuals around the world were estimated to be
refugees (International Organization for Migration, 2017). As return is for many
increasingly unlikely, ﬁnding durable solutions for the new arrivals has become crit-
ical.
Even though lessons from history (Barslund et al., 2016; Angrist and Kugler,
2003), and much of the academic community (Aleinikoﬀ, 2015; Zimmermann, 2014;
Papademetriou, 2015) might insist on the positive impact refugees' incorporation
to the labour market would bring to all parties involved, restrictions on working
are still more commonplace than full access, especially directly after arrival (Wirth
et al., 2014; Long, 2015). Therefore, it warrants a further examination into the
determinants of policy-making on refugees' labour market integration to explain the
variation amongst countries.
1Thanks to Benjamin Beckers for consultation on the data analysis.
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States' preferences on refugee policy are guided by various economic, political,
cultural, and security concerns. This paper argues that the `welfare state' combines
the aggregated position that the government holds on the above-mentioned factors,
and is therefore a helpful indicator to explain the grounds of decision-making. A
country with a limited welfare system guided by the logic of the free market and
individualism, and another with a comprehensive welfare regime based on the logic
of solidarity and egalitarianism (Esping-Andersen, 1990; Scruggs, 2014; Sainsbury,
2006; Arts and Gelissen, 2002) will most likely approach policy-making towards
refugees diﬀerently, thus oﬀering explanations on the variance amongst the host
states. Therefore, the ﬁrst research question is whether generous welfare states are
more or less restrictive towards refugees. Considering the possible reactionary style
of policy-making in refugee issues, a second research question on how do countries
shape their refugee-speciﬁc labour policy when faced with refugee inﬂows was included
to account for change in policies.
On the basis of previous literature on policy-making in limited versus comprehen-
sive welfare states, I proposed three explanations to shed some light on choice in
refugee policy-making: (1) protective welfare that expects arguments about humani-
tarianism and solidarity to dominate economic considerations in refugee policies; (2)
welfare chauvinism predicting more restrictions on refugees due to a sense of com-
petition for scarce resources within the country; and (3) welfare universalism that
assumes a linear relationship between generosity and openness towards refugees.
Following similar analyses (Boräng, 2015; Römer, 2017), the three explanations
were tested with a panel dataset on 28 countries over three decades (1980-2014).
In the ﬁeld often dominated by case studies, a large-n comparative study such as
this can bring new insights. Furthermore, considering that refugees are still often
disregarded as potential workforce, the ﬁeld of refugee-speciﬁc labour policy analysis
is rather underdeveloped. By attempting to bring clarity to the underlying grounds
of decision-making in regard to refugees' labour market integration, this paper hopes
to contribute to both, refugee studies and comparative welfare state research.
The results tell a story of welfare universalism prevailing as an explanation of
policy-making in comprehensive welfare states, welfare chauvinism being trumped by
market logic in limited welfare states, and protective welfare explaining the actions
of the conservative welfare regimes in the middle ground due to traditional values
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upheld. Furthermore, with regard to reacting to increased inﬂows of refugees, the
analysis shows that policy-makers in limited welfare states are most likely to do so,
but not in the direction of more restrictions often proposed in the literature. It was
found that the least generous welfare states (with a generosity score of around 20)
are 35% more likely to reduce restrictions and opt for more open policies on refugees'
labour market integration.
Considering that the majority of scholarly work (Card, 1990; Peri and Yasenov,
2017; Peri and Sparber, 2009; Constant, 2014) has found that market mechanisms
manage to adequately absorb immigrants, there is no real basis for government
restrictions. Barslund et al. (2016) have shown that this holds also for increased
inﬂows of refugees. For example, previously restrictive Austria opened up its labour
market as a response to rising numbers of Bosnian refugees ﬂeeing the Yugoslav
war, and witnessed a speedier convergence of the refugee and native employment
rate, and lower levels of national social expenditure. Therefore, open regulations in
regard to refugees' labour market integration can be seen to serve the self-interest
of the host nations (Aleinikoﬀ, 2015; Papademetriou, 2015; Zimmermann, 2014;
Wirth et al., 2014; Long, 2015). This approach is, however, not easily accepted by
national policy-makers, who are conditioned to treat refugees as a distinct category
of temporary, vulnerable, and non-economic migrant (Zetter, 2007).
The paper is structured as follows. The ﬁrst section discusses how welfare states
and refugee-speciﬁc labour policy are connected (by building on the literature on
welfare states, labour policy, and immigration), and proposes three explanations
why limited and comprehensive welfare systems behave the way they do in regard
to refugees' labour market integration. Thereafter, the research method and data
are described, followed by an overview of the ﬁndings. Lastly, the discussion part
summarizes the implications of the results for refugee labour market integration.
4.2 Theoretical framework
The nature of the welfare state plays a prominent part in national policy-making
(Klitgaard, 2007). Whether the welfare state is limited or comprehensive (Scruggs,
2014)2, and whether it follows the logic of the market and individualism (liberal
2Scruggs (2014) generosity score evaluates the scope (who receives) and level (how much he/she
receives) of welfare entitlements. Limited welfare states give out low levels of beneﬁts to an ex-
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welfare state), the logic of corporatism and social hierarchies (conservative welfare
state), or the logic of solidarity and egalitarianism (social-democratic welfare state)
(Esping-Andersen, 1990)3, shows the aggregated position that the government holds
on various economic, political, and societal factors. Therefore, the welfare state
could be seen as a helpful indicator to explain the grounds of decision-making,
and by this can be expected to inﬂuence what stance a country takes in regard to
labour market integration for refugees. The following section will guide the empirical
approach that will aim to evaluate which (if any) of the three explanations presented
in the second half of the section provides the best description of policy-making. It
begins with a discussion on the relation between labour, immigration, and refugee
policy-making, and welfare generosity.
4.2.1 Welfare states, labour policy, and immigration
Labour policy is an inherent part of the activities of the welfare state. As dependence
on wage labour grew with societies becoming more industrialised, states had to take
on a new role to mitigate the `vulnerabilities among those with little or no labour to
sell' to maintain the labour force4 (Pampel and Weiss, 1983; Kerr et al., 1960 cited
in Myles and Quadagno, 2002, Dragano et al., 2011; Rueda, 2015). Goodin (2001)
has even sloganized Esping-Andersen's regime types as a relation between labour
and welfare: `work, not welfare' for liberals, `welfare through work' for corporatists,
and `welfare and work' for social-democrats.
Sainsbury (1999, 2006) has further explained what can be anticipated from dif-
ferent welfare states pertaining to labour policy. Both liberal and social-democratic
systems set higher labour market participation rates as a goal. The reasoning, how-
ever, diﬀers. In limited welfare systems guided by free market principles, all individ-
uals are allowed (and expected) to realise their potential regardless of their initial
clusive target group, whilst comprehensive welfare states provide for everyone equally generously.
The middle ground is made up of systems that oﬀer relatively high levels of beneﬁts to an exclusive
target group (entitlements based on prior income and work tenure).
3Esping-Andersen (1990) bases his three ideal types on (1) the degree of decommodiﬁcation (i.e.
the degree to which a person can maintain a livelihood without reliance on the market), and (2)
level of solidarity/social stratiﬁcation (i.e. the level to which welfare systems diﬀerentiate between
social groups). Besides Esping-Andersen, multiple other scholars have proposed classiﬁcations of
welfare regimes. A summary is provided by Arts and Gelissen (2002) and Arcanjo (2006) in Figure
4.1.
4Either by promoting employment or by alleviating the eﬀects of unemployment.
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Figure 4.1: Proposed classiﬁcations of welfare regimes (Arcanjo, 2006; Arts and
Gelissen, 2002)
position in the social hierarchy. As the state oﬀers only means-tested welfare entitle-
ments,5 individual eﬀort is seen as key to personal well-being. In social-democratic
countries, the state takes care of the well-being of all its constituents making it neces-
5Beneﬁts assigned when income and other `means' of well-being are below a certain threshold
(Korpi and Palme, 1998).
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sary to promote full employment to maintain the expensive system. Nevertheless, in
both cases the underlying assumption is equality of opportunity (Sainsbury, 1999).
Oppositely, corporatist welfare regimes, often referred to as conservative regimes,
aim to preserve traditional status diﬀerentials in the society (often based on Chris-
tian values) (Esping-Andersen, 1990; Arts and Gelissen, 2002; Beblavy et al., 2011;
Sainsbury, 1999) and keep those who have not contributed on the outside. The basis
for receiving entitlements is work tenure and income, thus exhibiting low levels of
solidarity towards anyone outside the labour market.
Moving onto the question of immigration in the welfare states framework, the
clash between `insiders' (who contribute and therefore are entitled to states' assis-
tance), and `outsiders' becomes even more salient. The concept `welfare chauvinism'
(Banting, 2000; Bommes and Geddes, 2000; Brochmann and Hammar, 1999; Crepaz
and Damron, 2009 cited in Boräng, 2015) explains this through the competition for
scarce resources, i.e. the conﬂict arising from the sense that immigrants abuse the
welfare system by using the services, whilst not paying taxes. Moreover, the sup-
porters of this view assume that immigrants also make it tougher on the natives by
depressing wages, and taking away their jobs (Faist, 1994 cited in Crepaz and Dam-
ron, 2009). Thus, welfare chauvinism presumes generally more restrictive policies
towards immigrants.
It could be assumed that comprehensive welfare states would restrict rights of
immigrants to protect their more expansive beneﬁt systems (Römer, 2017), but ac-
cording to Van Der Waal et al. (2013) and Crepaz and Damron (2009), welfare
chauvinism is actually more commonplace in more limited (i.e. liberal and conser-
vative) regimes. The exclusivity of the welfare entitlements' assignment on the basis
of `who's deserving, and who is not', creates hierarchies and insecurities about one's
own well-being, which in turn raises the levels of welfare chauvinism in the coun-
try (Banting, 2000 cited in Crepaz and Damron, 2009). At the same time in more
comprehensive systems, generous and universal welfare entitlements that protect
workers from market risks (Crepaz and Damron, 2009; Römer, 2017), and reduce
income inequality (Van Der Waal et al., 2013 cited in Römer, 2017), make welfare
chauvinism less prominent.
Instead of feelings of resentment, acceptance, and tolerance towards outsiders
across ethnic, religious, and racial lines can be witnessed in more comprehensive
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welfare states (Boräng, 2015; Crepaz and Damron, 2009; Rothstein and Uslaner,
2005). It is argued that an inherent inclusive nature (Castles, 2004) of a generous
welfare state conditions them to adopt more liberal policies. This is backed by a high
level of generalized trust in institutions within the society in which the government
has taken the major responsibility to oﬀer protection and security to its constituents
(Rothstein, 1998 cited in Römer, 2017).
4.2.2 Welfare states and refugee-speciﬁc labour policy
Boräng (2015) argues that the conﬂict between immigration and welfare state sug-
gested in the literature might be even more severe for forced migrants as they are
more likely to place greater pressure on the host country's system (Hansen and
Lofstrom, 2009). Therefore, policy-making on refugee entry and settlement can be
expected to be thoroughly intertwined with welfare generosity. On the basis of
above-mentioned logics of policy-making in limited versus comprehensive welfare
states, I propose three possible explanations for potentially diﬀering approaches to
refugees' labour market integration: protective welfare, welfare chauvinism, and
welfare universalism.
4.2.2.1 Protective welfare
Although included in both, the Refugee Convention (UNHCR, 1951) and the Uni-
versal Declaration of Human Rights [Article 23] (United Nations, 1948), refugees'
`right to work' comes in many shapes and forms. As shown by Wirth et al. (2014)
and Long (2015), many national policy-makers have erected de facto barriers aim-
ing to keep refugees from settling, and taking up employment. Often the reasoning
behind such actions is `the cause to protect'. Many scholars (Harrell-Bond, 1995;
Ticktin, 2014; Fassin, 2012) refer to this as the `humanitarian' policy agenda, which
focuses on altruistic protection of those vulnerable, and successful repatriation,6
not successful integration, as the preferred outcome. Similarly, the comprehensive
welfare state concerns itself with the commitment to protect the well-being of unfor-
tunate individuals. Therefore, it is likely that the more comprehensive the welfare
state, the less restrictive its general refugee policies (e.g. entry quotas and family
reuniﬁcation to provide a initial security).
6Not necessarily to the origin country, but to a `safe third' one.
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However, due to the assumption that refugees are vulnerable, temporary, non-
economic migrants (Zetter, 2007), the quest to protect might also make the more
inclusive systems more restrictive in regard to refugee-speciﬁc labour policies as a
preventative measure against potential abuse on the labour market. On the contrary,
in limited welfare states economic aspects are expected to dominate the humanitar-
ian agenda, hence those countries can be expected to be less restrictive towards
refugees' labour market integration, and letting the free market forces handle it in-
stead. This explanation thus suggests that the degree of generosity of the welfare
regime drives general refugee policies and refugee-speciﬁc labour policies of a coun-
try in opposite direction: while more generosity is associated with less restrictive
general refugee policies, it is associated with more restrictive refugee-speciﬁc labour
market policies.
4.2.2.2 Welfare chauvinism
As mentioned above, in more limited welfare states, where welfare entitlements are
not universal, economic considerations often play a much larger role in policy-making
than do arguments about solidarity and humanitarianism. Welfare chauvinism at-
tempts to explain this through the notion of `competition'. First, there is fear of
direct competition on the labour market as refugees might limit job availability and
depress wages (Rowthorn, 2008; Aiyar et al., 2016). Second, there is a sense of com-
petition for beneﬁts as refugees are expected to `freeload' on the welfare state even
more so than economic immigrants, (Sciortino and Finotelli, 2017; Aiyar et al., 2016)
bringing up the feelings of resentment in cases where welfare entitlements are limited
or contribution-based. As a result, Boräng (2015) shows that in countries with a
lower generosity level, forced migrants face more regulatory restrictions than they
do in more generous states. Therefore, welfare chauvinism hypothesis predicts that
the more limited the welfare state, the more restrictive its policy-making towards
refugees.
What might counter the welfare chauvinism explanation, and deter liberal, lim-
ited welfare countries from closing their labour markets to refugees, is the structural
demand for immigrant workers omnipresent in Western economies. According to
migration theorists (Piore, 1979; Massey et al., 1993), the existence of a dual labour
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market with `immigrant jobs7' should mitigate the sense of labour market compe-
tition that natives might feel. Furthermore, the fact that refugees experience a
complicated human capital transfer irrespective of their skill level, makes them pose
a limited threat to job availability for native workers as they end up instead as con-
tenders for the immigrant jobs at the low-skill end of the labour market (Ruiz and
Vargas-Silva, 2016; Ceritoglu et al., 2015). This might actually in some cases proﬁt
the native workers who have gone through `occupational upgrading,' and specialized
in something less labour intensive, thus becoming complementary to refugees, and
experiencing a potential wage growth.8 Therefore, this explanation challenges the
welfare chauvinism literature hypothesis about limited welfare states by predicting
that with regard to refugees' labour market integration, the policy-making will opt
for less restrictions.
4.2.2.3 Welfare universalism
Lastly, research shows that the basic features of comprehensive welfare states 
higher degree of social solidarity and decommodiﬁcation (Esping-Andersen, 1990;
Scruggs, 2014)  steer refugee policies towards more openness (Boräng, 2015). High
level of inclusivity of the welfare system builds a more egalitarian state, which is
more likely to welcome outsiders into the society, and onto the labour market (equal-
ity of opportunity) (Sainsbury, 1999, 2006). For example, an overall high generosity
lessens economic competition between natives and immigrants, because the state
administers generous universal beneﬁts independent from any individual contribu-
tion (Römer, 2017; Angrist and Kugler, 2003). This mitigates the perceived threat
arising from immigration, and eliminates the need to protect the native workforce,
thus allowing for less restrictions to refugee labour market integration, and instead
introducing measures to encourage such participation. By itself, this explanation
thereby opposes the protection argument, and predicts that more generous welfare
regimes are characterised by lower labour market restrictions for refugees.
7The so called `immigrant jobs' are usually executed under unpleasant conditions, at low wages,
with great instability and facing little chance for advancement (sometimes also referred to as
DDD-jobs, dirty, dangerous, and demeaning jobs) (Massey et al., 1993).
8`Immigrant jobs' are often labour intensive, so in contrast natives move to ﬁelds in which com-
munication and language skills, as well as culture-speciﬁc knowledge, play a bigger role and give
them a comparative advantage i.e. occupational upgrading (Peri and Sparber, 2009).
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Another feature common to more generous welfare states mentioned by Boräng
(2015) is the high levels of generalised trust in the society, and an expectation
arising from it that the state can and should `administer solidarity.' In this way, the
main aim of the state is to secure the well-being of all its constituents. Oppositely,
it is assumed that the `exclusive' nature of the more limited welfare systems will
generally restrict rights of foreigners (Crepaz and Damron, 2009). Similarly to the
welfare chauvinism hypothesis, this explanation thereby also predicts that more
generous welfare states are characterized by less restrictive labour market policies
directed at refugees.
These three explanations are tested in a 28-country sample to provide answers to
the main research questions, (1) whether generous welfare states are more or less
restrictive towards refugees, and (2) how countries shape their refugee-speciﬁc labour
policy when faced with refugee inﬂows. The inclusion of `being faced with refugee
inﬂows' in the research question gives the matter some urgency, because often only
when more forced migrants enter a country, the matter becomes newsworthy, and
warrants a policy response. Thus, it is also those episodes in particular that allow
for a more causal interpretation of the associated link, because at times of high
refugee-inﬂows, the observed policy response is less likely driven by other socio-
demographic factors (Ruiz and Vargas-Silva, 2016; Peri and Yasenov, 2017). The
following chapter will describe in more detail how the variables are operationalised,
and tested.
4.3 Data and research method
Countries included in this comparative study were chosen for both theoretical and
practical reasons. From the theoretical side, the sample covers the most important
welfare state types, as well as countries with varying experiences with refugees. This
aids in identifying diﬀerent behaviours, and generalizing the results later on. Fur-
thermore, by concentrating on established democracies, a functioning immigration
regulation that can be compared across countries is presupposed (Helbling et al.,
2017). From the practical side, reliable comparative data on welfare generosity,
and immigration policy are still rather limited, therefore similarly to other studies,
this study can mostly make conclusions about OECD countries for which the data
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is most complete.9 Thus, this unbalanced panel10 ranges from 1980 to 2014, and
across 28 countries (including countries often discussed in refugee studies such as
Sweden and Canada, but in addition those, which have been given little attention,
like Finland and Japan).11
4.3.1 Estimation strategy
Following similar analyses (Römer, 2017; Boräng, 2015), the ﬁrst research ques-
tion whether generous welfare states are more or less restrictive towards refugees is
addressed using a panel ordinary least squares regression
polresi,t = αi + φt + β1generosi,t−1 + γXi,t + ui,t (4.1)
where polresi,t is the dependent policy restrictiveness score for country i in year t
and generosi,t−1 is the level of welfare generosity (or welfare regime) of country i in
the previous year as shown in Tables 4.1 and 4.2. The model also includes country-
and year-ﬁxed eﬀects (alphai and φt respectively), and further socio-economic and
policy variables12, as well as refugee inﬂows were included as control captured by
Xi,t. Furthermore Xi,t includes a squared generosity term to allow for possible non-
linearities in the relationship between generosity and policy restrictiveness.
The key parameter of interest is β1 with welfare chauvinism and welfare universal-
ism predicting β1 < 0, and protective welfare predicting β1 > 0 when estimating the
eﬀect on refugee-speciﬁc labour market policies. In order to answer this question,
the primary sample was reduced to 21 countries for which complete data was avail-
able (speciﬁcally the original Scruggs et al. (2017) generosity score). Nevertheless,
9OECD countries also have comparable data available on many other indicators that can be used
as controls, thus facilitating a large scale comparative analysis (Helbling et al., 2017).
10Some missing values occur due to the chosen data sources. Years 2010-2014 are missing in
IMPIC dataset on absolute levels of restrictiveness, and in Scruggs' generosity index. Also,
the non-OECD countries included in the DEMIG POLICY dataset were not included in any
of the other datasets used, hence the sample available has come down from 45 to 28 countries.
When data could be extrapolated on the basis of existing data, it was done to allow for more
observations.
11The full list of countries included in the study: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Czech
Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan,
Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain,
Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom, United States.
12A discussion of all included control variables is provided further along this section.
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the results are robust to estimating the model on an extended set of 28 countries
where an extrapolated generosity score was used for all 28 countries.13 Additionally,
a third speciﬁcation was checked in which Esping-Andersen's static ideal types were
used as the measure for welfare generosity.
To answer the second research question addressing how countries change their
refugee-speciﬁc labour policies when faced with an increase in refugee inﬂows, an
ordered logit model was employed. Here the change in policy restrictiveness variable
∆polresi,t takes the value ∆polresi,t = −1 if country i lowers restrictiveness in year
t, or ∆polresi,t = 1 if restrictiveness is increased. When no change is recorded,
∆polresi,t = 0. The probability of ∆polresi,t taking the value j ∈ {−1, 0, 1} cor-
responds to the probability that the estimated underlying linear function is within
the range of two estimated cut points µj−1 and µj:
Pr(∆polresi,t = j) = Pr(µj−1 < β1generosi,t−1 + β2refinfli,t−1
+ β3generosi,t−1 × refinfli,t−1 + γXi,t + ui,t < µj) (4.2)
where the minimum and maximum cut points are −∞ and∞ respectively. The key
variable of interest is here the interaction between generosity, and refugee inﬂows
country i experiences (generosi,t−1× refinfli,t−1). This interaction allows countries
to respond diﬀerently to refugee inﬂows depending on their predetermined generosity
level. Similarly to the predictions for β1 in the level regression, β3 is predicted to be
negative when welfare chauvinism or universalism dominate, whereas β is predicted
to be positive when protective welfare dominates.
4.3.2 Dependent variable
The centre of the analysis is policy that restricts or facilitates refugees' labour market
integration14. As outlined above, I use two measures to capture policy15 restrictive-
ness: the absolute level and the change. To assess the ﬁrst question asking whether
13As described below in subsection Independent Variables.
14Policies regulating refugees' labour market integration are the rules governing access and partic-
ipation of refugees on the host's labour market (such as the general right to take up employment
or become self-employed, rules concerning the recognition and transfer of foreign qualiﬁcations,
and sanctions on employers for hiring refugees).
15DEMIG POLICY authors de Haas et al. (2016) and IMPIC authors Helbling et al. (2017) both
deﬁne policy as the written laws, regulations, and measures.
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generous welfare states are more/less restrictive towards refugees, I use the absolute
level of policy restrictiveness as the dependent variable. To answer the second ques-
tion on how countries respond to refugee inﬂows depending on their welfare regime,
I employ the change in the restrictiveness.
The data for the absolute levels of policy restrictiveness come from the Immigra-
tion Policies in Comparison (IMPIC) dataset compiled by Helbling et al. (2017).
It includes comparative data on 33 OECD countries over the period of 1980-2010,
and diﬀerentiates between targeted immigrant groups, allowing to describe policy
variation across time and space, and to bring out speciﬁcs about policies aimed
at forced migrants (Figure 4.4). The DEMIG POLICY (Determinants of Inter-
national Migration) dataset constructed by de Haas et al. (2016), also allows for
cross-sectional (45 countries) and longitudinal (1945-2014) comparisons, and iden-
tiﬁes forced migrants as a categorical target group of policy change, but in contrast
to IMPIC, it only permits following the evolution of immigration policies (DEMIG,
2015). On average, 130 migration policy changes were recorded per country16 most
of which showed an `accelerated liberalization' trend in migration policy from 1945
up until the 1990s followed by a `decelerated liberalization' turn (Figure 4.2). The
picture for refugee policies (Figure 4.3) shows a slight larger tendency to become
more restrictive suggesting the prevailing humanitarian approach towards refugees
described beforehand.
The DEMIG POLICY dataset does not distinguish refugee-speciﬁc labour poli-
cies, therefore I identiﬁed the policy changes manually for the 1980-2014 period (123
observations)17. Based on this identiﬁcation, I use a weighted annual restrictiveness
change as my variable similarly to the authors of the DEMIG POLICY dataset
(de Haas et al., 2016). This means that for each country-year observation the mag-
nitude (coverage and degree of departure from previous policy) and the direction
(less or more restrictive) of all changes that occurred during that year are combined
to evaluate the relative change in restrictiveness to the previously existing regulatory
16The largest number of policy changes were recorded for Canada and France, as well as other
countries with long immigration histories such as the U.S. and Australia or that play a crucial
role as regional migration hub, such as Germany and Spain.
17To capture policy changes in labour policy towards immigrants, I also manually identiﬁed the
instances in the DEMIG POLICY dataset. 838 observations were coded as such.
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Figure 4.2: Yearly Average of
Weighted Changes in Migration Pol-
icy Restrictiveness, 45 Countries,
19002014 (de Haas et al., 2016)
Figure 4.3: Average of Weighted
Changes in Migration Policy Restric-
tiveness by Migrant Group for the 22
Liberal Democracies of Western Eu-
rope, North America, Australia, and
New Zealand, 19402014 (de Haas
et al., 2016)
framework.18 Due to the small number of refugee-speciﬁc labour policy changes that
could be located in the DEMIG POLICY dataset, I then used identiﬁed changes in
the IMPIC absolute levels of restrictiveness to build a more complete dependent
variable presented on Figure 4.5. This variable takes on the values of (-1) for less
restrictive change and (+1) for more restrictive change, and (0) for no change in
restrictiveness or no policy change. Speciﬁcally, the variable takes the value (-1) if
either the DEMIG POLICY dataset or the change in the IMPIC dataset indicates
a decrease in restrictiveness, and likewise for an increase in restrictiveness (+1).
By evaluating the relative (Figure 4.5) and the absolute (Figure 4.4) levels of re-
strictiveness from the two datasets, this paper describes both the general approach,
as well as the reactions (especially in response to refugee inﬂows) of policy-makers
towards forced migrants, and their labour market integration. Additionally, the
18As an example: In 1992 Canada introduced a policy that prohibited working until ﬁnal decision
on asylum claim had come. This is coded as a policy change towards more restrictiveness (1)
of high magnitude (4), giving a total score for this policy of 1x4=4. I then sum all policies
weighted by their magnitude that a country implemented in a given year to measure the overall
change in restrictiveness for the country-year pair. A negative score indicates a move towards
less restrictiveness, while a positive score indicates higher restrictiveness.
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overall refugee policy, general immigration policy, and labour policy towards immi-
grants are used as dependent variables to give a complete picture19.
Figure 4.4: Absolute levels of refugee-speciﬁc labour policy restrictiveness be-
tween 1980-2010, scale from [0] least restrictive to [1] most restrictive and/or no
refugee/asylum policy (Helbling et al., 2017)
4.3.3 Independent variables
The main measure of welfare state generosity is the total generosity index devel-
oped by Scruggs et al. (2017) that captures both the scope (who receives) and level
(how much he/she receives) of welfare entitlements. The CWED dataset (Compar-
ative Welfare Entitlements Dataset) provides a score for total generosity based on
each major social insurance program (unemployment, sickness, and pensions) for 30
countries between 1980-2010. For calculating the score, replacement rates [the ratio
between income out of work i.e. from welfare beneﬁts, and some measure of the
19Absolute levels of restrictiveness for these variables originated from IMPIC data (own calculations
on the basis of items pertaining to refugee policies and labour policies, and IMPIC authors general
score). Change in restrictiveness originate from DEMIG POLICY data (all own calculations).
The results of those regressions are not explicitly presented in this paper, but are available upon
request.
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Figure 4.5: Change in refugee-speciﬁc labour policies between 1980-2014, [-1] as less
restrictive, [0] as no change due to policy or no policy, and [+1] as more restrictive
(own calculations)
average wage (De Giorgi and Pellizzari, 2009)], qualifying conditions, and coverage
of the individual items are computed to produce a comparable annual cross-sectional
score, which captures variance in generosity over time and space.
Due to the generosity score not being available for some of the countries for the
entire time frame, a second measure, `Social expenditure as a percentage of the
GDP' (OECD, 2017 cited in Armingeon et al., 2017) is included. This is then used
to extrapolate the total generosity score as per the values of the Scruggs et al. (2017)
index to extend observations. Both of these variables are included in the regression
with a lag of one year to assure that only refugee policies, and not welfare policies,
respond to refugee inﬂows.
Furthermore, Esping-Andersen (1990) static measure of welfare regime was incor-
porated in separate regression instead of the generosity score to connect with the his-
tory of welfare state research discussed in the previous sections. Esping-Andersen's
three welfare regime types (liberal, conservative/corporatist, and social-democratic)
acted as a base for Scruggs' work, therefore it is interesting to assess the `new and
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improved' relative to the `old classic'. The relation between the three generosity and
welfare regime indicators is shown on Figure 4.8.
4.3.4 Control variables
First and foremost, the research question dictates the inclusion of the magnitude of
refugee inﬂows as both a control, and an independent variable in this study. The
measurement of Inﬂow of forced migration is per deﬁnition of the OECD, which is
the source of the data20, `the yearly number of people who obtained protection in
the receiving country'. This includes both asylum seekers whose claims have been
accepted, and refugees who have been resettled. To better gauge the magnitude of
the inﬂows relative to the local populations, the variable is measured as per capita
(of the previous year)(Figure 4.6 and Figure 4.7).
20For missing years in the OECD for Ireland, Greece, Iceland, Slovenia, and Luxembourg data from
Eurostat (2017) was additionally used. Data for New Zealand originates from their statistics oﬃce
(Stats NZ Tatauranga Aotearoa, 2017).
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Figure 4.6: Forced migration admissions (1) (OECD, 2017; Eurostat, 2017)
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Figure 4.7: Forced migration admissions
(2) (OECD, 2017; Eurostat, 2017; Stats
NZ Tatauranga Aotearoa, 2017)
Country Average
score of total
generosity
Average level
of social ex-
penditure
Esping-Andersen's
welfare regimes
Australia 21.5 7.6 liberal
Canada 26.0 9.3 liberal
Ireland 29.6 12.3 liberal
New Zealand 21.7 11.8 liberal
United Kingdom 27.7 13.0 liberal
United States 21.2 11.3 liberal
Finland 34.2 16.3 conservative
France 37.5 17.4 conservative
Germany 34.9 16.8 conservative
Italy 27.4 16.1 conservative
Japan 24.9 9.9 conservative
Switzerland 36.3 10.8 conservative
Austria 32.5 18.4 social-democratic
Belgium 40.1 16.3 social-democratic
Denmark 36.8 17.0 social-democratic
Netherlands 37.3 14.2 social-democratic
Norway 42.0 13.7 social-democratic
Sweden 42.6 16.8 social-democratic
Greece 27.3 14.3
Portugal 31.4 12.8
Spain 32.6 14.4
Figure 4.8: Generosity variables (Scruggs et al., 2017; Armingeon
et al., 2017; Esping-Andersen, 1990)
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Additionally, a number of factors that have been highlighted in the migration
literature as impacting overall refugee, and refugee-speciﬁc labour policy have been
included as control variables. Political aspects, such as Cabinet composition and
Prevalence of radical right parties show the ideological direction of policy-making.
It is understood that left-wing parties have been more pro-immigrant, supporting
the extension of all immigrant rights (Koopmans et al., 2012; Lahav, 1997 cited in
Römer, 2017, Breunig and Luedtke, 2008 cited in Boräng, 2015), whilst conservative
right-wing politicians might be seen as naturally inclined to impose restrictions on
(forced) migrants. Freeman and Kessler (2008) bring out an interesting reversal
of this assumption in regard to labour policy towards immigrants. Namely, left-
wing parties have been historically more tied to organised labour which most likely
wants to protect the native workers by limiting rights to employment for any type
of immigrant. At the same time, right-wing parties with their pro-business and
free market attitudes are inclined to push for more openness. However, Freeman
and Kessler (2008) also point out that in case of tension (such as increased levels
of incoming refugees) left-wing policy-making tends to favour more openness, and
right-wing more restrictions. In any case, success of radical right parties, who com-
pletely oppose giving any rights to immigrants, greatly limits the options available
for mainstream left-right parties, and pushes them towards the right on immigration
issues (Freeman and Kessler, 2008). Both of these variables are operationalised in the
Comparative Political Dataset (CPDS) compiled by Armingeon et al. (2017).21 As
policy-making is often cyclical in its nature (following the election cycles), Election
year as a binary variable is marked and included with a lag, a lead, and contem-
poraneously in the regressions. Additionally, general characteristics of the country,
such as Membership in the EU and Level of democracy22 have been added.
Beyond politics, economic factors23 might impact policy-making in this ﬁeld. Gen-
eral indicators of how well the economy is doing, such as GDP per capita and GDP
growth are included to control for the assumption that richer countries can aﬀord to
21Cabinet composition is described as a scale from 1 (hegemony of right-wing and centre parties)
to 5 (hegemony of social-democratic and other left-wing parties). Prevalence of radical right is
expressed as the share of votes in election for radical right parties.
22From the Polity IV Project (Marshall et al., 2017) that classiﬁes countries' political systems on
a scale from -10 (fully autocratic) to +10 (fully democratic). In my sample, there is not much
variance in this variable as all countries are fully (or close to fully) democratic.
23Data sources are Armingeon et al. (2017); OECD (2017); International Monetary Fund (2017).
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give more rights to immigrants (Koopmans and Michalowski, 2017). Furthermore,
the dual labour market theory suggests that richer Western countries are dependent
on low-skilled immigrant workforce, thus more lenient policies towards everyone
working might be supported especially. The same applies to economies more inte-
grated into the world economy (Koopmans and Michalowski, 2017) operationalised
here through the percentage of trade of the GDP (Openness of economy).
Having already moved towards factors speciﬁc to labour policy-making, ﬁrst Un-
employment rate needs to be controlled for. Considering that one of the main
concerns that natives have in regard to incoming people, is that they might take
away their jobs, it is likely that a high unemployment rate in the country will lead
to restrictions towards the newcomers. Protecting the native workforce is also ex-
pected in coordinated market economies, where organised labour (Union coverage)
will push for restrictions on additional workforce (Freeman 2004). Nonetheless, the
policy-makers might overlook these factors if they believe that in order to combat
population ageing (Population over 64 years), and the pressure it places on the wel-
fare state resources, foreign workers on the labour market are required. Similarly, if
it is assumed that most immigrants (and especially refugees) will end up competing
for the low-skilled jobs, and providing relief for industries struggling to ﬁll those
positions (dual labour market theory), it is likely that countries with more highly
educated populations 24 are less-restrictive towards refugees working as they do not
directly compete with the natives. All control variables are lagged by one year with
the exception of election year dummies as described above.
4.4 Findings
Results from the regressions tell the story of welfare universalism in comprehensive,
market logic in limited, and protective approach in middle ground welfare states in
regard to refugee policy-making (Table 4.1 about refugee-speciﬁc labour policy, and
Table 4.2 about overall refugee policy). In general, higher generosity is associated
with less restrictive policies. Nevertheless, as the squared terms are signiﬁcant and
with an opposite sign for the coeﬃcients, it is likely that non-linearities are at work.
This can be seen from graphic presentation of the results from regressing policy
24Data on education from The World Bank (2017) (enrolment levels in tertiary education). For
Germany education data came from German Statistics oﬃce (Statista, 2017).
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restrictiveness on the Esping-Andersen measure, which shows that the relation is
actually more of a inverse U-shape (Figure 4.9 and Figure 4.10), predicting less
restrictive attitudes towards refugees at both ends of the generosity scale, whilst
the more restrictive attitudes appear in the middle ground. This corresponds to
what has been assumed in the literature, and found in case studies (Germany for
example in Harrell-Bond, 1995; Barslund et al., 2016)  conservative/corporatist
welfare regimes are not really invested in integrating the incoming refugees as their
preferred outcome following the traditional asylum system is repatriation. Thus, the
protective welfare explanation best expresses the relation between policy-making on
refugee aﬀairs and conservative (or middle ground) welfare states.
Figure 4.9: Level of restrictiveness
in refugee-speciﬁc labour policy in
Esping-Andersen's welfare regimes
Figure 4.10: Level of restrictiveness
in refugee policy in Esping-Andersen's
welfare regimes
The results also shed some light on the prevalence of humanitarian motives in
refugee-speciﬁc labour policies of comprehensive welfare states. The results suggest
that the general labour policy objective of full employment, and social policy goal of
universalism, dominates the potential overprotection of refugees on the labour mar-
ket. The coeﬃcient is negative, sizeable, and robust over all speciﬁcations (Models
1-5 in Table 4.2), except when unionisation variable is included (Model 6 in Ta-
ble 4.2). This is due to the high correlation between coordination on the labour
market, and comprehensive welfare systems. Therefore, the hypothesized connec-
tion between protective policy-making in refugees' labour market integration, and
comprehensive welfare system does not ﬁnd support, whilst the claim of welfare
universalism guiding the policies can be witnessed.
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Welfare chauvinism explanation presumes generally more restrictive policies to-
wards immigrants due to the sense of competition for scarce resources. The results
from the ordered logit regression show, however, surprisingly that limited welfare
states, assumed in the literature to exhibit higher levels of welfare chauvinism due
to perceived individual insecurity, ended up being less likely to turn towards restric-
tiveness on the labour market when faced with potential higher competition (from
increased refugee inﬂows). The ﬁgures show the marginal probability to increase
(Figure 4.11) or decrease (Figure 4.12) restrictiveness of labour market policies in
response to an increase in refugee inﬂows, depending on the welfare generosity (x-
axis). The results show that if any countries are to be expected to respond to refugee
inﬂows by changing the policies, it is the limited welfare states, and in the direction
of more openness of labour policy towards refugees. The least generous welfare states
(with a generosity score of around 20) were predicted to be 35 percentage points
less probable to increase restrictiveness. This ﬁnding seems to support the challenge
proposed to welfare chauvinism as an explanation by market logic. Decision-making
in the comprehensive welfare state seems to be less inﬂuenced by refugee inﬂows.
Figure 4.11: Probability to make
refugee-speciﬁc labour policies more
restrictive as response to refugee in-
ﬂows at diﬀerent levels of total gen-
erosity
Figure 4.12: Probability to make
refugee-speciﬁc labour policies less re-
strictive as response to refugee inﬂows
at diﬀerent levels of total generosity
Additional non-labour market control variables seemed to have less of explanatory
power, and are largely not statistically signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero. Nonethe-
less, two of the controls stand out in presenting somewhat controversial results.
Namely, membership in the European Union, and the interdependence of the na-
tional economy on world economy have been argued in the literature to cause much
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of liberalization of national policies. In these ﬁndings, however, both seem to pre-
dict more restrictions towards refugees. Following Guiraudon (2000) hypothesis that
national policy-makers in the ﬁeld of asylum and migration moved policy-making
on these matters often to the new EU `policy venue' in the hope to circumvent
liberal pressures and obstacles on the domestic level (so called `venue-shopping'),
one could argue that this result is consistent with such actions. When it comes to
understanding why more open economies would apply more restrictions on refugees,
I turn to the core of the above-mentioned traditional international asylum system 
protection. It can be argued that for countries that are so intertwined in the world
economy, higher standards in regard to universal human rights and international
labour rights apply (Christensen, 2017). In order to comply with the international
regulatory frameworks, they then might also turn towards more protective (and
therefore restrictive) policies.
The robustness of the ﬁndings were further investigated by using a 3-year and a 5-
year cumulative refugee inﬂow variable due to the assumption that policy might not
respond to a one year spike in inﬂows but most likely will for a sustained cumulative
inﬂow. In all these sensitivity analyses, the ordinary least squares regression results
remained robust, and statistically signiﬁcant. The results were less robust to the
speciﬁcations in the logit model. Although some statistically insigniﬁcant coeﬃcients
were witnessed, similar trends in the interaction between welfare generosity, policy-
making, and refugee inﬂows could be detected. The following section will discuss
the implications of the results further.
4.5 Discussion
The ﬁndings summarized in the previous section paint an interesting picture of the
potential underlying causes of decision-making in regard to refugee labour market
integration. First, the literature expects limited welfare states to be more restrictive
towards forced (and voluntary) immigrants due to perceived competition that the
newcomers pose. Welfare chauvinism has been found to be more present in countries
that do not extend generous welfare entitlements all around, therefore making every-
one's position dependent on their individual economic success. Within the sample
studied in this paper, on the contrary, it seems that market logic trumps welfare
chauvinism as an explanation in limited welfare states. Minimal state intervention
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Table 4.1: IMPIC refugee policy restrictiveness
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
L.Generosity -0.0630∗∗ -0.0651∗∗∗ -0.0569∗∗∗ -0.0797∗∗∗ -0.0501∗∗
(-3.31) (-5.90) (-4.45) (-5.13) (-3.07)
L.Generosity sqr. 0.000766∗∗ 0.000796∗∗∗ 0.000695∗∗∗ 0.00102∗∗∗ 0.000633∗∗
(2.90) (4.84) (3.75) (4.67) (2.75)
L.Soc. Expend. 0.00464 -0.0105 -0.0111 -0.0188 -0.0201∗
(0.53) (-1.30) (-1.27) (-1.84) (-2.00)
L.Soc. expend. sqr. -0.000283 0.000250 0.000232 0.000540 0.000672∗
(-0.99) (0.92) (0.82) (1.59) (2.00)
L.Refugee inﬂow -3.676 -3.229 -0.704
(-1.16) (-0.94) (-0.23)
L.Share tertiary 0.000488 0.000457
(1.27) (1.28)
L.Unemployment -0.00505∗ -0.00583∗∗
(-2.41) (-2.80)
L.Cabinet composition 0.00286 0.00261
(1.42) (1.42)
L.Right-wing vote 0.000585 0.000106
(0.78) (0.15)
EU member 0.0923∗∗∗ 0.0779∗∗∗
(5.42) (4.92)
L.Election year 0.00132 -0.00207
(0.18) (-0.29)
F.Election year -0.00472 -0.00699
(-0.62) (-0.94)
Election year -0.00333 -0.00690
(-0.41) (-0.89)
L.GDP per cap -0.0131 0.0840∗
(-0.34) (2.19)
L.Openness 0.000492 0.00269∗∗∗
(0.80) (3.93)
L.Unionisation -0.000997∗
(-2.13)
Observations 607 627 604 551 498 489
R2 0.714 0.591 0.717 0.676 0.681 0.677
Adjusted R2 0.688 0.555 0.690 0.641 0.635 0.629
t statistics in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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Table 4.2: IMPIC refugee labour policy restrictiveness
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
L.Generosity -0.0837∗∗∗ -0.0879∗∗∗ -0.0751∗∗∗ -0.0890∗∗∗ -0.0245
(-5.26) (-5.51) (-4.08) (-4.04) (-1.15)
L.Generosity sqr. 0.000996∗∗∗ 0.00107∗∗∗ 0.000907∗∗∗ 0.00113∗∗∗ 0.000313
(4.32) (4.59) (3.44) (3.72) (1.05)
L.Soc. Expend. 0.0181 -0.00259 0.00247 0.00516 0.0168
(1.70) (-0.26) (0.23) (0.40) (1.40)
L.Soc. expend. sqr. -0.000843∗ -0.000114 -0.000302 -0.000335 -0.000597
(-2.46) (-0.35) (-0.88) (-0.81) (-1.57)
L.Refugee inﬂow -2.862 0.218 5.751
(-0.69) (0.05) (1.49)
L.Share tertiary -0.000395 -0.000747
(-0.76) (-1.72)
L.Share elderly -0.00788 -0.0137∗∗∗
(-1.79) (-3.39)
L.Unemployment -0.00488 -0.00358
(-1.61) (-1.26)
L.Cabinet composition 0.00381 0.00210
(1.47) (0.94)
L.Right-wing vote 0.00115 0.00109
(1.18) (1.27)
EU member 0.0919∗∗∗ 0.0726∗∗∗
(4.44) (4.38)
L.Election year -0.00304 -0.00698
(-0.31) (-0.79)
F.Election year -0.00851 -0.0113
(-0.87) (-1.26)
Election year -0.00809 -0.0118
(-0.80) (-1.32)
L.GDP per cap -0.0192 0.148∗
(-0.33) (2.55)
L.Openness -0.0000623 0.00362∗∗∗
(-0.07) (3.92)
L.Unionisation -0.00385∗∗∗
(-6.60)
Observations 607 627 604 551 498 489
R2 0.783 0.702 0.788 0.762 0.758 0.780
Adjusted R2 0.763 0.675 0.767 0.736 0.722 0.746
t statistics in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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in the workings of free market, equality of opportunity with the expectation of indi-
vidual eﬀort to assure well-being, and the actual (or perceived) lack of competition
from refugees all guide policy-makers to less restrictions on refugee-speciﬁc labour
policies. Higher levels of generosity also lessen competition on the labour market as
the state guarantees well-being for all. Similarly to prior research (Boräng, 2015),
this study ﬁnds that the basic features of comprehensive welfare states  higher
degree of social solidarity and decommodiﬁcation  shape refugee policies towards
more openness.
Thus, both ends of the generosity scale seem to welcome refugee labour market
integration. The middle ground, however, does so to a lesser extent. Welfare chau-
vinism, as well as protective welfare might explain this pattern. In most of the
countries falling into the middle, welfare entitlements are based on actual contri-
bution, meaning the opinion of refugees `freeloading' due to aid provided within
the system, might build additional pressure on policy-makers to show that they
are controlling the situation by imposing more restrictions. Furthermore, for many
host countries belonging to this middle ground, refugees are still ﬁrst and foremost
temporary, vulnerable, non-economic migrants, who should be oﬀered protection,
but not integration. In summary, protective welfare seems to best explain the be-
haviour of middle ground conservative welfare states, welfare universalism predicts
the approach of comprehensive welfare states, and market logic counters the assumed
welfare chauvinism in limited welfare states pushing them towards more openness.
This study followed policy evolutions over three decades identifying certain move-
ments described by the above-mentioned explanations, but that could also be at-
tributed to path-dependency and policy diﬀusion. On the one hand, institutional
inertia and history matter to choices in policies (Arts and Gelissen, 2002). In migra-
tion policy, it is likely that country's own history with immigration plays a large role
in setting the overall trend of policy processes (Koopmans and Michalowski, 2017).
On the other hand, it might be possible that due to the increased transfer of ideas,
knowledge and other resources, policy-makers end up developing in the direction
of one of the well-known policy regimes (Fenger, 2007), and away from their own
historical path. These two explanations were not tested in this study due to data
limitations, but could be further investigated in a qualitative case study setting.
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A further limitation arising from the data pertains to the nature of refugee-speciﬁc
labour policy, and how it is recorded and measured in the datasets. First of all, poli-
cies in general, and in this ﬁeld in particular, do not change too frequently (de Haas
et al., 2016). When they do, then the change is usually minor, and poses a challenge
for the data collectors to locate, and analysts thereafter to adequately measure.
Quite often, the basic `right to work' policy (changing of which would signify some-
thing close to an overhaul of the entire system) is given much more weight than the
many smaller policies that could have a profound impact on refugee labour market
integration (e.g. foreign qualiﬁcations recognition, special job trainings, and sup-
port for refugees, and language teaching). It would be interesting to investigate how
much eﬀort diﬀerent welfare regimes put into dealing with these matters.
Despite the limitations, some implications for the welfare state and for refugee
labour market integration from the results of this study can be discussed. In regard
to the welfare state, the question has often times been that of whether generous wel-
fare states will survive immigration, or whether they will diminish as a consequence
of lost support from the public (Boräng, 2015). First, Crepaz and Damron (2009)
argue in reference to Richard Titmuss (1968) work that `extensive welfare states can
absorb immigrants with less groaning and moaning than residual welfare states.' In
addition, demands of the market (e.g. industries interested in immigrant labour)
mean that all in all refugees' impact on the welfare state should be rather limited,
and extra government interventions unnecessary.
Moreover, in many of the societies in the sample, the population is ageing rapidly,
thus, in order to sustain the welfare state, immigrants could be welcomed, and
speedily integrated into the labour market (Sciortino and Finotelli, 2017). This
would help in (1) mitigating the fear in the society from refugees' undermining,
and abusing the system, and (2) provide a more long-term solution to displacement
than the current repatriation plan. Equal access to the labour market would help
reduce the gap on entry between refugees and other immigrants/natives, and provide
them with the `equality of opportunity,' which is in the core of labour policy in both,
limited and comprehensive welfare states. All in all, to increase the returns and limit
the costs from forced migration, more ﬂexibility in regulations is required (Angrist
and Kugler, 2003).
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4.6 Conclusion
Many scholars have found that market mechanisms manage to adequately absorb
immigrants, thus there does not seem to be much basis for government restrictions.
Nevertheless, variation can be witnessed amongst countries in their policy-making
approaches towards immigrants, and refugees in particular. As refugee groups tend
to exhibit much higher rates of welfare systems' participation than non-refugee
groups, it can be expected that decision-making on refugee policy, and the pre-
vailing welfare regime are thoroughly intertwined.
The ﬁndings of this study show that the relationship between welfare generosity
and refugee policy restrictiveness is not clear-cut. Generosity brings with it tolerance
and openness, and an all-round logic of inclusion, but it does not mean that the least
generous countries are restrictive towards forced migrants. On the contrary, due to
their free market reasoning, they might be as open towards refugees (especially
refugees working) as the most generous welfare states. Also when faced with an
increased refugee inﬂow, the least generous countries were found to exhibit the most
welcoming attitudes by being less likely to restrict their policies. Most restrictive
behaviour, on the other hand, can be encountered in the conservative countries
in the middle-ground that uphold the humanitarian policy agenda inherent to the
traditional asylum system. In such systems, repatriation is the preferred outcome,
and policies aiming to limit refugees' settlement (such as encouraging labour market
integration) are more common.
Considering previous research on poor refugee labour market outcomes due to
de facto barriers erected by policy-makers, the higher likelihood of refugees being
dependent on welfare, and the often minimal direct competition that refugees pose
for the natives on the labour market, there should not be much ground for policy
restrictiveness. Therefore, irrespective of the type of the welfare state, more rights,
and facilitated inclusion of refugees in the workforce should be the chosen course of
action.
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